UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
AT   LOS  ANGELES 


GIFT  OF 

CARNEGIE  INSTITUTION 
OF  WASHINGTON 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  GRENVILLE 


ON 


1787-1798 


8  T  4  8 


THE 


INFLUENCE  OF  GRENVILLE 


ON 


PITT'S    FOREIGN    POLICY 


1787-1798 


BY 


EPHRAIM  DOUGLASS  ADAMS 

OF    I.ELAND    STANFORD    JUNIOR    UNIVERSITY 


PUBLISHED  BY  THE  CARNEGIE  INSTITUTION  OF  WASHINGTON 

1904 


CARNEGIE  INSTITUTION  OF  WASHINGTON 


PUBLICATION  No.  is 


PAPERS  OF  THE  BUREAU  OF  HISTORICAL  RESEARCH 

ANDREW  c.  MCLAUGHLIN,  EDITOR 


JUDD  ft.  DBTWBILER,   PRINTERS 
WASHINGTON,   D.   C. 


THE    INFLUENCE    OF    GRENVILLE    ON    PITT'S 
FOREIGN    POLICY,    1787-1798. 


INTRODUCTION. 

In  discussing  the  course  of  the  English  government  during  the  wars 
of  the  French  Revolution  it  has  been  the  custom  of  historians  to  credit 
Pitt  with  responsibility  for  the  initiation  and  adoption  of  each  specific 
point  of  English  policy.  Pitt,  it  is  said,  was  the  head  of  the  English 
government  and  the  English  government  was  Pitt.  In  minor  matters 
he  might  defer  to  his  colleagues,  but  in  greater  questions  of  policy  his 
will  was  supreme  and  his  decision  final.  In  short  histories  of  the 
period  such  extreme  statements  may  be  excused  by  the  necessity  for 
concise  writing,  but  the  tendency  to  overestimate  the  importance  of 
Pitt  is  found  also  in  more  extended  accounts.  It  amounts  very  nearly 
to  an  assertion  of  despotic  control  by  the  chief  minister  and  of  an 
entire  subordination  of  the  other  members  of  the  Cabinet. 

In  fact,  however,  Pitt's  Cabinet  was  so  organized  as  to  preclude  the 
absolutism  of  one  man.  It  consisted  not  of  the  chief  supporters  of 
one  fixed  line  of  policy,  as  is  the  case  today,  but  of  a  variety  of  ele- 
ments, all  of  which  it  was  necessary  to  harmonize  by  concession  and 
compromise.  At  least  two  of  the  members  of  the  Cabinet,  Dundas  and 
Grenville,  asserted  their  authority  in  their  own  departments,  and  were 
in  consequence  rather  the  fellow-ministers  of  Pitt  than  his  executive 
agents.  Contemporary  opinion,  indeed,  credited  Grenville  with  a 
greater  influence  upon  the  general  policy  of  government  and  a  more 
complete  control  of  his  own  department  than  were  exercised  by  any 
other  of  Pitt's  colleagues.  Lord  Muncaster*  is  authority  for  Gren- 
ville's  independence  in  outlining  foreign  policy  ;  I,ord  Sheffield  con- 
sidered Grenville's  "  head  as  a  statesman  *  '  '  '  to  be  at  least  as 
good  as  that  of  any  of  His  Majesty's  ministers,"  f  and  Count  Woron- 
zow,  the  Russian  ambassador,  told  Gouverneur  Morris  that  Grenville 

*  Stanhope,  III,  4.        t  Auckland,  III,  371. 

(3) 


209095 


4        THE   INFLUENCE   OF   GRENVILLE   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

was  the  strongest  man  in  the  English  Cabinet.*  As  less  direct  evidence 
may  be  cited  Malniesbury's  resume  of  the  difficulties  of  temper  experi- 
enced by  Pitt  and  Grenville  in  their  relations, f  and  Rose's  testimony 
to  the  same  effect.  J  Of  a  directly  opposite  character,  but  equally  to 
the  point,  is  the  picture  presented  by  Stanhope  §  of  the  friendship  and 
intimacy  existing  between  these  ' '  two  proud  and  sensitive  natures 
when  personal  affection  was  not  clouded  by  differences  of  political 
opinion. ' ' 

In  themselves,  these  and  similar  isolated  assertions  of  Grenville's 
influence  and  of  his  intimacy  with  Pitt  furnish  insufficient  proof  of  the 
important  r61e  sustained  by  Grenville  in  formulating  English  foreign 
policy  during  the  French  Revolution.  That  proof  has  been  unex- 
pectedly supplied  by  the  recent  publication  in  England  of  the  Dropmore 
manuscripts,  embodying  a  very  complete  series  of  ' '  most  private ' '  and 
' '  most  secret ' '  letters  between  Grenville  and  English  diplomats  at 
foreign  posts.  It  is  the  purpose  of  this  article,  by  means  of  these  manu- 
scripts, in  connection  with  the  principal  memoirs  of  the  time,  and  with 
the  aid  of  some  few  primary  authorities,  to  trace  the  development  and 
extent  of  Grenville's  influence  in  foreign  policy  up  to  the  Napoleonic 
period.  No  attempt  is  here  made  to  outline  all  of  the  important  events 
of  English  diplomacy  of  the  period.  Only  those  episodes  are  described 
in  which  Grenville  was  an  important  factor,  and  these  are  treated  in 
their  chronological  order. 


OCCASIONAL  INFLUENCE  OF  GRENVILLE  ON  FOREIGN  POLICY. 
1787  TO  APRII,,  1791. 

William  Wyndham  Grenville  entered  upon  his  Parliamentary  career 
in  1782,  when  but  twenty-two  years  of  age.  His  first  official  position 
was  that  of  chief  secretary  to  his  elder  brother,  Earl  Temple,  then  Lord 
Lieutenant  of  Ireland,  and  with  Temple  he  resigned  office  in  June,  1783, 
on  the  accession  to  power  of  the  short-lived  Coalition  Ministry.  In  the 
July  following,  George  III  began  those  negotiations  which  in  December 
resulted  in  Pitt's  acceptance  of  the  difficult  task  of  forming  a  ministry 
against  the  will  of  the  majority  of  the  House  of  Commons.  In  these 
negotiations  Grenville  had  an  intimate  share,  though  less  as  an  active 

*  Morris,  II,  95. 
t  Malmesbury,  III,  291^". 

j  Rose,  I,  4.     Pitt  is  stated  to  have  said,  "  I  will  teach  that  proud  man  [Gren- 
ville]  that  I  can  do  without  him." 
|  Stanhope,  II,  122. 


OCCASIONAL   INFLUENCE.  5 

agent  than  as  an  intermediary  in  the  discussions  between  Pitt  and 
Temple  upon  the  policy  of  the  prospective  government  and  the  make-up 
of  the  Cabinet.*  Under  Pitt's  government  as  organized  in  December, 
1783,  Grenville  filled  the  position  of  Paymaster  General,  while  other 
minor  offices  were  held  in  succeeding  years.  The  correspondence  for 
this  period  as  given  in  the  Dropmore  manuscripts  shows  very  clearly 
that  while  Grenville  was  aiding  his  kinsman  Pitt  in  every  way,  he  was 
as  yet  essentially  a  subordinate. 

Grenville' s  first  service  seems  to  have  been  the  smoothing  of  diffi- 
culties between  Pitt  and  Temple,  who  had  now  become  Marquis  of 
Buckingham.  His  importance  was,  however,  rapidly  increasing,  for 
the  steadiness  and  caution  of  his  judgment,  the  coolness  of  temper  that 
marked  his  decisions,  combined  with  a  conciliatory  manner,  made  him 
a  valuable  ally  in  the  daily  Parliamentary  battle.  By  1786,  though  not 
a  member  of  the  Cabinet,  he  actually  wielded  an  influence  on  the  con- 
duct of  public  affairs  greater  than  that  of  ostensibly  more  important 
members  of  the  government,  f 

It  was  as  an  interlude  in  the  routine  of  customary  official  duties  that 
Grenville  first  undertook  a  diplomatic  mission.  In  the  spring  of  1787 
affairs  in  Holland  had  reached  a  stage  where  it  finally  became  necessary 
for  Pitt  to  determine  whether  or  not  England  should  unite  with  Prussia 
in  repelling  the  aggressive  interference  of  France.  Harris,  the  English 
diplomat  at  The  Hague,  had  been  insistent  upon  more  forcible  measures 
by  England  and  more  open  assistance  to  the  Stadtholder,  but  Pitt  was 
as  yet  undecided.  In  his  perplexity  he  determined  to  send  Grenville  as 
a  trusted  friend  and  adviser  to  report  upon  the  situation  in  Holland.  J 

That  Pitt  felt  the  utmost  confidence  in  Grenville' s  judgment  is  evinced 
by  the  letters  passing  between  them  at  this  juncture,§  while  the  recog- 
nition in  other  quarters  of  the  extent  of  Grenville' s  influence  is  shown 
by  the  correspondence  of  Harris  and  others  interested  in  upholding  the 
Stadtholder.il 

Pitt  gave  Grenville  a  free  hand  in  managing  the  details  of  the  enter- 
prise. "If,"  he  wrote  in  forwarding  the  draft  of  a  memorial  to  Hol- 
land, "you  find  anything  objectionable  as  it  now  stands,  have  no 

*  A  series  of  letters  between  Pitt,  Grenville,  and  Temple.    Dropmore,  I,  214-220. 

t  Surges,  68. 

JMalmesbury,  II,  302-307,  and  Keith,  II,  208-218.  Grenville's  mission  was  also 
undertaken  for  the  effect  it  was  likely  to  have  in  consolidating  the  party  of  the  Stadt- 
holder in  Holland.  At  the  time  it  was  considered  that  the  strongest  proof  of  the 
intention  of  the  British  government  to  act  with  vigor  was  "the  mission  of  Mr. 
Grenville,  who  was  supposed  to  possess,  and  was  known  to  deserve,  the  entire  con- 
fidence of  Mr.  Pitt."  History  of  the  Late  Revolution  in  the  Dutch  Republic,  193. 

§  Dropmore,  III,  408^ 

||  Letters  between  Grenville,  Harris,  and  Bentinck.     Ibid.,  415,  416,  417,  422, 423. 


6        THE   INFLUENCE   OP  GRENVILLB   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

scruple  to  get  Sir  James  Harris  to  change  it  in  any  manner  you  think 
safe,  preserving  the  two  general  ideas  I  have  just  mentioned."* 
Grenville  found  conditions  in  Holland  favorable  to  intervention  and 
supported  with  energy  the  efforts  of  Harris.  He  was  thus  an  active 
participant  and  agent  in  formulating  those  principles  that  resulted  in 
the  Triple  Alliance  of  1788,  and  heartily  approved  the  spirited  attitude 
assumed  by  the  English  government  in  its  relations  with  France,  f 
Grenville's  services  at  this  crisis  were  not,  however,  concluded  with 
the  completion  of  his  work  in  Holland.  He  returned  to  London  in 
the  middle  of  August,  and  the  scene  of  diplomatic  action  was  trans- 
ferred to  Paris,  where  Eden  and  Goltz  represented  England  and 
Prussia.  Goltz  reported  to  his  government  that  Eden  was  not  sup- 
porting him  with  energy  in  the  demand  made  for  a  cessation  of  French 
interference  in  Holland,  and  this  gave  rise  to  a  momentary  impression 
at  Berlin  that  England  was  not  acting  in  good  faith.  Though  Eden 
was  anti-Prussian  in  his  sympathies,  the  report  was  seemingly  unjust 
to  him,  but  it  determined  Pitt  to  send  him  a  letter  of  reproof  |  and  to 
hurry  Grenville  to  Paris  to  take  charge  of  the  negotiations.  Grenville 
went  to  Paris  ' '  to  speak  plain,  because  he  [Eden]  has  not ' '  §  spoken 
plainly,  and  wrote  to  Buckingham,  who  disapproved  of  his  acceptance 
of  the  undertaking,  that  "one  of  the  difficulties  on  this  subject  was 
Eden's  want  of  a  competent  knowledge  of  the  points  in  dispute.  •  •  •  • 
Another,  and  perhaps  not  the  least  of  the  two,  was  the  strong  bent  of 
his  mind  to  admit  the  assertions  of  the  French  government,  however 
unfounded,  and  to  soften  our  communications  in  order  to  keep  back  a 
rupture  •  *  *  •."  ||  Grenville  set  out  for  Paris  on  September  2 1 , 
but  before  he  arrived  the  rapid  march  of  Prussian  troops  under 
the  Duke  of  Brunswick  had  restored  the  Prince  of  Orange  to  his 
authority  and  nearly  all  of  Pitt's  demands  were  already  satisfied.  In 
these  circumstances  Pitt  thought  that  England  should  ask  a  guaranty 
of  non-interference  from  France,  rather  than  enter  upon  stipulations 

*  Pitt  to  Grenville,  August  7,  1787.     Dropmore,  III,  414-415. 

t  Court  and  Cabinets,  I,  319-339. 

j Smith  MSS.,  p.  357  [Papers  of  Joseph  Smith,  private  secretary  to  Pitt  after 
1787].  Eden  was  reported  at  Berlin  to  have  stated  in  Paris  that  England  was  not 
interested  in  supporting  Prussia's  claims  to  satisfaction  in  Holland,  but  merely 
desired  Prussian  mediation.  Pitt  wrote  to  Eden,  Sept.  8,  1787  :  "  The  report  of  it 
[this  speech]  may  have  produced  the  most  serious  and,  in  my  opinion,  irreparable 
consequences,  if  communications  since  made  from  hence  have  not  fortunately 
arrived  in  time  to  counteract  it."  It  is  noteworthy,  as  illustrating  the  caution 
with  which  memoirs  and  letters  compiled  by  interested  partisans  or  relatives  must 
be  taken,  that  theportion  of  this  letter  containing  Pitt's  reproof  is  wholly  omitted 
in  the  Auckland  Correspondence  without  any  indication  of  the  elision. 
f  Buckingham  to  Grenville,  Sept.  20,  1787.  Dropmore,  I,  283. 

||  Grenville  to  Buckingham,  Sept.  19,  1787.     Court  and  Cabinets,  I,  326-327. 


OCCASIONAL  INFLUENCE.  7 

for  a  settlement  in  Holland.*  Grenville  opposed  this,  and  wrote  at 
length  to  Pitt,  stating  his  reasons  for  preferring  to  any  guaranty  a 
silent  acquiescence  by  France  in  the  events  in  Holland,  f  Harris,  the 
foremost  manipulator  for  England  in  the  intrigues  at  The  Hague, 
strongly  urged  a  guaranty, £  while  Eden,  still  friendly  to  France, 
thought  the  time  was  ripe  for  establishing  an  alliance  between  England, 
France,  and  Spain. §  Before  Grenville's  letter  could  reach  England, 
Pitt  had  come  to  a  similar  opinion  in  favor  of  silent  acquiescence. || 

Grenville,  having  satisfied  himself  that  France  would  accept  such  a 
settlement,  asked  and  obtained  leave  to  return  to  L,ondon,  leaving  the 
formal  conclusion  in  the  hands  of  Eden.  Negotiations  were  closed 
October  27  by  the  signing  at  Paris  of  a  declaration  and  counter- 
declaration,  If  in  which  the  French  government  stated  that  it  had  not 
had  and  did  not  have  any  idea  of  interfering  in  Holland,  and  agreed 
with  England  to  a  disarmament.  It  was  the  exact  result  desired  by 
Grenville.  He  had  not  brought  Pitt  to  this  conclusion,  for  both  had 
separately  reached  the  same  opinion,  but  probably  the  incident  still 
further  increased  the  confidence  felt  by  Pitt  in  Grenville's  judgment. 
The  letters  between  the  two  at  this  period  are  remarkable  for  their  tone 
of  sincere  friendship  and  confidential  intimacy.  They  are  rather  familiar 
letters  of  conference  than  diplomatic  instructions,  and  are  in  marked 
contrast  to  the  letters  passing  between  Pitt  and  other  diplomatic  agents. 
Two  days  after  Grenville  left  London  on  his  journey  to  Paris,  Pitt  had 
written  in  regard  to  foreign  complications  :  ' '  Let  me  know  what  you 
think  of  all  this.  Even  in  these  two  days  I  feel  no  small  difference  in 
not  being  able  to  have  your  opinion  on  things  as  they  arise. ' '  **  Harris, 
Eden,  and  others  interested  in  these  negotiations  noted  Grenville's 
aptitude  for  diplomacy,  and  were  not  slow  to  express  their  appreciation 
of  his  influence  and  their  admiration  for  his  intelligence. 

As  yet,  however,  Grenville  was  not  a  member  of  the  Cabinet,  nor  is 
it  to  be  understood  that  he  was  always  consulted  on  questions  of  for- 
eign policy.  His  activities  were  principally  directed  toward  the  details 
of  Parliamentary  management,  and  in  January,  1789,  his  services  in  this 
field  were  rewarded  by  election  to  the  speakership  of  the  Commons. 
During  the  regency  crisis  of  1788-1789  Grenville  vigorously  supported 

*  Pitt  to  Grenville,  Sept.  23,  1787.     Dropmore,  III,  428. 
t  Grenville  to  Pitt,  Sept.  27,  1787.     Ibid,,  431. 
j  Harris  to  Grenville,  Oct.  5,  1787.     Ibid.,  437. 

§Eden  to  Grenville,  Oct.  10  and  Dec.  6,  1787.  Ibid.,  438,  440.  Also  Eden  to 
Pitt,  Oct.  10,  1787.  Auckland,  I,  219. 

|l  Pitt  to  Grenville,  Sept.  28,  1787.     Dropmore,  III,  434. 
|  For  text  see  Parliamentary  History,  XXVI,  1264. 
**Pitt  to  Grenville,  Sept.  23,  1787.     Dropmore,  III,  429. 


8        THE   INFLUENCE   OF  GRENVILLE   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

Pitt  in  the  determination  to  make  no  compromise  with  the  opposition 
and  was  particularly  efficient  in  influencing  his  brother,  Buckingham, 
the  Lord  Lieutenant  of  Ireland,  to  conduct  affairs  there  in  such  a  man- 
ner as  not  to  embarrass  the  English  ministry.*  The  occupancy  of  the 
speakership  was  brief,  for  on  June  5,  1789,  Addington  became  Speaker, 
while  Grenville  took  up  the  position  and  duties  of  Secretary  of  State 
for  the  Home  Department. f  He  was  now  a  full-fledged  member  of  the 
Cabinet,  with  an  important  department  of  public  business  within  his 
own  personal  control,  yet  Pitt  still  found  occasion  to  use  him  in  con- 
nection with  foreign  complications.  In  the  Nootka  Sound  controversy 
with  Spain  it  was  Grenville  who  corresponded  directly  with  Eden,  now 
become  Baron  Auckland,  who  was  the  English  minister  at  The  Hague, 
with  the  view  to  obtaining  information  from  the  Dutch  as  to  the  readi- 
ness of  Spain  and  France  for  war  and  to  securing  Dutch  assistance 
under  the  terms  of  the  Triple  Alliance  4 

Grenville's  intimate  knowledge  of  details  of  foreign  policy  and  the 
great  degree  of  confidence  reposed  in  him  are  brought  out  even  more 
clearly  in  connection  with  another  episode  relating  to  this  controversy 
with  Spain.  France  was  bound  by  the  Family  Compact  to  support 
Spain  if  war  took  place.  In  order  to  prevent  such  support  Pitt,  using 
Italian  diplomacy  not  customary  with  him,  sent  Hugh  Elliot  and  Miles 
to  propose  secretly  to  Mirabeau  an  alliance  with  England.  This  nego- 
tiation was  kept  entirely  out  of  the  Foreign  Office.  Miles's  share  in  it 
apparently  was  not  known  either  by  Lord  Gower,  the  English  ambas- 
sador at  Paris,  or  by  the  members  of  the  Cabinet  in  England.  All 
documents  relating  to  it,  whether  in  the  letters  of  Elliot,  Miles,  or  Pitt, 
were  suppressed,  and  the  sole  source  of  information  in  regard  to  it  is  in 
the  later  statements  of  the  persons  interested.  It  is  certain  that  Pitt 
merely  used  Elliot  and  Miles  to  avert  French  interference,  and  that 
Miles  at  least  was  ignorant  that  Pitt  was  not  in  earnest  in  the  proposals 

*  Buckingham  was  opposed  to  summoning  the  Irish  Parliament  for  January,  1789, 
but  yielded  to  Grenville's  advice,  and  later  recalled  a  letter  of  resignation  which 
Grenville,  urging  a  reconsideration,  had  withheld.  Dropmore,  I,  411^".  Gren- 
ville also  influenced  Buckingham  to  refuse  to  transmit  to  England  the  address 
of  the  Irish  Parliament  requesting  the  Prince  of  Wales  to  assume  the  regency  of 
Ireland.  Bernard  to  Grenville,  Feb.  21,  1789.  Ibid.,  417. 

t  Grenville  succeeded  Sydney  in  the  Home  Department.  The  change  had  been 
decided  on  a  year  previous,  but  had  been  delayed  by  circumstances  connected  with 
Buckingham's  control  of  the  county  represented  by  Grenville  in  Parliament.  Gren- 
ville's letter  of  acceptance  at  this  time  exhibits  him  as  still  in  a  subordinate  posi- 
tion :  "  In  being  allowed  to  look  forward  to  this  object  at  the  beginning  of  the  next 
session,  I  feel  I  am  placed  much  beyond  what  I  had  any  right  or  pretension  to  look 
to  ;  and  that  in  the  interim  I  shall  only  be  desirous  to  give  any  assistance  which 
may  be  in  my  power,  on  every  occasion  on  which  it  can  be  of  service."  Grenville 
to  Pitt,  June  n,  1788.  Ibid.,  335. 

t  Auckland  to  Grenville,  May  15  and  June  8,  1790.     Ibid.,  585,  588. 


OCCASIONAL   INFLUENCE.  9 

made.  In  spite  of  the  great  secrecy  maintained  in  the  entire  conduct 
of  the  negotiation,  Grenville  was  unquestionably  informed  of  it  and 
was  known  by  Miles  to  be  so  informed,  for  the  latter  on  two  occasions 
wrote  to  Buckingham,  evidently  with  the  purpose  of  influencing  Gren- 
ville, urging  an  actual  alliance  with  France.  Grenville' s  knowledge 
of  this  incident  of  Pitt's  diplomacy — an  incident  of  which  even  the 
Secretary  of  State  for  the  Foreign  Department,  the  Duke  of  Leeds, 
was  ignorant  at  the  time — is  most  positive  proof  of  Pitt's  confidence 
in  his  advice.  * 

Grenville' s  influence  on  foreign  policy  was  in  fact  steadily  increasing, 
and  in  another  direction  also  was  being  exerted  without  the  knowledge 
of  the  nominal  head  of  the  Foreign  Office,  the  Duke  of  L/eeds.  A  new 
commercial  treaty  was  being  negotiated  with  Holland,  and  Pitt  had 
chosen  to  take  this  out  of  the  hands  of  L/eeds  in  order  apparently  to 
conduct  the  details  himself.  In  reality  he  had  transferred  the  whole 
matter  to  Grenville,  with  whom  the  idea  had  originated,!  and  whose 
familiarity  with  Dutch  affairs,  acquired  by  his  mission  in  1787,  fitted 
him  to  deal  with  what  proved  to  be  a  most  difficult  and  intricate  prob- 
lem. After  July,  1790,  Grenville  was  in  constant  and  secret  corre- 
spondence with  Auckland  in  regard  to  the  details  of  this  treaty,  J  and 
when  finally,  in  January,  1791,  these  had  been  formulated  in  a  pre- 
liminary draft,  Pitt  took  the  precaution  to  send  them  through  the 

*  Miles  to  Buckingham,  Dec.  13,  1790.  Miles,  I,  178.  Miles  is  the  chief  author- 
ity for  this  negotiation,  but  as  a  friend  of  the  French  Revolution  and  ignorant 
of  Pitt's  duplicity,  his  entire  thesis  is  that  Pitt  in  1790  was  on  the  point  of 
making  a  friendly  alliance  with  France,  and  thus  of  safely  guiding  France  through 
the  dangers  of  revolution.  Neither  the  letters  of  Hugh  Elliot  nor  of  Miles  for  this 
period  were  to  be  found  by  their  biographers,  nor  can  any  statement  by  Elliot  be 
found,  save  a  very  meager  one  in  Morris  (II,  256)  to  the  effect  that  an  alliance  was 
actually  proposed.  Bourgoing  gives  no  hint  of  Elliot's  mission,  while  Sorel  briefly 
describes  it  as  merely  to  convince  French  leaders  that  England  sincerely  desired 
peace.  Pitt's  real  purpose  and  secret  plan  is,  however,  revealed  in  a  letter  from 
the  King,  included  in  the  papers  of  Joseph  Smith,  Pitt's  private  secretary.  '  •  From 
a  thorough  conviction  how  essential  Peace  is  to  the  Prosperity  of  this  Country  it 
is  impossible  for  me  to  object  to  any  means  that  may  have  a  chance  of  effecting  it; 
though  not  sanguine  that  Mr.  H.  Elliot  and  his  French  Friend  [Mirabeau]  are 
likely  to  succeed  where  caution  and  much  delicacy  are  necessary.  While  our 
Ambassador  and  Official  Correspondence  are  kept  clear  of  this  business,  it  will  cer- 
tainly be  wise  to  keep  up  the  proposed  Communication  for  the  sole  purpose  of  re- 
storing peace,  but  no  encouragement  must  be  given  to  forwarding  the  internal 
Views  of  the  democratical  Party.  We  have  honourably  not  meddled  with  the  in- 
ternal dissensions  of  France,  and  no  object  ought  to  drive  us  from  that  honourable 
ground."  George  III  to  Pitt,  Oct.  26,  1790.  Smith  MSS.,  p.  368. 

Oscar  Browning's  Despatches  of  Earl  Gower  proves  that  Gower  knew  of  the 
friendly  advances  made  by  Elliot  to  Mirabeau,  and  hence  that  Leeds  was  also  aware 
that  Elliot  was  being  employed  by  Pitt,  but  no  hint  is  given  of  Miles's  activities. 
Despatches  of  Oct.  22  and  Oct.  26,  1790,  pp.  38,  40. 

fDundas  to  Grenville,  Sept.  2,  1787.     Dropmore,  III,  419. 

|Pitt  to  Grenville,  July,  1790,  and  Grenville  to  Auckland,  July-August,  1790. 
Ibid,,  I,  597,  598. 


10      THE   INFLUENCE   OF  GRENVILLE  ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

English  Foreign  Office  in  such  a  manner  as  to  prevent  Leeds' s  knowl- 
edge of  Grenville's  authorship.  *  Leeds  was  in  fact  rapidly  becoming 
a  mere  figurehead  in  English  diplomacy.  Pitt  more  and  more  exercised 
a  direct  supervision,  leaning  the  while  on  the  advice  of  Grenville. 

It  was  while  engaged  in  this  negotiation  with  Holland  that  Gren- 
ville consented  to  an  arrangement  which,  in  the  opinion  of  many  of 
his  friends,  involved  a  distinct  sacrifice  of  his  political  future.  On 
November  25,  1790,  he  was  created  Baron  Grenville,  and  was  trans- 
ferred to  the  House  of  Lords.  Personally  he  was  not  averse  to  the 
change,  and  politically  he  rendered  a  great  service  to  Pitt,  who  did  not 
possess  in  the  upper  house  a  single  supporter  of  ability  upon  whose 
fidelity  he  could  rely.f  Grenville  was  admirably  suited  to  the  place 
and  at  once  assumed  the  leadership  of  that  majority  of  mediocrity 
always  at  Pitt's  service  in  the  House  of  Lords.  As  it  proved,  he  was 
considerably  advanced  in  political  importance  by  the  change.  Each 
departure  in  governmental  policy,  each  serious  defense  against  the 
attacks  of  the  opposition,  was  made  in  the  Commons  by  Pitt,  in  the 
Lords  by  Grenville.  Both  spoke  for  the  government  with  the  voice  of 
authority,  while  Grenville  was  listened  to  with  an  increased  attention. 
Auckland  in  particular  was  quick  to  express  his  sense  of  the  much 
greater  influence  now  likely  to  be  wielded  by  Grenville,  and  sought  to 
establish  an  intimacy  that  might  be  used  in  thwarting  what  seemed  to 
him  an  ill-considered  and  dangerous  scheme  of  foreign  policy.  The 
time  was  now  at  hand  in  fact  when  Grenville  was  to  enter  formally 
upon  his  long  tenure  of  office  as  Foreign  Secretary,  in  which  his  influ- 
ence was  to  be  no  longer  occasional  and  concealed,  but  constant  and 
direct. 

*Pitt  wrote  to  Grenville,  Jan.  n,  1791,  referring  to  the  draft  sent  him  by  Gren- 
ville: "'  '  '  '  I  am  satisfied  that  in  substance  your  proposal  is  the  best  that  can 
be  made.  I  have  suggested  some  alteration  as  to  the  form  which  I  wish  you  to 
consider  and  to  dispose  of  as  you  think  best.  •  •  •  •  j  see  no  possibility  of 
conveying  this  to  the  office  without  its  being  known  that  you  have  been  chiefly 
concerned  in  the  manufacture.  I  have  thought  that  the  best  way  of  avoiding  any 
difficulty  on  that  account  was  to  send  a  letter  to  the  Duke  of  Leeds,  which  Smith 
can  seal  and  forward  with  the  draft."  Dropmore,  II,  12. 

t  Pitt  to  his  mother,  Nov.  24,  1790.  Stanhope,  II,  74.  Thurlow  had  already 
begun  to  evince  the  sullen  temper  which  ultimately  caused  Pitt  to  remove  him 
from  the  chancellorship. 


RUPTURE   OF  THE  TRIPLE   ALLIANCE.  II 

RUSSIAN  ARMAMENT  OF  1791  AND  RUPTURE  OF  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE. 

When  in  1788  the  Triple  Alliance  had  been  signed  between  Holland, 
England,  and  Prussia,  it  was  understood  that  a  check  was  to  be  put 
upon  the  ambitious  designs  of  Russia  and  Austria  in  Turkey  and  of 
Austria  in  Germany.  Pitt  in  fact  regarded  the  alliance  as  an  instru- 
ment suited  to  maintain  the  existing  balance,  and  saw  in  this  the  best 
interests  of  both  England  and  Prussia.  Yet  by  1790  it  became  evident 
that  Frederick  William  II  had  schemes  of  aggrandizement  for  his  coun- 
try. His  diplomats  busied  themselves  in  intrigues,  planning  a  revolution 
in  Galicia  and  sustaining  a  similar  movement  in  Belgium  ;  signing 
secret  treaties  with  the  Turks,  then  at  war  with  Austria  and  Russia  ; 
proposing  a  Polish  cession  of  Danzig  and  Thorn  to  Prussia  ;  and  en- 
couraging Gustavus  III  of  Sweden  in  his  attack  upon  Catherine  II. « 
The  Prussian  diplomacy  failed  in  every  direction  and  the  Prussian 
ministers  found  themselves  confined  to  only  two  points  of  their  wider 
intrigues — the  limitation,  if  possible,  of  Austrian  annexations,  and  the 
manipulation  of  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  peace  to  be  signed  between 
Russia  and  Turkey.  But  in  this  latter  plan,  since  England  and  Prussia 
were  agreed  to  prevent  any  acquisition  of  territory  by  Russia,  Frederick 
William  II  saw  the  opportunity  of  saving  his  prestige  in  the  diplo- 
matic field  and  of  drawing  a  distinct  benefit  from  the  Triple  Alliance.* 
He  therefore  urged  the  English  government  to  act  with  him  in  bringing 
pressure  to  bear  upon  Russia,  and  to  this  Pitt  at  first  agreed. 

At  the  opening  of  the  negotiations  with  Russia  in  September,  1790, 
the  instructions  of  Leeds  to  Whit  worth,  the  English  representative  at 
St.  Petersburg,  ordered  him  to  insist  on  a  restoration  of  the  status  quo 
ante  bellum  and  went  so  far  as  to  threaten  an  English-Turkish  alliance 
if  this  was  not  conceded. f  Catherine  II,  however,  was  determined 
not  to  make  peace  without  some  acquisition  of  territory,  and  fixed 
upon  the  fortress  of  Ochakov  with  the  surrounding  district  as  the 
least  price  at  which  she  would  discontinue  war.  Moreover,  Pitt's 
supporters  were  not  united  in  favor  of  an  anti-Russian  policy.  As 
early  as  December,  1790,  Auckland,  who  was  throughout  his  career 
an  advocate  of  a  peaceful  diplomacy  for  England,  began  to  interject 
in  his  letters  to  Grenville  arguments  against  the  project  of  a  Russian 
war.  In  this  he  was  earnestly  supported  by  Van  der  Spiegel,  the 
Grand  Pensionary  of  Holland  ;  for  Holland  by  the  terms  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  seemed  likely  to  be  drawn  into  a  contest  in  which  she  had  no 
real  interest.  Auckland's  first  letter  to  Grenville  on  this  topic  was 

*  Sorel,  II,  154-155- 

t  See  Pitt's  speech  in  the  Commons,  March  29,  1791.  Parl.  Hist.,  XXIX,  52-55, 
70-75  ;  also  Lecky,  V,  292. 


12      THK   INFLUENCE   OP  GRENVILLE  ON  PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

apparently  in  reply  to  a  request  by  Grenville  for  information,*  and 
after  this  opening  had  been  presented,  Auckland,  in  nearly  every  letter, 
up  to  the  actual  change  in  English  policy  in  April,  1791,  continued  to 
supply  arguments  for  peace. f  Moreover,  he  took  advantage  of  the 
necessity  of  corresponding  with  Pitt  on  the  commercial  treaty  then  being 
negotiated  between  Holland  and  England  to  emphasize  his  objections 
to  the  policy  about  to  be  pursued,  J  writing  to  Grenville  by  the  same 
mail :  "I  have  addressed  to  Mr.  Pitt  the  answer  which  I  wished  to 
write  to  your  letter  from  Holwood,  and  as  happily  for  both  of  you 
and  for  the  public,  whatever  is  written  to  one  may  be  considered  as 
written  to  the  other,  I  will  not  detain  the  packet."  § 

Yet  Grenville  was  in  no  sense  attempting  to  influence  Pitt  by  indirect 
means.  Auckland  was  entirely  correct  in  supposing  that  it  made  no 
difference  to  whom  his  letters  were  addressed,  for  they  were  certain  to 
be  read  by  both  men.  Grenville  was  in  fact  convinced  of  the  inad- 
visability  of  pushing  Russia  to  extremes,  and  was  trying  to  bring  Pitt 
to  the  same  conclusion  ;  yet  he  was  so  loyal  to  his  chief  as  to  give 
Auckland  no  hint  of  his  own  sentiments.  On  March  5  Auckland,  who 
had  just  received  a  strong  letter  from  Burges,  ||  an  Under  Secretary 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  urging  increased  efforts  to  procure  effective  Dutch 
armaments,  wrote  to  Grenville:  "I  have  collected  with  concern  from 
your  silence  •  •  •  •  that  my  sentiments  and  those  of  the  Grand 
Pensionary  have  not  the  good  fortune  to  be  approved  by  you."fl 

A  few  days  later  this  judgment  seemed  premature,  for  on  March  7 
Pitt  addressed  a  private  letter  to  Auckland  asking  for  specific  infor- 
mation on  the  importance  of  Ochakov,  information  which  Auckland 
hastened  to  give,  quoting  Kingsbergen,  the  Dutch  admiral,  as  author- 
ity for  his  statements  of  the  small  importance  of  the  district  in  ques- 
tion.** In  spite,  therefore,  of  a  savage  letter  from  Burges  threatening 
investigation  and  censure  for  his  indifference, ff  Auckland  was  suffi- 
ciently hopeful  to  write  to  Keith  at  Sistovo,  hinting  at  a  probable 
change  in  English  policy.  J| 

In  reality,  however,  Pitt  had  not  as  yet  decided  to  yield  to  the  ad- 
vice of  Grenville  and  Auckland,  though  he  was  becoming  less  firm  in 
his  determination  to  risk  a  war  with  Russia.  The  instructions  to 

*  Auckland  to  Grenville,  Dec.  31,  1790.     Dropmore,  I,  612. 

t  Auckland  to  Grenville,  Feb.  and  March,  1791.     Ibid.,  II,  31,  32,  33 

t  Auckland  to  Pitt,  Feb.  2,  1791.     Ibid.,  23. 

§  Auckland  to  Grenville,  Feb.  2,  1791.     Ibid.,  25. 

H  Burges  to  Auckland,  March  i,  1791.     Burges,  160. 

i||  Dropmore,  II,  38. 

**Pitt  to  Auckland,  March  7,  1791.     Auckland,  II,  382. 

ft  Burges  to  Auckland,  March  21,  1791.     Burges,  163. 

it  Auckland  to  Keith,  March  24,  1791.     Keith,  II,  394. 


RUPTURE   OF  THE  TRIPLE   ALLIANCE.  13 

English  diplomats  still  breathed  the  language  of  firmness,  and  on 
March  27  an  ultimatum  to  be  addressed  to  Catherine  II  was  sent  to 
Whitworth  at  St.  Petersburg.*  The  arguments  hitherto  advanced 
against  armed  intervention  had  turned  upon  the  dubious  delay  of  Leo- 
pold II  in  making  peace  with  the  Turks  at  Sistovo,f  the  danger  of  war 
to  English  commerce,  and  the  uselessness  of  Ochakov  to  Russia,  even 
if  acquired.  These  were  now  greatly  strengthened  by  the  evident  dis- 
like of  England  for  the  war  and  the  rapid  lessening  of  Pitt's  majority 
in  the  Commons.  I  Grenville  returned  to  the  attack,  and  on  April  16, 
three  weeks  after  the  sending  of  the  ultimatum  to  Russia,  an  instruction 
was  read  to  the  Cabinet  recalling  it  before  delivery.  Leeds,  refusing 
to  sign  the  paper,  retired  from  the  Cabinet, §  and  Grenville  at  once  took 
up  the  responsibilities  of  the  office,  though  not  formally  assuming  the 
title  of  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Foreign  Department  until  June  8. 

The  new  regime  in  England  was  immediately  manifested  in  the  in- 
creased activity  of  English  diplomats  on  the  continent.  Keith,  who  was 
watching  English  interests  in  the  wearisome  negotiations  for  an  Austro- 
Turkish  peace  at  Sistovo,  received  definite  instructions.  ||  Auckland 
concerted  with  the  Dutch  government  measures  to  secure  Austria's 

*  Koch,  XIV,  500-503. 

f  The  quibbling  of  Leopold's  diplomats  in  the  negotiations  at  Sistovo  has  not 
usually  been  cited  as  a  cause  of  Pitt's  change  of  policy ;  yet  Auckland  wrote  to 
Keith  on  March  24,  1791  :  "  I  have  strong  hopes  that  the  incomprehensible  conduct 
of  Leopold,  to  which  I  allude,  will  tend  to  prevent  the  breaking  out  of  new  wars 
in  Europe  and  in  its  effects  to  a  general  pacification  sooner  than  was  expected.  I 
will  take  occasion  to  explain  this  by  the  first  safe  conveyance."  Keith,  II,  394. 

J  Various  reasons  have  been  asserted  for  Pitt's  sudden  face-about.  Stanhope 
(II,  115-118)  ascribes  it  entirely  to  the  lack  of  support  in  the  country  and  in  Par- 
liament, and  quotes  Pitt's  letter  to  Ewart,  May  24,  1791  :  "To  speak  plainly,  the 
obvious  effect  of  our  persisting  would  have  been  to  risk  the  existence  of  the  present 
government,  and  with  it  the  whole  of  our  system  both  at  home  and  abroad." 
Sorel  (II,  204-208)  adopts  the  same  view  and  adds  the  information  that  the  rapid 
development  of  public  opposition  was  due  to  the  energ}'  of  the  Russian  envoy  in 
London,  Rostopochine,  who  busied  himself  in  the  distribution  of  articles,  hand- 
bills, and  monographs,  and  subsidized  crowds  to  protest  against  the  war.  Bourgoing 
(I,  294-298)  briefly  mentions  Grenville's  opposition,  and  states  that  this  was  based 
mainly  on  his  anxiety  over  the  menacing  state  of  France  and  the  fear  of  a  spread 
of  revolutionary  principles,  an  idea  clearly  disproved  by  the  Dropmore  MSS.  On 
the  other  hand,  Malmesbury  (II,  441)  wrote  on  October  14,  1791,  to  Portland:  "It 
appears  very  clear  to  me,  from  some  confidential  communications  which  were 
made  to  me,  that  Lord  Grenville  was  the  cause  of  Mr.  Pitt's  giving  way,  and  that 
he  acted  not  from  the  reason  which  was  given,  the  nation's  being  against  it,  but 
from  its  being  his  fixed  opinion  that  we  should  not  interfere  at  all  in  the  affairs 
of  the  Continent."  The  correct  view  seems  to  be  that  Pitt  was  weakened  in  his 
opinion  by  the  attacks  of  Grenville,  and  that  the  ill-will  of  Parliament  furnished 
the  last  and  convincing  argument. 

§  Leeds's  account  was  that  on  refusing  to  sign  the  new  instructions,  he  suggested 
that  Grenville  do  so,  thus  indicating  his  knowledge  of  the  person  chiefly  responsi- 
ble for  the  change.  Political  Memoranda  of  the  Duke  of  Leeds,  156-158. 

||  From  December,  1790,  to  May,  1791,  Keith  had  not  had  a  line  from  Leeds.  He 
was  rejoiced,  therefore,  at  the  vigor  with  which  Grenville  took  up  the  duties  of  his 
office.  Keith,  II,  418,  423. 


14      THE   INFLUENCE  OF  GRENVILLE  ON   PITT'S  FOREIGN   POLICY. 

friendship.  A  new  negotiator,  Fawkener,  was  despatched  to  St.  Peters- 
burg, and  Ewart,  who  had  been  absent  on  leave  in  L/ondon,  was  hurried 
back  to  Berlin.  It  now  became  the  purpose  of  English  diplomacy  to 
secure  favorable  terms  for  the  Ottoman  government,  if  possible,  but  if 
Catherine  II  proved  obdurate,  to  acquiesce  in  a  Russian  acquisition  of 
territory.  In  this  connection  England's  relations  with  her  ally,  Prussia, 
were  of  the  first  moment.  Ewart's  instructions  were  :  first,  to  forward 
an  English- Austrian-Prussian  alliance  with  the  view  of  forcing  Russia 
to  make  peace  with  the  Turks  on  the  basis  of  the  status  quo  existing 
before  the  war  ;  second,  if  this  failed,  to  "  unite  with  the  allies  in  re- 
quiring that  the  territory  between  the  Bog  and  the  Dniester  •  •  •  • 
tje  reduced  to  the  state  of  a  desert  "  ;  third,  if  Austria  refused  to  join, 
to  consent  to  a  cession  of  a  part  of  the  district  of  Ochakov  to  Russia, 
"  provided  both  banks  of  the  Dniester  be  preserved  to  the  Porte."* 
These  instructions,  then,  still  looked  toward  some  limitation  upon  the 
demands  of  Russia.  In  this  spirit  they  were  cordially  accepted  f  by 
the  Prussian  King,  to  whom  Ewart  had  been  instructed  to  appeal  per- 
sonally. \  In  fact,  Frederick  William  II  had  just  been  informed  by 
Leopold  II  of  the  possibility  of  a  friendly  alliance  with  Austria  and  had 
consented  to  opening  negotiations  through  Bischofswerder.§  Gren- 
ville,  on  being  informed  of  this  opening,  sent  Elgin  to  Italy,  where  the 
Emperor  then  was,  offering  in  effect  admission  to  the  Triple  Alliance. 
The  purpose  of  both  England  and  Prussia  was  to  isolate  Russia,  and 
so  force  her  to  yield  in  the  projected  treaty  with  the  Turks,  but  the 
result  was  exactly  the  reverse.  The  Polish  coup  d'etat  of  May  3,  1791, 
neutralized  the  friendly  advances  of  Austria,  while  Elgin's  disclosures 
convinced  Leopold  II  that  under  no  circumstances  would  England 
undertake  a  war.  Acting  upon  this  belief,  Austria  drew  nearer  to  her 
late  ally,  Russia,  and  increased  her  demands  at  Sistovo.||  Grenville 
was  in  truth  determined  not  to  risk  a  war,  and  although  Parliament  as 
yet  knew  nothing  of  the  change  of  policy, f  he  was  instructing  Ewart 
that ' '  in  the  case  of  a  total  rejection  of  all  modifications  of  the  status  quo, 

*  Memorandum  by  Ewart.     Dropmore,  II,  49. 

t  Ewart  to  Pitt  and  Ewart  to  Auckland,  April  30,  1791  ;  Ewart  to  Greuville,  May 
13,  1791.  Ibid.,  61,  68,  73. 

j  Grenville  to  Auckland,  April  19,  1791.     Ibid.,  51. 

§  For  a  general  discussion  of  these  negotiations  see  Sybel,  I,  274-297. 

||  Sorel,  II,  222  ;  Sybel,  I,  295  ;  Keith,  II,  436.  Keith  wrote  to  Grenville  on  June 
9,  1791,  the  day  of  the  seeming  disruption  of  the  conference  at  Sistovo  :  "  Certain  it 
is  '  that  from  the  moment  Prince  Kaunitz  could  form  a  tolerable  guess 

respecting  the  objects  of  L,ord  Elgin's  last  journey,  he  redoubled  the  haughtiness 
and  inflexibility  of  his  instructions  to  Baron  Herbert." 

1|  As  late  as  May  9,  Grenville  was  still  asserting  in  the  House  of  Lords  the  neces- 
sity of  British  preparation  for  a  war  with  Russia.  Parl.  Hist.,  XXIX,  435.  Pitt 
kept  up  the  pretense  much  later  in  the  House  of  Commons. 


RUPTURE   OP  THE   TRIPLE   ALLIANCE.  15 

•    •    '    '    it  would  still  be  desirable  that  the  Turks  should  conclude  on 
this  basis,  and  look  for  their  future  security  to  the  guarantees  of  other 
powers     *     '     "     '  "  *     For  the  same  reason  Grenville  refused  to  pre- 
pare a  fleet  for  the  Black  Sea,  a  measure  strongly  urged  by  Prussia,! 
and  a  little  later  definitely  destroyed  Frederick  William's  hopes  of  ever 
obtaining  any  benefit  from  the  Triple  Alliance  by  his  answer  to  a  request 
for  aid  in  case  war  should  ensue  between  Prussia  and  Austria.     War 
did  not  indeed   appear  imminent,  although  the  momentary  friction 
between  Prussia  and  Austria,  due  to  the  unexpected  revolution  in 
Poland,  had  cast  a  decided  shadow  on  the  previous  friendly  approaches. 
In  answer  to  the  Prussian  inquiry,  Grenville  wrote  to  Ewart  on  July  6  : 
' '  I  will  freely  own  to  you  that  I  entertain  a  strong  persuasion  that 
matters  will  not  come  to  extremities  with  the  Emperor.     '     •     •     •     It 
is  a  painful  situation  to  be  measuring  one's  expressions  between  the 
fear,  on  one  hand,  of  holding  out  expectations  to  Prussia  which  we 
could  not  perform  and  others  would  not,  and  on  the  other  hand  of  con- 
veying an  impression  disadvantageous  to  our  national  good  faith.    The 
whole  of  our  line  is  summed  up  in  a  few  words.    His  Majesty's  present 
servants  will  certainly  advise  him  at  all  risks  to  perform  the  engage- 
ments of  his  alliance,  if  the  case  exists  ;  but  there  is  every  reason  in 
the  situation  of  this  country,  and  quite  independent  of  any  motive 
personal  to  ourselves,  to  wish  that  the  case  may  not  exist.     We  can 
answer  for  our  conduct,  but  we  can  not  answer  for  our  success."  Jt/ 
It  is  evident  that  this  communication  was  intended  to  convey  an  argu- 
ment similar  to  that  previously  used  by  Pitt  in  withdrawing  from  the 
proposed   English-Prussian   ultimatum  to    Russia, §   namely,  that  to 
give  the  support  asked  for  would  result  in  driving  Pitt's  ministry  from 
office,  and  that  with  the  return  of  the  opposition  to  power  the  system 
of  the  allies  would  fall  to  the  ground.     The  repetition  of  this  argu- 
ment, now  used  in  an  entirely  new  connection,  could  not  fail  further 
to  impress  Frederick  William  II  with  the  valuelessness  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  to  Prussia.     Grenville  was  right  in  thinking  the  danger  of 
war  remote,  but  the  incident  had  not  been  used  to  England's  advan- 
tage, and  it  assisted  the  Austrian  party  at  Berlin  in  inclining  the  King 
toward  an  Austrian  alliance. 

The  stubbornness  of  Catherine  II  and  the  diplomatic  ability  of 
Leopold  were  more  than  a  match  for  the  poorly  combined  efforts  of 
England  and  Prussia.  Leopold  dallied  with  the  Prussian  proposals  and 

*  Grenville  to  Ewart,  May  24,  1791.     Dropmore,  II,  78. 

t  Ewart  to  Grenville,  May  17,  1791.     Ibid.,  74  ;  I/ecky,  V,  294. 

j  Dropmore,  II,  124. 

§  Lecky,  V,  293,  and  see  ante,  p.  13,  foot-note  {. 


1 6      THE   INFLUENCE   OF  GRENVILLE  ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN  POLICY. 

increased  his  demands  at  Sistovo  until  it  was  certain  that  Russia  would 
secure  a  satisfactory  peace.  The  English  and  Prussian  diplomats  at 
St.  Petersburg  with  little  delay  yielded  to  the  inevitable,  and  on  July  22 
signed  an  agreement  acquiescing  in  the  terms  fixed  by  Catherine  II  atid 
even  pledging  that  pressure  would  be  brought  to  bear  upon  Turkey 
to  enforce  their  acceptance.*  A  little  later  the  discussions  at  Sistovo 
were  resumed  and  here  also  little  difficulty  was  encountered  in  reaching 
a  conclusion,  though  one  more  favorable  to  Austria  than  had  at  first 
been  intended. f  In  the  meantime,  Frederick  William's  disgust  with 
English  diplomacy  had  resulted  in  pushing  him  into  a  hastily  conceived 
alliance  with  Austria.  On  July  25  the  Vienna  Convention  was  signed 
by  Bischof swerder  and  Kaunitz  for  their  respective  states.  ±  Grenville 
had  hoped  to  bring  Austria  into  the  S3rstem  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  and 
to  isolate  Russia,  and  even  after  it  became  evident  that  Russia  could 
not  be  coerced,  he  looked  to  the  realization  of  his  project  and  urged 
Ewart  to  press  it  upon  the  court  of  Berlin. §  Auckland  had  written  of 
this  alliance  :  "I  think  it  eligible  for  the  Emperor,  and  highly  eligible 
for  us,  but  it  seems  to  be  evidently  against  the  Prussian  interests, "|| 
but  Grenville  in  reply  stated  :  ' '  and  yet  even  to  his  [the  King  of 
Prussia's]  interests  rightly  understood,  a  system  of  peace  and  a  security 
for  the  continuance  of  the  present  state  of  power  in  Europe  would 
surely  be  beneficial ;  and  such  I  conceive  would  be  the  effects  of  this 
scheme,  supposing  it  to  succeed  to  our  most  sanguine  expectations."  fl 
Grenville' s  hopes  were  soon  dashed  to  the  ground.  An  alliance  was 
signed,  but  England  was  not  a  party  to  it  and  found  herself  powerless 
to  prevent  it.  "  The  Vienna  Convention, ' '  wrote  Grenville,  ' '  is  ratified . 
We  have  thought  it  infinitely  the  best  way  to  take  the  thing  with  a  good 
grace,  keeping  ourselves  out  of  the  complicated  difficulties  into  which 
His  Prussian  Majesty  is  plunging  himself."**  Yet  the  reverse  to  Eng- 
lish diplomacy  was  unmistakable,  and  every  Englishman  acquainted 
with  the  situation  must  have  agreed  with  Auckland  in  the  statement 
that  "  it  is  impossible  not  to  feel  to  private  conviction  that  the  alliance 
between  Austria  and  Prussia  suspends  in  a  great  degree  the  cordiality 
and,  in  some  measure,  the  effect  of  our  alliance  with  the  latter,  "ff 

*Koch,  XIV,  500-503.  Prussia  disclaimed  any  responsibility  for  the  treaty,  but 
did  not  disavow  Goltz,  her  representative  at  St.  Petersburg,  who  had  signed  it. 

t  Keith  to  Grenville,  Aug.  4,  1791.     Keith,  II,  469. 

J  Koch,  IV,  186  ;  Sorel,  II,  236-239  ;  Sybel,  I,  301^.  The  Vienna  Convention  was 
preliminary  to  the  definitive  treaty  of  Berlin,  Feb.  7,  1792. 

S  Grenville  to  Ewart,  July  26,  1791.     Dropmore,  II,  141. 

J  Auckland  to  Grenville,  July  13,  1791.     Ibid.,  129. 

\  Grenville  to  Auckland,  July  22,  1791.     Ibid.,  135. 

**  Grenville  to  Auckland,  Aug.  26,  1791.     Ibid.,  177. 

ft  Auckland  to  Grenville,  Aug.  31,  1791.     Ibid.,  180. 


RUPTURE   OF  THE  TRIPLE   ALLIANCE.  17 

England,  not  Russia,  was  isolated  by  the  outcome  of  Grenville's 
first  efforts  as  the  head  of  the  Foreign  Office.  He  alone  directed  the 
diplomacy  of  England  during  the  negotiations,*  but  he  alone  was  not 
responsible,  for  Pitt  was  his  steadfast  supporter  in  the  Cabinet,  agree- 
ing perfectly  in  the  necessity  for  each  step  taken.  Pitt  indeed  made 
light  of  the  diminution  of  English  influence,  though  he  thought  the 
result  not  very  creditable,  f  Other  Englishmen,  and  in  particular 
English  diplomats,  were  more  bitter  in  their  expressions.  Keith, 
while  refusing  to  criticize  his  government,  deplored  England's  isola- 
tion. J  Malmesbury  was  vexed  with  English  supineness,  and  pointed 
out  to  his  political  friends  the  opportunity  for  harassing  the  ministry. § 
Ewart  was  embittered  at  the  overthrow  of  the  diplomatic  structure  he 
had  been  so  largely  instrumental  in  building,  and  could  not  find  words 
harsh  enough  to  characterize  Grenville's  policy.  ||  Other  rulers  than 
those  directly  concerned  regarded  England  as  withdrawing  from  the 
theater  of  European  politics. fl  These  judgments  were  not  unfounded. 
The  first  six  months  of  Grenville's  diplomacy  had,  in  truth,  resulted 
in  failure,  and  the  Triple  Alliance  ceased  to  be  a  factor  in  European 
politics.  It  was  fortunate  for  the  reputation  of  Grenville  and  for  the 
continuance  of  his  influence  in  English  foreign  policy  that  the  wars  of 
the  French  Revolution  nullified  every  diplomatic  prophecy  and,  creating 

*  Burges  wrote  to  Ewart  May  6, 1791  :  "  Our  foreign  politics  •  •  •  •  are  solely 
and  exclusively  those  of  Lord  Grenville's.  •  •  •  •  By  everything  I  can  see,  His 
Lordship  is  very  rapidly  gaining  a  preeminence  which  promises  to  place  him  much 
higher  than  any  one  at  present  suspects.  •  •  •  •  Pitt  gives  way  to  him  in  a  man- 
ner very  extraordinary.  •  •  •  •  One  prime  cause  of  the  sudden  turn  we  have 
experienced  was  owing  to  the  influence  of  Lord  Grenville."  Burges,  172.  Up  to 
April,  1791,  Pitt  had  kept  up  personal  communication  with  English  diplomats. 
After  that  date,  such  interchange  of  letters  almost  entirely  ceased.  Everything 
now  passed  through  Grenville. 

f  Pitt  to  Rose,  Aug.  10,  1791.     Rose,  I,  no. 

j  Keith  felt  the  humiliation  of  his  position  at  Vienna.  February  4,  1792,  he  wrote 
Grenville :  "A  man  in  my  situation,  who  is  carefully  debarred  by  the  Austrian 
ministry  from  the  smallest  share  in  their  secrets,  has  a  very  difficult  task  •  •  •  •. " 
Keith,  II,  498. 

?  Malmesbury  to  Portland,  Oct.  14,  1791.     Malmesbury,  II,  440. 

jj  During  the  progress  of  the  negotiations,  Ewart  wrote  to  Keith,  June  18,  1791  : 
"•  •  •  •  What  a  dreadful  change  has  taken  place  !  Our  influence  was  all-pow- 
erful as  long  as  it  was  maintained  with  the  necessary  vigor ;  and  the  moment  we 
flinched  all  the  Powers,  as  if  by  common  consent,  turned  the  tables  upon  us,  and 
from  having  had  the  certainty  of  restoring  peace  in  our  power,  there  seems  now  to  be 
the  greatest  wish  of  a  general  confusion.  •  •  •  •  It  is  impossible  to  suffer  greater 
mortification  than  I  do  at  this  moment.  •  •  •  •  The  Empress  of  Russia  and  Potem- 
kin  are  striving  who  can  throw  most  ridicule  on  England  and  on  our  ministers  at 
Petersburg.  Their  evident  intention  is  to  gain  time,  and  to  push  their  operations 
on  the  Black  Sea.  Oh  !  how  my  blood  boils,  my  dear  sir !  "  Keith,  II,  447. 

fl  Gustavus  III  to  Baron  d'Armfelt,  June  16,  1791  :  "Toutce  qu'on  me  mande 
d'Angleterre  me  prouve  ses  embarras  et  sert  a  me  convaincre  qu'elle  ne  met  aucune 
suite  dans  sa  politique  exteYieure. "  Gustave  III,  V,  212. 


1 8      THE   INFLUENCE   OP  GRENVILLE   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

new  and  unaccustomed  combinations,  saved  England  from  the  fruits 
of  his  errors.  But  neither  Grenville  nor  any  other  English  diplomat 
with  whom  he  corresponded  foresaw  this  change  or  counted  upon  it. 

The  humiliation  resulting  from  the  negotiations  at  St.  Petersburg 
would  seem  to  have  been  sufficient  ground  for  Pitt's  resuming  that 
direct  control  of  foreign  policy  which  he  had  been  accustomed  to  exer- 
cise while  Leeds  was  in  office.  There  is  no  evidence,  however,  that  he 
was  in  anyway  distrustful  of  Grenville's  ability  or  inclined  to  exercise 
his  authority.  On  the  contrary,  such  indirect  evidence  as  exists  tends 
to  show  a  complete  control  by  Grenville  of  his  special  department. 
Under  Leeds's  administration  Pitt  had  been  in  constant  personal  com- 
munication with  English  diplomats  at  foreign  courts,  receiving  letters 
from  them  that  should  have  been  written  to  Leeds,  and  returning  pri- 
vate answers  that  should  have  gone  through  the  Foreign  Office.  On 
one  occasion,  when  Leeds  had  offered  Keith  the  choice  between  with- 
drawing what  he  considered  an  insulting  letter  or  being  recalled  from 
Vienna,  Pitt  had  forced  Leeds  to  retract  this  threat  and  had  gratified 
Keith  with  marks  of  honor  and  increased  pay.  *  Under  Grenville, 
Pitt  in  general  ceased  to  write  directly  to  the  English  diplomats,  and 
in  but  one  notable  instance,  to  be  considered  later,  did  he  attempt  to 
conduct  an  indirect  correspondence  with  an  English  agent  who  was 
nominally  acting  under  instructions  from  the  department  of  foreign 
affairs. 

In  his  relations  with  his  subordinates  Grenville  knew  his  rights  and 
assumed  them  without  opposition.  The  recall  of  Ewart  well  illus- 
trates this ;  for  Ewart,  more  than  any  other,  had  created  the  English 
influence  at  Berlin  which  permitted  the  realization  of  Pitt's  most  bril- 
liant stroke  of  diplomacy,  the  formation  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  Yet 
Grenville  recalled  Ewart  in  October,  1791,  unjustly,  though  not  openly, 
making  him  responsible  for  the  failure  of  the  Russian  negotiation,  retired 
him  on  a  pension,  and  after  his  death  sent  an  agent  to  seize  his  papers, 
fearing  disclosures  embarrassing  to  the  government  and  to  the  prestige 
of  the  foreign  department  if  these  papers  became  public.  When  Ewart 
was  recalled  Pitt  did  not  try  to  prevent  the  unmerited  disgrace  of 
a  faithful  servant,  and  Ewart  himself  recognized  the  futility  of  an 

*A  series  of  letters  from  Keith  to  Leeds  and  to  Pitt  from  April,  1788,  to  Novem- 
ber, 1789,  discloses  a  conflict  between  Keith  and  Leeds  illustrative  both  of  Pitt's 
control  and  of  Leeds's  carelessness.  Keith  complained  in  an  official  letter  to  the 
Foreign  Office  of  having  been  kept  in  ignorance  of  the  project  of  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance, and  even  of  having  received  instructions  from  Leeds  which,  if  carried  out, 
would  have  been  directly  opposed  to  that  project.  He  demanded  that  his  letter  be 
placed  on  file.  Leeds  returned  it,  and  gave  Keilh  the  option  of  withdrawing  the 
letter  or  resigning.  Keith  sent  the  letter  back  again,  and  traveled  to  London  to 
appeal  to  Pitt,  who  sustained  him  in  the  controversy.  Keith,  II,  225-248. 


WAR   WITH    FRANCS.  19 

appeal  to  the  Prime  Minister.*  In  the  letters  passing  directly  between 
Grenville  and  his  chief  there  is  no  mention  whatever  of  those  details  of 
administration  with  which  Pitt  busied  himself  while  Leeds  was  his 
Foreign  Secretary.  Such  letters  are  indeed  infrequent,  and  wherever 
occurring  are  concerned  with  general  questions  of  foreign  policy. 
Grenville  understood  the  dignity  of  his  position  and  his  rights  in  per- 
sonal control,  while  Pitt  was  well  content  to  shift  the  burden  of  petty 
management  to  responsible  shoulders. 


WAR  WITH  FRANCE— THE  MANIFESTO  AND  THE  TOULON  DECLARATION. 
OCTOBER  TO  NOVEMBER,  1793. 

Since  midsummer  of  1791  no  great  question  of  foreign  policy  had 
arisen  to  excite  the  interest  of  Englishmen  or  to  test  the  comparative 
control  of  Pitt  and  Grenville.  Gradually  attention  was  centering  on 
the  threatening  cloud  from  France  that  endangered  England's  neu- 
trality. The  events  of  the  loth  of  August,  1792,  long  prophesied,  yet 
unexpected  after  all,  momentarily  threw  into  confusion  British  govern- 
mental circles,  and  incidentally  furnished  an  illustration  of  the  degree 
of  dependence  now  felt  by  Pitt  in  the  management  of  foreign  affairs. 
Grenville  was  absent  from  London  upon  his  wedding  journey.  He  was, 
however,  in  constant  touch  with  his  departmental  work,  for  Burges 
kept  him  regularly  informed  of  each  day's  budget  of  news,  and  both 
Pitt  and  Dundas  wrote  him  with  a  frequency  indicating  their  anxiety 
for  his  advice .  f  Matters  not  requiring  immediate  attention  were  referred 
to  him  for  decision,  and  copies  of  all  despatches  from  abroad  were 
forwarded.  When  the  news  of  the  excesses  committed  in  France 

*  Ewart's  recall  deserves  more  attention  than  has  been  given  to  it  in  history, 
both  as  the  ending  of  a  definite  epoch  of  English  diplomacy  and  as  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  career  of  a  very  able  diplomat.  Auckland's  efforts  to  secure  Ewart's 
disgrace,  Grenville's  wil  liagness  to  make  him  a  scapegoat,  and  the  seizure  of  Ewart's 
papers,  as  brought  out  in  the  Dropmore  MSS. ,  do  not  reflect  much  credit  on  the 
English  government.  The  letters  relating  to  the  seizure  of  the  papers  are  in 
Dropmore,  II,  253-256.  Grenville  increased  Mrs.  Ewart's  pension  in  order  to  get 
them,  but  this  was  not  known  even  to  Auckland.  Mrs.  Ewart  afterward  received 
the  offer  of  a  round  sum  from  the  opposition  for  these  same  papers,  and  made  the 
amusing  reply  that  she  must  reject  the  offer  as  she  "  considered  them  [the  papers] 
as  a  sacred  deposit  belonging  to  her  son."  Auckland,  II,  435.  Ewart's  importance 
and  his  great  influence  at  Berlin  are  asserted  in  a  letter  from  St.  Helens  to  Croker, 
written  November  2,  1836.  Croker,  II,  95-97. 

t  Letters  from  Pitt,  Dundas,  and  George  III  to  Grenville  indicate  that  all  the 
more  important  despatches  were  forwarded  to  Grenville  for  his  advice.  Drop- 
more,  II,  310-315.  Burke  also  wrote  two  letters  to  Grenville  at  this  crisis,  protesting 
against  the  government's  policy  of  neutrality,  as  in  effect  a  sanction  of  the  crimes 
in  France.  The  first  letter  was  written  August  18,  1792,  when  news  of  the  events  of 
the  loth  reached  England,  but  was  not  sent  until  September  19,  when  Burke  wrote 
out  his  views  after  an  interview  with  Grenville.  Ibid.,  Ill,  463-467. 


2O     THE   INFLUENCE   OF  GRENVILLE   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

reached  London,  the  government  was  thrown  into  a  fit  of  consternation 
and  feared  that  its  representative  in  Paris,  Lord  Gower,  might  suffer 
personal  injury.  A  despatch  was  immediately  sent  recalling  him.  It 
was  deemed  unwise  to  delay  until  Grenville  could  be  consulted,  and 
Pitt  himself  drew  up  the  despatch,  writing  also  to  Grenville  of  what  he 
had  done  and  adding  :  "I  wish  we  could  have  had  time  to  know  your 
sentiments  first,  but  that  seemed  impossible. ' '  *  Pitt  was  anxious  that 
Grenville  should  return  to  assume  charge  of  foreign  business  during 
this  crisis,  and  Grenville  accordingly  made  a  hurried  trip  to  London,  f 
A  short  stay  sufficed  to  calm  the  excitement  of  his  fellow-ministers  and 
to  put  affairs  in  order  in  his  department.  Burges  wrote  :  "Lord  Gren- 
ville came  to  town  on  Wednesday  evening,  and  of  course  business  begins 
to  flourish."  J  No  definite  line  of  policy  was  determined  upon,  for  it 
was  evident  that  time  was  necessary  to  see  the  recent  events  in  a  true 
light.  Pitt's  dependence  and  Grenville' s  control  of  details  are,  however, 
forcibly  brought  out,  for  twice  more  Grenville  was  hurriedly  re- 
called when  Pitt  disliked  to  assume  the  sole  responsibility,  and  finally, 
in  November,  Pitt's  desire  that  Grenville  should  formulate  the  line  of 
policy  most  likely  to  deter  France  from  attacking  Holland  forced  the 
latter  to  resume  his  customary  duties.  § 

The  interesting  and  much-discussed  question  of  whether  England 
followed  the  wisest  policy  in  determining  upon  war  with  France,  and 
whether,  indeed,  war  could  have  been  avoided,  must  here  be  passed 
over,  for  there  is  no  proof  whatever  that  Grenville  was  at  this  period 
more  favorable  to  war  than  was  Pitt.  In  truth,  Grenville's  entire 
policy  had  thus  far  been  based  on  the  necessity  of  peace  for  England.  [| 
The  events  of  the  loth  of  August  had  not  stirred  him  from  his  belief 
in  the  possibility  of  maintaining  England's  neutrality,  and  even  the 
King  held  to  the  same  view,  though  he  is  usually  regarded  as  having 
been  desirous  of  war.fl  Before  two  months  had  passed,  however,  a 

*  Pitt  to  Grenville,  Aug.  17,  1792.     Dropmore,  II,  302. 

|Pitt  to  Grenville,  Aug.  18,  1792.  Ibid.,  303.  Aust  to  Miles,  Aug.  18,  1792. 
Miles,  I,  329. 

I  Burges  to  Auckland,  Sept.  21,  1791.     Auckland,  II,  446. 

§  Pitt  to  Grenville,  Nov.  5-12,  1792.  Dropmore,  II,  328.  There  are  more  letters 
from  Pitt  to  Grenville  in  the  fifteen  days  when  the  excitement  in  England  was  at 
its  height  than  in  the  previous  eighteen  months. 

||  Immediately  after  the  signing  of  the  peace  of  Sistovo,  Grenville  wrote  :  "  I  am 
repaid  by  the  maintenance  of  peace,  which  is  all  this  country  has  to  desire.  We 
shall  now,  I  hope,  for  a  very  long  period  indeed,  enjoy  this  blessing,  and  cultivate 
a  situation  of  prosperity  unexampled  in  our  history."  Grenville  to  Buckingham, 
Aug.  17,  1791.  Court  and  Cabinets,  II,  196. 

Tf  Brunswick  had  asked  in  August,  1792,  for  a  declaration  by  England  of  her 
intentions.  Grenville,  through  Dundas,  instructed  Murray,  who  was  with 
Brunswick's  army,  to  state  that  England  would  maintain  her  neutrality  and  could 
not  make  a  declaration,  though  approving  the  purpose  of  restoring  a  responsible 
and  peacefully  inclined  government  in  France.  Dropmore,  II,  313.  George  III 
approved  the  draft  of  this  answer.  Ibid.,  310. 


WAR    WITH    FRANCE.  21 

great  change  took  place  in  ministerial  sentiment,  due  not  so  much  to 
anxiety  for  the  situation  of  royalty  in  France  as  to  the  astounding  and 
rapid  successes  of  French  arms.  From  a  nation  about  to  be  crushed 
by  a  superior  military  force,  France  became  at  a  bound  a  great  revolu- 
tionary power,  pushing  its  doctrines  and  its  armies  beyond  its  own 
frontiers.  French  victories  in  Italy,  on  the  Rhine,  and  in  Belgium 
forced  England  to  recognize  that  she  must  gird  herself  for  war  in  de- 
fense of  Holland.  This  was  the  determination  reached  by  the  English 
ministry  early  in  November,  1792.*  A  little  later  it  is  evident  from 
Grenville's  instructions  to  Auckland  and  others  that  in  Cabinet  circles 
at  least  there  was  a  definite  purpose  to  restrain,  and  if  possible  to 
overthrow,  the  revolutionary  principles  enunciated  by  the  French 
government,t  though  the  final  and  public  defense  for  the  inauguration 
of  war  was  the  opening  of  the  Scheldt  and  the  defense  of  Holland.  | 

So  far,  then,  as  the  adoption  of  a  war  policy  is  concerned,  there  is  no 
question  of  comparative  influence  between  Pitt  and  Grenville.  It  is 
true  that  after  September,  1792,  the  King  was  eager  for  a  rupture  with 
France,  and  it  is  probable  that  Grenville  more  readily  came  to  this  view 
than  did  Pitt,  but  both  were  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  war  and  were 
acting  in  perfect  harmony.  During  the  first  months  of  preparation  and 
endeavor,  no  important  question  of  policy  arose.  Grenville  was  busy 
in  detailed  diplomatic  negotiations  with  England's  allies.  Pitt  labored 
with  Dundas  to  perfect  a  scheme  of  military  operations.  But  when 

*This  is  shown  by  a  letter  from  Buckingham  to  Grenville,  Nov.  18,  1792.  "I 
am  very  glad  that  you  have  taken  your  line  as  to  Holland.  •  •  •  •  I  think  it 
probable  that  you  will  be  forced,  in  case  of  the  conquest  of  the  Netherlands,  to  in- 
terfere; and  you  cannot  do  it  more  wisely  than  by  choosing  for  the  ground  of  the 
quarrel  one  so  very  essential  to  us,  and  upon  which  the  minds  of  the  people  of 
England  have  been  so  lately  made  up."  Dropmore,  II,  336. 

f  January  15,  1793,  Grenville  wrote  to  Auckland  in  regard  to  the  proposed  pub- 
lication of  a  letter  from  Fagel  outlining  the  Dutch  ideas  of  the  attitude  of  Holland 
to  France:  "It  is,  I  doubt  not,  adapted  to  the  present  temper  of  the  Republic,  but 
the  expressions  of  still  hoping  to  preserve  peace  by  adhering  to  neutrality  would 
be  construed  here  to  exclude  all  measures  to  be  taken  on  the  general  view  of  affairs, 
and  for  the  object  of  restraining  the  progress  of  French  arms  and  French  princi- 
ples, even  though  we  should  not  be  the  immediate  objects  of  attack."  Ibid.,  366, 
Almost  the  same  words  are  used  in  the  Cabinet  minute  of  Jan.  25,  1793,  containing 
St.  Helens's  instructions  in  proposing  an  alliance  with  Spain.  The  object  here  is 
stated  to  be  "to  establish  a  concert  to  prevent  the  progress  of  French  arms  and 
principles."  Ibid.,  373. 

J  The  most  exhaustive  and  critical  analysis  of  the  questions  that  led  to  war  is 
Oscar  Browning's  "  England  and  France  in  1793  "  in  the  Fortnightly  Review  for 
February,  1883.  The  Dropmore  MSS.  bear  out  in  the  main  all  of  Browning's  con- 
tentions, though  the  tenor  of  Grenville's  letters  after  November  15,  1792,  is  that 
the  war  is  practically  decided  upon  and  that  only  a  most  unexpected  giving  way  by 
France  can  avert  it.  If  this  be  true,  the  numerous  and  involved  negotiations  sub- 
sequent to  that  date  lose  much  of  their  importance  and  significance.  They  were 
continued  rather  with  the  idea  of  gaining  time  for  preparation,  and  in  order  to 
conciliate  Holland,  than  with  any  real  hope  of  a  peaceful  adjustment. 


22      THK   INFLUENCE   OF  GRENVILLE   ON   PITT'S  FOREIGN   POLICY. 

the  counter-revolutions  in  France,  the  risings  in  Vendee,  and  the  cap- 
ture of  Toulon  gave  promise  of  a  rapid  victory  for  the  allies,  it  became 
necessary  for  England  to  manifest  more  clearly  than  she  had  as  yet 
done  her  ideas  in  regard  to  the  proper  form  of  government  and  the 
proper  political  conditions  to  be  established  in  France.  It  was  in  this 
connection  that  the  first  difference  of  opinion  on  the  conduct  of  the 
war  arose  between  Pitt  and  Grenville.  While  Pitt  proceeded  to  draft 
a  declaration  to  be  published  at  Toulon,  Grenville  drew  up  a  manifesto 
to  be  approved  by  the  allies  and  to  set  forth  England's  objects  in  the 
war.  The  former  was  primarily  a  military  proclamation,  the  latter  a 
document  of  state,  but  both  necessarily  were  drawn  on  similar  lines. 
Pitt  at  first  wished  to  postpone  any  general  declaration  until  some  con- 
siderable time  after  the  issue  of  that  from  Toulon,  but  he  soon  yielded 
to  Grenville's  insistence,  and  the  documents  were  ultimately  issued  in 
the  reverse  order  from  that  desired  by  Pitt.  Concerning  the  subject- 
matter  of  Grenville's  manifesto,  Pitt  wrote  to  Grenville  on  October  5  : 

' '  With  respect  to  your  paper,  the  most  material  suggestion  which  I 
have  stated  is  that  which  proposes  a  more  pointed  recommendation  of 
monarchical  government  with  proper  limitations.  I  do  not  see  that  we 
can  go  on  secure  grounds  if  we  treat  with  any  separate  districts  or 
bodies  of  men  who  stop  short  of  some  declaration  in  favour  of  monarchy  ; 
nor  do  I  see  any  way  so  likely  to  unite  considerable  numbers  in  one 
vigorous  effort,  as  by  specifying  monarchy  as  the  only  system  in  the  re- 
establishment  of  which  we  are  disposed  to  concur.  This  idea  by  no 
means  precludes  us  from  treating  with  any  other  form  of  regular  gov- 
ernment, if,  in  the  end,  any  other  should  be  solidly  established  ;  but  it 
holds  out  monarchy  as  the  only  one  from  which  we  expect  any  good, 
and  in  favour  of  which  we  are  disposed  to  enter  into  concert."  * 

It  is  evident  that  the  mental  reservation  here  suggested  by  Pitt  in 
favor  of  "  any  other  form  of  regular  government,  if,  in  the  end,  any 
other  should  be  solidly  established,"  could  not  be  included  in  the  public 
declaration.  If  so  included,  the  reservation  would  in  itself  negative 
the  "  specifying  monarchy  as  the  only  system  in  the  re-establishment 
of  which  we  are  disposed  to  concur."  Yet  to  issue  the  declaration  in 
the  form  proposed  by  Pitt,  without  the  insertion  of  the  saving  clause, 
would  just  as  effectively  tie  the  hands  of  the  British  government,  whether 
in  future  negotiations  or  in  Parliamentary  discussions,  as  if  no  reserva- 
tion had  been  intended.  Pitt  also  insisted  on  the  insertion  of  a  clause 
which  demanded  the  restoration  of  the  "ancient  judicature,"  and 
was  unquestionably  influenced  by  Burke  and  to  a  lesser  degree  by  the 

*Pitt  to  Grenville,  Oct.  5,  1793.     Dropmore,  II,  438. 


WAR   WITH    FRANCE.  23 

information  supplied  him  by  Miles.*  Grenville  stoutly  resisted  the  line 
of  policy  proposed,  and  his  objections  were  so  far  effective  that  Pitt 
yielded  the  main  point,  though  still  clinging  to  the  "ancient  judica- 
ture" clause. f  The  result  was  in  some  sense  a  compromise,  in  which 
monarchy  in  France  was  given  a  greater  prominence  than  was  desired 
by  Grenville,  but  was  distinctly  not  stipulated  as  an  essential  to  peace. 
This  was  the  solution  for  both  the  general  manifesto  and  the  Toulon 
declaration,  though  the  latter,  drafted  by  Pitt,  was  much  more  em- 
phatic in  favor  of  the  restoration  of  monarchy  than  was  the  former. 
The  two  documents  well  illustrate  the  temper  of  mind  of  the  two  leading 
English  statesmen  at  the  time.  Grenville' s  manifesto  was  published 
October  29,  1793.  In  regard  to  the  government  of  France,  it  stated  : 

' '  The  King  demands  that  some  legitimate  and  stable  government 
should  be  established,  founded  on  the  acknowledged  principles  of  uni- 
versal justice,  and  capable  of  maintaining  with  other  powers  the  ac- 
customed relations  of  union  and  peace.  His  Majesty  wishes  ardently 
to  be  enabled  to  treat  for  the  reestablishment  of  general  tranquillity 
with  such  a  government,  exercising  a  legal  and  permanent  authority, 
animated  with  the  wish  for  general  tranquillity,  and  possessing  power 
to  enforce  the  observance  of  its  engagements.  '  It  is  for 

these  objects  that  he  calls  upon  them  [the  people  of  France]  to  join 
the  standard  of  an  hereditary  monarchy  ;  not  for  the  purpose  of  decid- 
ing, in  this  moment  of  disaster,  calamity,  and  public  danger,  on  all 
the  modifications  of  which  this  form  of  government  may  hereafter  be 
susceptible,  but  in  order  to  unite  themselves  once  more  under  the 
empire  of  law,  of  morality,  and  of  religion  '  \  •  '."  J 
The  Toulon  declaration  of  November  20,  1793,  said  : 
' '  His  Majesty  ardently  wishes  the  happiness  of  France,  but  by  no 
means  desires,  on  that  account,  to  prescribe  the  form  of  its  government, ' ' 
but  "  His  Majesty  does  not  hesitate  to  declare  that  the  reestablishment 
of  monarchy,  in  the  person  of  Louis  XVII  and  the  lawful  heirs  of  the 


*  Miles  had  considerable  influence  as  a  public  writer  and  was  occasionally  em- 
ployed by  Pitt  in  that  capacity.  He  was  apparently  thoroughly  honest,  but  since 
his  employment  abroad  by  Pitt  in  1787  and  in  1790  he  had  grown  to  consider  him- 
self as  an  important  ex-officio  adviser  of  the  government.  Pitt  evidently  believed 
him  possessed  of  unusual  means  of  information  about  France.  On  September  16, 
1793,  Miles  wrote  to  Pitt  urging  the  printing  and  distribution  in  France  of  Hood's 
proclamation  of  August  28  announcing  that  Toulon  had  been  taken  in  trust  for 
Louis  XVII.  Miles,  II,  101.  The  authority  of  Miles  for  exact  statements  must, 
however,  be  taken  with  great  caution.  He  was  one  of  those  conscientiously  argu- 
mentative persons  who  are  always  in  the  right.  His  perfect  sincerity  renders  it 
doubly  difficult  to  distinguish  between  the  true  and  the  false. 

fPitt  to  Grenville,  Oct.  ir,  179^.     Dropmore,  II,  443. 

\Parl.  Hist.,  XXX,  1057-1060. 


24      THE   INFLUENCE   OF  GRENVILLE   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

crown,  appears  to  him  the  best  mode  of  accomplishing  these  just  and 
salutary  views. ' '  * 

Grenville  used  monarchy  as  a  rallying  cry ;  Pitt  asserted  that  it 
would  be  the  best  solution  of  difficulties  in  France.  But  in  the  docu- 
ment of  neither  does  monarchy  appear  as  ' '  the  only  system  in  the 
re-establishment  of  which  we  are  disposed  to  concur,"  nor,  indeed,  is 
there  any  mention  of  the  restoration  of  the  "  ancient  judicature." 

Grenville' s  foresight  had  in  truth  saved  Pitt  from  a  serious  tactical 
blunder.  Had  England  issued  a  declaration  upon  the  lines  originally 
proposed  by  Pitt,  the  government  would  have  been  forced  but  a  little 
later  to  the  humiliation  of  pleading  a  secret  reservation,  in  the  terms 
of  an  energetic  public  document,  or  would  have  found  itself  com- 
pelled to  maintain  an  absolute  bar  to  any  peace  negotiation.  England 
had  declared  her  opinion  that  monarchy  was  best  suited  to  France,  yet 
she  was  not  pledged  to  support  that  form  of  government  alone.  Burke 
and  the  ultra-royalists  were  indignant  at  the  declarations  made,f  but 
the  allies  were  satisfied,  and  indeed  so  strong  was  the  impression  abroad 
that  England  had  specified  monarchy  as  an  essential  to  peace  that 
nearly  every  continental  historian  has  stated  it  as  a  fact.|  In  Parlia- 
ment itself  the  opposition  constantly  harped  upon  the  same  theme, 
though  Sheridan  was  frank  enough  to  admit  that  no  pledge  had  been 
given, §  and  in  every  debate  upon  this  topic  up  to  1797  it  is  noteworthy 
that  the  arguments  of  Fox  and  others  were  invariably  based  upon  the 
Toulon  declaration  and  not  upon  Grenville's  manifesto.  Pitt,  at  first 
apologetically,  later  triumphantly,  denied  the  implied  pledge,  and  was 
able  to  support  his  arguments  by  a  reference  to  the  strict  letter  of  the 
documents.  For  this  he  had  Grenville  to  thank.  Thus  at  the  very 

*  Part.  Hist.,  XXX,  1060. 

f  Burke  wrote  to  Grenville  October  27,  1793,  asking  to  be  heard  on  the  manifesto, 
but  was  too  late,  for  it  had  already  been  sent  to  the  foreign  powers.  Dropmore, 
II,  450.  Sir  Gilbert  Elliot  temporarily  alienated  Burke  at  this  time  by  acquiescing 
in  the  ministerial  policy  and  accepting  the  mission  to  Toulon.  Burke  regarded  the 
royalists  as  abandoned.  Burke  to  Elliot,  Sept.  22,  1793.  Elliot,  II,  169,  403. 
Elliot  himself  wished  more  favor  shown  to  the  royalists  and  desired  Monsieur  to 
come  to  Toulon  to  raise  the  royalist  standard.  Elliot  to  Dundas,  no  date,  and 
Elliot  to  Lady  Elliot,  June  i,  1797.  Ibid.,  189,  403.  This  proposal  was,  however, 
thwarted  by  Grenville  through  the  agency  of  Malniesbury  and  the  Comtesse  de 
Balbi.  Grenville  to  Malmesbury,  Dec.  9,  1793.  Dropmore,  II,  476.  Malmesbury 
to  Comtesse  de  Balbi,  Dec.  27,  1793.  Malmesbury,  III,  32  ;  Sorel,  III,  503. 

\  Sorel  falls  into  this  error.  In  discussing  the  Vendean  risings,  he  interprets  the 
manifesto  of  October  29,  1793,  to  mean  that  England  will  insist  on  a  restoration  of 
constitutional  monarchy.  Sorel's  sources  on  this  subject  are  all  French  or  Aus- 
trian. Ibid.,  500-503. 

§  Part.  Hist.,  XXX,  1226,  Jan.  21,  1794. 


THE   PRUSSIAN   WITHDRAWAL   PROM   THE    WAR.  25 

outset  of  the  Revolutionary  wars,  the  influence  of  Grenville  had  proved 
all-important  in  saving  the  administration  from  a  compromising  dec- 
laration.* 

THE  PRUSSIAN  WITHDRAWAL  FROM  THE  WAR. 

OCTOBER,  1793,  TO  SEPTEMBER,  1794. 

At  the  very  moment  when  England  was  outlining  a  plan  of  treat- 
ment for  a  conquered  France,  she  was  confronted  with  the  danger  of 
desertion  by  one  of  her  allies,  for  Prussia,  distracted  by  troubles  in 
Poland,  was  threatening  to  withdraw  her  troops,  urging  as  her  excuse 
a  bankrupt  treasury.  Shortly  after  the  declaration  of  war  by  France 
Yarmouth  had.  been  sent  to  the  continent  f  with  the  purpose  of  decid- 
ing upon  some  common,  ground  of  action  with  Prussia  and  Austria, 
and  on  July  14,  1793,  he  had  signed  a  treaty  with  Prussia  at  Mayence, 
pledging  both  countries  to  continue  in  arms  against  France.  |  A  sim- 
ilar agreement  with  Austria  was  signed  in  London,  August  30,  though 
the  latter  contained  in  addition  a  mutual  guaranty  of  territory  as 
against  France.  §  These  treaties  amounted  to  no  more  than  pledges 
of  good  faith, ||  and  neither  contained  any  exact  specifications  of  the 

*  Fox  led  the  attack  upon  what  he  termed  Pitt's  monarchical  policy.  "If  we 
look  at  the  declaration  to  the  people  of  France,  the  first  idea  presented  by  it, 
although  afterwards  somewhat  modified,  but  again  confirmed  by  the  declaration 
of  Toulon,  is  that  the  restoration  to  monarchy  must  be  the  preliminary  to  peace. ' ' 
Parl.  Hist.,  XXX,  1260,  Jan.  21,  1794.  The  arguments  of  the  opposition  on  this 
point  do  not  bear  the  stamp  of  sincerity.  They  were  put  forward  more  to  embar- 
rass the  government  than  for  any  other  purpose,  for  it  was  impossible  for  Pitt  to 
deny  that  the  restoration  of  monarchy  was  at  least  an  object  hoped  for.  To  have 
clone  so  would  have  disgruntled  the  allies  and  have  lessened  the  chances  of  a 
royalist  rising  in  France.  In  the  first  debates  in  the  Lords,  therefore,  Grenville 
wholly  evaded  the  subject,  while  Pitt  in  the  Commons  pursued  a  like  policy  until 
pinned  down  by  a  direct  question  from  Fox.  Later,  as  the  hopes  of  monarchy 
dwindled,  both  Pitt  and  Grenville  exalted  the  wisdom  of  the  ministry  in  not  having 
pledged  England  to  an  impossible  policy. 

t  Yarmouth  went  to  Prussia  in  July,  1793.  He  thought  Prussia  could  easily  be 
brought  to  more  active  participation  in  the  war  by  promising  (i)  that  no  idea  of  a 
Bavarian  exchange  would  be  brought  forward  at  the  conchision  of  the  war ;  (2)  that 
England  would  "  not  endeavour  to  interrupt  the  King  of  Prussia  in  the  enjoyment 
of  his  new  Polish  acquisitions  " — i.  e.,  a  negative  guaranty  of  the  partition  of  1792. 
Beauchamp  to  Pitt,  June  24,  1793.  Dropmore,  II,  399. 

tKoch,  IV,  236;  Debrett,  I,  18. 

\Ibid.,  19  ;  Sorel,  III,  460. 

||  Bourgoing,  III,  161,  makes  an  entirely  erroneous  statement  of  the  London  con- 
vention of  August  30,  1793.  He  says  that  secret  articles  provided  that  "  1'Autriche 
recevait  comme  compensation  de  ses  sacrifices  pendant  la  guerre,  une  indemnity 
territoriale  aux  depens  de  la  France,  a  savoir,  la  Lorraine,  1'Alsace,  la  Flandre; 
elle  renoncait  a  toute  prevention  sur  la  Bavidre,  et  1'Angleterre  en  ^change  lui 
garantissait  la  possessione  des  provinces  beiges."  The  Dropmore  letters  disprove 
this  and  in  fact  show  that  while  exact  stipulations  were  under  discussion  they 
were  all  postponed  because  of  the  difficulty  of  reaching  an  agreement  upon  Dutch 
demands  for  indemnities.  See  also  Morton  Eden  to  Auckland,  Nov.  16,  1793, 
Auckland,  III,  144,  and  Auckland  to  Van  der  Spiegel,  Jan.  24,  1794,  ibid.,  173. 


26      THE   INFLUENCE   OF  GRENVIL.LE   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

assistance  to  be  rendered ;  but  Prussia  was  bound  by  other  treaties 
to  furnish  certain  stipulated  succors  to  England  and  Holland,  and 
these  Lucchesini  asserted  it  was  now  impossible  for  her  to  render  longer, 
unless  England  would  grant  a  subsidy  and  guarantee  Prussia's  Polish 
possessions.*  The  news  reached  England  September  30.  Grenville 
immediately  asserted  that  neither  demand  could  be  complied  with,  but 
Pitt,  while  agreeing  that  the  Polish  guaranty  was  out  of  the  question, 
was  inclined  to  argue  in  favor  of  some  sort  of  subsidy,  provided  the 
King  of  Prussia  was  first  made  to  acknowledge  that  under  existing 
treaties  he  could  not  honorably  withdraw  the  troops  already  in  the 
field. f  Pitt  further  suggested  that  Malmesbury  might  be  sent  to 
Berlin  to  unravel  the  tangle  in  which  Yarmouth's  lack  of  ability  had 
involved  English  interests  ;  I  but  for  the  moment  he  yielded  his  own 
opinion,  and  in  a  Cabinet  meeting  on  October  9  both  guaranty  and 
subsidy  were  refused,  though  the  language  of  the  note  drawn  up  by 
Grenville  was  materially  softened. § 

Grenville  was  already  convinced  that  Prussia  had  no  intention  of 
continuing  the  war,  and  he  objected  to  the  subsidy  both  on  the  ground 
that  Prussia  had  no  right  to  ask  it,  and  also  because  he  did  not  believe 
that  it  would  insure  vigorous  action  by  Prussian  armies.  Accordingly 
he  recalled  Yarmouth,  ||  and  only  withdrew  that  recall  to  please  Yar- 
mouth, who  still  believed  that  he  could  be  of  service  in  Berlin.fi  But 
the  English  government  had  underestimated  the  strength  of  the  anti- 
war party  at  Berlin.  Instead  of  intimidating  the  Prussian  court  by 
insistence  on  the  fulfilment  of  existing  treaties,  the  English  govern- 
ment was  itself  thrown  into  consternation  on  the  receipt  of  an  angry 
and  threatening  communication  from  Jacobi,  the  Prussian  minister  in 
London.**  Pitt  at  once  reverted  to  his  original  plan,  and  this  time  the 
Cabinet  was  with  him,  while  Grenville  acquiesced  in  the  proposed 
subsidy,  prophesying  nevertheless  that  no  good  would  result  from  it.f  f 
Malmesbury  was  despatched  to  Berlin  to  arrange  the  terms  of  a  sub- 
sidy, but  was  instructed  that  the  King  of  Prussia  must  first  be  made 
to  acknowledge  that  the  existing  situation  was  a  casus  fcederis  under  the 
terms  of  the  alliance  of  1788. \\  On  this  point  Frederick  William  II 

*  Surges  to  Grenville,  Sept.  30,  1793.     Dropmore,  II,  430. 

t  Pitt  to  Grenville,  Oct.  2,  1793.     (Two  letters .)     Ibid.,  433,  434. 

JPitt  to  Grenville,  Oct.  4,  1793.  Ibid.,  503.  The  date  given  for  this  letter  in 
the  MSS.  is  Feb.  4,  1794,  but  the  context  shows  that  this  is  an  error.  The  letter  is 
exactly  70  pages  out  of  place  in  the  order  of  arrangement  used  in  the  MSS. 

§Pitt  to  Grenville,  Oct.  10,  1793.     Ibid.,  447. 

||  Grenville  to  Yarmouth,  Oct.  17,  1793.     Ibid.,  446. 

fi  Yarmouth  to  Grenville,  Nov.  6,  1793.     Ibid.,  453. 

**  Yarmouth  to  Grenville,  Nov.  24,  1793      Ibid  ,  470. 

tt  Grenville  to  Malmesbury,  March  7,  1794.     Ibid  ,  516. 

jj  Grenville  to  Malmesbury,  Nov.  20,  1793.     Malmesbury,  III,  I. 


THE    PRUSSIAN   WITHDRAWAL    FROM    THE    WAR.  27 

satisfied  the  English  envoy  at  their  first  interview,*  but  the  terms 
of  a  subsidy  treaty  were  not  easily  agreed  upon,  and  it  was  not  until 
Haugwitz  and  Malmesbury  had  repaired  to  The  Hague  that  a  conven- 
tion was  signed  on  April  19,  1794,  between  England,  Prussia,  and 
Holland. f  Malmesbury,  who  was  enthusiastic  in  the  pursuit  of  his 
object,  had  ventured  to  exceed  the  exact  letter  of  his  instructions,  J 
resting  rather  upon  his  knowledge  of  Pitt's  general  purposes  than 
upon  the  instructions  received  from  Grenville.  Pitt  was  wholly 
pleased  with  the  result,  §  but  Grenville  was  still  distrustful  of  Prussia, 
though  publicly  expressing  his  satisfaction,  ||  and  his  suspicions  were 
speedih"  confirmed  by  the  actual  progress  of  events.  Prussia  refused 
to  move  her  troops  until  the  first  subsidies  were  paid,  and  England 
was  slow  in  making  the  payments.  Frederick  William  II  was  in  fact 
again  yielding  to  the  influence  of  that  party  in  Berlin  which  saw 
Prussia's  real  interests  in  the  exploitation  of  Poland,  and  by  June, 
1794,  even  Malmesbury  had  reached  the  conclusion  that  effective  Prus- 
sian aid  was  not  to  be  expected,  fi  Nevertheless  both  he  and  Pitt  clung 
to  the  remote  hope  of  honesty  in  the  Prussian  government  and  success- 
fully opposed  Grenville' s  proposition  of  an  immediate  withdrawal  of 
subsidies  if  the  Prussian  troops  did  not  at  once  begin  their  march  to 
the  Rhine.**  Grenville  yielded  with  good  grace,  for  the  time  had  now 
come,  as  he  hoped,  for  the  realization  of  his  own  essential  line  of  policy. 
While,  therefore,  Malmesbury  was  hurrying  from  post  to  post  in  the 
vain  effort  to  infuse  some  energy  into  the  Prussian  camps,  and  while 
Mollendorf  was  secretly  opening  those  negotiations  with  the  French 
that  were  to  lead  to  Prussia's  complete  withdrawal  from  the  war,  Gren- 
ville had  brought  Pitt  and  the  English  Cabinet  to  accept  a  project  for 
an  Austrian  alliance  that  should  go  far  in  compensating  for  the  treachery 
of  Prussia. ft  The  plan  as  originally  outlined  did  not  necessarily  mean 

*  Diary,  Dec.  26,  1793.     Malmesbury,  III,  28. 

t  For  analysis,  see  Koch,  IV,  269-271.     For  text,  see  Parl.  Hist.,  XXXI,  433. 

j  Malmesbury  to  Grenville,  March  13,  1794      Malmesbury,  III,  77. 

§  Pitt  to  Grenville,  April  24,  1794.     Dropmore,  II,  552. 

||  In  the  Parliamentary  debate  on  the  treaty  on  April  30,  1794,  there  is  nothing  to 
indicate  Grenville's  opposition  to  the  project.  Indeed,  he  seems  unnecessarily 
explicit  in  stating  his  personal  approval,  as  if  denying  a  rumor  that  he  was  opposed 
to  it.  "  He  was  free  to  say  that  he  never  had  had  two  opinions  on  the  question, 
whether  he  should  confine  the  aid  to  the  stipulated  succour  of  the  former  treaty,  or 
extend  it  to  that  which  was  now  secured."  Parl.  Hist.,  XXXI,  453. 

1j  Malmesbury  to  Grenville,  June  21,  1794.     Dropmore,  II,  577. 

**  Pitt  to  Grenville,  June  29,  1794.  Ibid.,  592.  Portland  to  Malmesbury,  July  23, 
1794.  Malmesbury,  III,  124. 

ft  Auckland  wrote  to  Henry  Spencer  on  September  18,  1794  :  "  The  moment  for 
Ix>rd  Grenville  making  his  proposed  great  arrangement  is  at  hand,  for  the  mes- 
senger went  last  Saturday  with  the  final  instructions  to  Lord  Spencer  and  Mr. 
Grenville  •  '  '  •."  Auckland,  III,  241.  The  terms  used  here  and  elsewhere 
on  diplomatic  projects  indicate  Auckland  to  mean  that  the  Austrian  project  was 
due  wholly  to  Grenville. 


28      THE   INFLUENCE   OF   GRENVILLE   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

the  withdrawal  of  Prussia,  but  as  it  was  gradually  developed  came  to  be 
regarded  as  an  alternative  proposition  to  be  executed  in  case  of  the  fail- 
ure of  Malmesbury's  mission.*  In  the  latter  part  of  July,  1794,  Spencer 
and  Thomas  Grenville  were  despatched  to  Vienna,  while  Mercy  received 
orders  from  Thugut  to  proceed  to  London,  f  As  soon  as  he  learned  of 
this  new  negotiation,  Malmesbury,  already  disheartened,  definitely  gave 
up  hope  of  realizing  his  object  and  asked  to  be  recalled.  J  This  was 
not  at  once  granted,  Grenville' s  purpose  being  apparently  to  use  his 
known  activities  as  a  lever  at  Vienna,  and  it  was  not  until  October  24, 
some  days  after  the  Prussian  subsidies  had  been  officially  stopped,  that 
the  recall  was  sent.§  By  that  time  it  was  evident  that  England  and 
Austria  could  not  as  yet  agree  upon  the  terms  of  a  treaty.  ||  Grenville 
had  expected  to  find  a  willingness  at  the  court  of  Vienna  to  accept 
English  direction  in  the  conduct  of  the  war,  provided  only  a  liberal 
subsidy  and  a  specific  guaranty  of  conquests  were  granted.  Instead, 
his  diplomats  found  a  suspicious  court  and  a  changeable  policy,  while 
Grenville  was  hampered  by  his  very  loyalty  to  his  Dutch  ally,  whose 
preposterous  demands  for  indemnities  vexed  the  Austrian  ministers. 
Austria  was  anxious  to  exchange  the  Netherlands  for  Bavaria,  and  in- 
directly sounded  the  English  ministry  on  this  point,  but  did  not  venture 
to  propose  it  openly  4  Other  considerations  complicated  the  negotia- 
tion, and  the  English  ministry,  apparently  frightened  at  the  whirlpool 
of  diplomacy  in  which  it  was  in  danger  of  being  involved,  hastened  to 
withdraw  its  agents. 

A  few  months  later  the  rapid  march  of  French  armies  forced  England 
to  acquiesce  in  a  request  for  peace  by  Holland.**  It  was  a  time  of  hu- 
miliation for  the  English  government.  England  had  entered  upon  the 
war  fully  convinced  that  a  speedy  victory  would  follow  the  combined 
efforts  of  the  allies,  and  thus  the  attention  of  both  Pitt  and  Grenville 
was  at  first  directed  principally  to  the  form  of  government  to  be  estab- 
lished in  France  and  the  nature  of  the  indemnities  to  be  secured.  The 
essential  feature  of  the  English  plan  was  the  restitution  of  Belgium  to 
Austria,  that  it  might  constitute  a  bulwark  in  defense  of  Holland.  It 

*  For  Pitt's  memoir  on  the  plan,  July  15,  1794,  see  Dropmore,  II,  599.  Thomas 
Grenville  to  Grenville,  Aug.  4,  1794.  Ibid.,  609. 

t  Grenville  to  Hertford,  July  17,  1794.    Ibid.,  601. 

\  Malmesbury  to  Grenville,  Sept.  20,  1794.     Ibid.,  633. 

\  The  subsidies  were  stopped  on  October  19.  For  a  resume"  of  the  Prussian  point 
of  view,  see  Grenville's  note  on  a  memorial  presented  by  Jacobi.  Ibid.,  Ill,  536. 

||  Court  and  Cabinets,  II,  259-317  ;  Sybel,  III,  248-251. 

^Ibid.,  248-251.  Both  Buckingham's  Court  and  Cabinets  and  the  letters  in 
Dropmore  (II,  600-640)  leave  the  impression  of  surprise  and  dismay  at  the  difficulty 
of  the  Austrian  negotiation  and  the  diversity  of  subjects  to  be  considered. 

**  Cabinet  minute  of  November  18,  1794.     Dropmore,  II,  646. 


THE    NEW    PRUSSIAN    PROPOSALS.  29 

was  natural,  therefore,  that  Grenville,  uninformed  of  the  real  indiffer- 
ence of  Austria  to  the  Netherlands,  and  personally  suspicious  since  1791 
of  the  methods  and  purposes  of  the  Prussian  court,  should  be  inclined 
to  an  Austrian  rather  than  to  a  Prussian  alliance.  Pitt,  on  the  other 
hand,  was,  by  the  credit  attaching  to  his  diplomacy  in  virtue  of  the 
Triple  Alliance  of  1788,  more  favorable  to  a  close  friendship  with 
Prussia.  After  the  withdrawal  of  Prussia  in  1794  no  hope  was  seri- 
ously entertained  of  effective  aid  from  that  quarter,  though  in  moments 
of  desperation  Pitt,  and  at  times  even  Grenville,  renewed  futile  attempts 
to  secure  it.  These  divergences  of  opinion  in  the  Cabinet  had  not  as 
yet  amounted  to  a  real  disagreement,  but  the  divergence  existed  and 
was  in  some  degree  at  least  a  factor  in  determining  the  diplomatic 
action  of  the  English  government.  The  Prussian  withdrawal  was  in 
no  sense  the  result  of  Grenville' s  hostile  attitude,  but  the  quick  turn  to 
Austria  was  a  distinct  victory  for  a  line  of  policy  long  considered  and 
now  matured  by  him.  Momentarily,  however,  an  Austrian  convention 
seemed  impossible  of  achievement,  due  not  to  any  opposition  by  Pitt, 
but  to  the  inability  of  the  two  governments  to  agree  upon  terms. 


PORTLAND'S  ACCESSION  AND  THE  NEW  PRUSSIAN  PROPOSALS. 
JULY,  1794,  TO  FEBRUARY,  1795. 

While  events  rather  than  personal  ascendency  were  thus  bringing 
Grenville's  foreign  policy  into  the  foreground,  an  incident  of  home 
politics  disclosed  the  fact  that  Pitt  was  the  master  in  that  field  at  least, 
and  that  he  did  not  have  so  high  a  regard  for  Grenville's  diplomatic 
services  as  to  be  unwilling  to  sacrifice  him  to  the  needs  of  party  organi- 
zation. Tentative  suggestions  in  July,  1792,  for  the  accession  of  the 
Portland  wing  of  the  Whig  party  had  resulted  in  November  of  that 
year  in  definite  proposals  by  Pitt  for  a  coalition.*  These  were  refused, 
and  it  was  not  until  July,  1794,  that  the  breach  between  Fox  and  Port- 
land had  reached  the  point  where  complete  rupture  was  inevitable. 
Portland  headed  a  defection  of  Whig  politicians  composed  of  men  who 

*  The  negotiations  for  a  coalition  with  Portland  in  1 792  have  not  been  proved  to 
the  satisfaction  of  historians.  Oscar  Browning  in  "  England  and  France  in  1793  " 
concludes  that  no  definite  proposals  were  made  by  Pitt,  and  that  Malmesbury's 
account  is  untrustworthy,  being  based  wholly  on  Loughborough's  statements.  The 
letters  in  the  Dropmore  MSS.  are  meager,  but  they  indicate  that  in  July,  1792,  Pitt 
was  making  efforts  to  gain  the  sxipport  of  Portland,  and  they  prove  that  in  No- 
vember terms  were  actually  proposed  by  Pitt  and  were  refused.  Pitt  to  Grenville, 
July  22,  1792;  Dundas  to  Grenville,  Aug.  9;  Pitt  to  Grenville,  Nov.  18  ;  Bucking- 
ham to  Greiiville,  Nov.  27.  Dropmore,  II,  294,  299,  335,  344. 


30      THE   INFLUENCE   OF   GRENVILLE   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

could  no  longer  uphold  the  radical  doctrines  of  Fox,  and  in  order  to 
reward  them  for  their  support  and  bind  them  to  his  policy  Pitt  was 
compelled  to  make  a  number  of  Cabinet  changes.  This  rearrangement 
was  not  difficult  except  in  the  case  of  Portland,  to  whom  it  was  neces- 
sary to  give  one  of  the  chief  departments.  Pitt  was  in  a  quandary  and 
in  his  perplexity  turned  to  Grenville,  who  had  been  urgent  for  the 
inclusion  of  Portland.  He  found  no  other  solution  than  that  Grenville 
should  resign  the  Foreign  Department  to  Portland,  receiving  in  its  place 
the  Home  Department,  but  without  the  conduct  of  the  war,  which  was 
to  be  retained  by  Dundas.*  Immediately  upon  the  receipt  of  Pitt's 
letter  suggesting  the  arrangement,  Grenville  replied  : 

"  I  and  my  situation  are,  as  you  well  know,  entirely  and  always  at 
your  disposal,  and  '  besides,  I  agree  with  you  in  thinking 

the  expedient  you  propose  the  best  to  avoid  an  alternative  which  seems 
either  way  embarrassing.  Under  these  circumstances  I  do  not  ask 
myself  whether  what  is  proposed  is  or  is  not  a  sacrifice  on  my  part,  but 
am  ready  at  once  to  say  that  no  consideration  could  reconcile  to  my 
mind  the  standing  for  a  moment  in  the  way  of  your  wishes,  or  of  so 
great  a  public  object  as  is  in  question."  f 

Two  days  later,  however,  Pitt  found  that  the  Foreign  Office  would 
not  be  agreeable  to  Portland,  and  finally  concluded  the  rearrangement 
by  dividing  Dundas's  department,  Portland  assuming  the  direction  of 
home  and  colonial  affairs,  while  Dundas  continued  to  manage  the  War 
Office.!  The  incident  had,  then,  no  immediate  effect  whatever  on 
foreign  policy,  though  it  unquestionably  gained  Grenville  the  grateful 
confidence  of  the  more  solid  portion  of  the  new  element  in  Pitt's  min- 
istry. It  does  indicate,  however,  that  Pitt  did  not  regard  Grenville 
as  indispensable  in  the  department  of  foreign  affairs,  and  at  the  same 
time  it  well  illustrates  the  intimacy  existing  between  the  two  men. 
Grenville' s  willingness  to  sacrifice  his  own  personal  preferences  in 
order  to  insure  party  success  §  could  but  increase  Pitt's  respect  and 
incline  him  to  listen  to  Grenville' s  advice,  and  it  was  in  this  very 
intimacy  that  Grenville' s  influence  chiefly  lay  at  this  period.  Differ- 
ences as  to  policy  were  as  yet  the  differences  in  private  of  warm  per- 
sonal friends  and  had  not  developed  into  Cabinet  controversies. 

It  was  as  a  result  of  the  introduction  of  this  Whig  element  into  the 
Tory  ministry  that  Grenville  soon  began  to  assume  a  more  independent 

*Pitt  to  Grenville,  July  5,  1794.     Dropmore,  II,  595. 

t  Grenville  to  Pitt,  July  5,  1794.     Ibid.,  596. 

I  Pitt  to  Greuville,  July  7,  1794.     Ibid.,  597. 

§  In  October,  1794,  Grenville  voluntarily  offered  to  resign  if  it  would  assist  Pitt 
in  making  arrangements  for  the  recall  of  Westmorland  from  Ireland  to  make  room 
for  Fitzwilliam,  but  Pitt  would  not  consider  it.  Stanhope,  II,  284. 


THE   NEW   PRUSSIAN   PROPOSALS.  31 

attitude  on  questions  of  foreign  policy.  Portland  and  his  friends 
had  joined  Pitt  because  they  believed  in  the  necessity  of  the  war  and 
could  no  longer  support  the  tactics  of  Fox  in  opposition  to  that  policy. 
Gradually  Grenville  and  Pitt  grew  apart,  the  former  becoming  more 
warlike  in  his  sentiments,  the  latter  more  pacific.  In  the  end  Gren- 
ville was  supported  by  the  Portland  Whigs  as  against  Pitt,  while  in 
general  Pitt  found  that  the  addition  of  the  Whigs  tended  to  destroy 
that  unanimity  which  had  heretofore  been  so  marked  a  characteristic 
of  his  ministry.  This  development  was  not  yet  foreseen,  nor  had  it 
been  fully  accomplished  when  next  a  difference  of  opinion  arose  be- 
tween Pitt  and  Grenville.  The  failure  of  Grenville's  Austrian  nego- 
tiations in  November  of  1794  had  momentarily  set  aside  the  thought 
of  a  close  military  alliance  with  any  power,  but  in  December  George  III 
himself  revived  the  Austrian  project,*  the  chief  obstacle  to  which  was 
Thugut's  demand  for  a  substantial  loan.  The  financial  distress  in 
England  made  it  impossible  for  the  ministry  to  promise  such  a  loan 
until  it  had  had  the  opportunity  of  laying  the  matter  before  Parlia- 
ment, but  meanwhile  an  unsatisfactory  arrangement  was  made  by 
which  temporary  advances  were  given  to  Austria.  While  the  whole 
question  of  a  systematic  alliance  with  Austria  was  thus  being  neces- 
sarily postponed,  it  daily  became  more  evident  that  Prussia  was  fast 
turning  toward  peace  with  France.  Pitt,  vexed  with  Thugut's  stub- 
bornness in  demanding  a  burdensome  loan  and  convinced  that  Prussia 
was  the  only  power  able  to  render  efficient  aid  in  a  proposed  recon- 
quest  of  Holland,  determined  to  bring  forward  again  the  plan  of  a 
Prussian  subsidy.  Already  in  December  of  1794  Malmesbury,  who 
was  at  Brunswick,  deriving  from  an  unpromising  despatch  by  Paget  a 
faint  hope  that  Prussia  might  yet  reenter  the  war,  had  written  a  final 
letter  of  appeal  to  Haugwitz,f  though  in  explaining  to  Grenville 
this  'unauthorized  communication  he  described  his  letter  as  one  of 
indignant  upbraiding.  J  On  February  3,  1795,  Malmesbury  informed 
Grenville  that  Prussia  was  vexed  at  the  excessive  demands  of  the 
French  and  was  about  to  renew  war.§  A  few  days  after  this  letter 
should  have  been  received  in  London,  Pitt  brought  forward  his  plan 
of  a  new  Prussian  subsidy  to  infuse  new  energy  into  the  war  and  to 
keep  Prussia  from  making  peace  with  France.  ||  Grenville's  opposition 

*  George  III  to  Grenville,  Dec   7,  1794.     Dropmore,  II,  650. 

f  Diary,  Dec.,  1794,  and  Malmesbury  to  Paget,  Dec.  25,  1794.  Malmesbury,  III, 
184-185,  228. 

JDec.  23,  1794.     Dropmore,  II,  653. 

\  Malmesbury,  III,  240. 

!|  This  plan  has  been  vaguely  suspected  by  historians,  but  is  customarily  omitted 
in  narratives  of  the  period  for  lack  of  satisfactory  proof.  The  fact  that  the  details 
of  this  episode  are  for  the  first  time  brought  out  by  the  Dropmore  MSS.  seems  to 
justify  a  more  extended  examination  than  the  incident  would  otherwise  require. 


32      THE   INFLUENCE   OF   GRENVILLE   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

was  instant  and  determined,  and  he  informed  Pitt  that  in  case  the  plan 
was  insisted  upon  he  must  resign  from  the  Cabinet.  Pitt  was  much 
agitated  at  the  thought  of  a  rupture  with  Grenville,  though  he  cannot 
have  been  unaware  that  the  latter' s  inclination  to  an  Austrian  alliance 
and  his  distrust  of  Prussia  would  cause  him  to  oppose  the  project.  In 
the  last  week  of  February  Pitt  wrote  to  Grenville : 

"I  have  been  trying  to  put  together  what,  according  to  my  ideas, 
should  be  the  instruction  on  this  unfortunate  subject  of  Prussia,  and 
have  desired  a  Cabinet  to  be  fixed  for  twelve  tomorrow.  I  should 
wish  much  to  see  you  first,  and  will  be  at  leisure  whenever  you  please 
at  eleven.  The  more  I  think  on  the  business  the  more  uneasiness  I 
feel  at  what  you  seemed  likely  to  determine,  and  I  want  much  to  talk 
it  over  with  you  at  large.  I  cannot  help  thinking  that  the  real  point 
of  honour  and  duty  in  such  difficulties  as  the  present  lies  the  other  way  ; 
and,  at  all  events,  I  am  sure  you  will  not  wonder  at  my  anxiety  to  tell 
you  all  that  on  reflection  strikes  me."  * 

Grenville' s  objections  to  a  Prussian  subsidy  were  drawn  up  in  a  long 
memoir,  f  in  which  he  reviewed  former  relations  with  Prussia  and 
found  in  them  and  in  the  known  interests  of  that  state  conclusive 
reasons  against  an  English  offer  of  subsidy.  He  argued  that  Frederick 
William  II  and  his  ministers  were  untrustworthy,  that  the  money 
offered  was  not  sufficient,  that  Prussia's  preponderance  in  Holland  and 
her  rivalry  with  Russia  were  best  served  by  a  French  alliance,  that 
honest  cooperation  was  not  to  be  hoped  for,  that  Prussia  would  use  an 
offer  from  England  merely  to  get  better  terms  from  France,  and  that 
Pitt's  government  would  be  discredited  at  home  unless  the  treaty  should 
prove  an  entire  and  unqualified  success.  In  the  course  of  his  memoir 
Grenville  exhibited  his  conviction  that  Austria  was  England's  true 
ally.  The  real  solution  of  all  Prussian  policy,  he  asserted,  was  the 
fear  of  Austria  :  ' '  What  other  clue  will  so  naturally  explain  the 
whole  political  conduct  of  the  King  of  Prussia  since  the  commence- 
ment of  the  war,  as  a  determination  to  prevent  the  acquisition  of  a 
barrier  to  Austria  on  that  side  [the  Netherlands] ,  while  that  object 
was  in  question  ;  and  afterwards  a  determination  to  hinder  the  recovery 
of  those  Provinces. ' '  Prussia  must  be  let  go  that  Austria  and  Russia 
may  be  firmly  bound  to  England.  "  The  hope  of  uniting  those  three 
Courts  [Prussia,  Russia,  and  Austria]  in  one  common  system  is  one 
which  neither  our  past  experience  nor  any  view  of  their  present  situation 
and  disposition  towards  each  other  seem  to  justify.  If  this  cannot  be 
done,  the  option  must  be  made,  and  being  made,  must  be  adhered  to." 

*The  date  of  this  letter  is  between  Feb.  20  and  28,  1795.     Dropmore,  III,  25. 
t  Ibid. ,  26-30. 


THE   NEW   PRUSSIAN  PROPOSALS.  33 

Grenville's  determination  to  resign  was  unchanged,  though  it  is  not 
evident  that  any  one  save  Pitt  was  aware  of  it.  Pitt  was  profoundly 
disturbed  at  the  disagreement  and  on  March  2  wrote  to  Grenville  : 

' '  It  would  be  useless  to  tell  you  on  how  many  accounts  I  am  misera- 
ble at  what  appears  to  be  your  determination.  I  am  not  at  all  sure, 
however,  that  the  decision  [of  the  Cabinet]  will  not  be  different  to- 
morrow, and  if  it  is,  tho'  I  shall  feel  comfort  in  one  respect,  I  am  not 
sure,  that  with  my  view  of  the  question,  I  shall  not  be  at  least  as  ill 
satisfied  as  now. ' '  * 

In  any  case,  Pitt  was  anxious  that  Grenville  should  postpone  his  res- 
ignation until  the  end  of  the  Parliamentary  session,  his  reason  being 
that  the  proposal  for  a  new  Prussian  subsidy  was  as  yet  a  Cabinet  secret. 

Meanwhile  the  opposition  in  the  Commons  were  basing  their  argu- 
ments against  an  Austrian  loan  upon  the  failure  of  the  previous  sub- 
sidy to  Prussia, f  and  as  yet  no  opening  in  regard  to  the  new  plan  had 
been  made  at  Berlin.  At  the  same  time  Grenville  was  pushing  his 
plan  of  a  closer  alliance  with  Austria,  and  thus  attempting  to  weaken 
Pitt's  determination.  On  March  8,  Stahremberg,  the  Austrian  ambas- 
sador in  England,  wrote  privately  to  Grenville  urging  a  plan  of  cam- 
paign which  omitted  all  idea  of  Prussian  aid,  but  required  more  effective 
Austrian  assistance  and  more  substantial  help  given  to  the  French 
royalists. |  Grenville  referred  this  to  Cornwallis,§  who  approved  it, 
and  Pitt  also  took  it  under  consideration.  ||  In  spite,  therefore,  of  his 
previous  insistence,  nothing  was  done  by  Pitt  to  realize  his  project  until 
news  from  abroad  seemingly  increased  the  hope  of  a  change  in  Prussian 
sentiment.  The  negotiations  at  Basle  between  France  and  Prussia  had 
been  begun  on  January  13,  but  on  February  5  Goltz,  the  Prussian 
negotiator,  died  very  suddenly,  and  nothing  was  done  until  March  8, 
when  Hardenberg  reached  Basle. If  In  the  course  of  his  journey  to 
Switzerland,  Hardenberg  contrived  an  indirect  communication  with 
Malmesbury,  in  which  he  said  that  Prussia  would  be  glad  to  reenter  the 
war  in  case  England  would  come  forward  with  a  subsidy.**  Malmes- 
bury at  first  thought  this  a  mere  intrigue  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  on 
France, ft  but  on  March  24  he  was  told  by  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  that 

*  Dropmore,  III,  30. 

t  See  the  speeches  of  Fox  on  February  23  and  May  28,  1795.     Parl.  Hist.,  XXXI, 
1315-1321,  XXXII,  38-41. 
J  Dropmore,  III,  31. 

<*  Corn wallis  to  Grenville,  March  19,  1795,     Ibid.,  34. 
|l  Cornwallis  to  Grenville,  March  31,  1795.     Ibid.,  45. 

|f  For  dates  and  resume*  of  the  negotiations  at  Basle,  see  Koch,  IV,  294-300. 
**  Malmesbury  to  Harcourt,  March  16,  1795.     Malmesbury,  III,  253. 
ft  Diary,  March  24,  1795.     Ibid.,  213. 


34      THE   INFLUENCE   OF   GRENVILLE  ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

Prussia  was  decidedly  in  earnest.  Malmesbury  was  then  on  his  way 
to  England,  and  immediately  after  his  arrival  in  London,  on  April  4, 
Pitt  resumed  with  enthusiasm  his  scheme  of  a  Prussian  subsidy.  In- 
structions were  drawn  up  ordering  Spencer  at  Berlin  to  open  negotia- 
tions with  the  King  in  person.*  On  April  8,  four  days  after  Malmes- 
bury's  arrival,  Grenville  fulfilled  his  intentions  by  announcing  his 
resignation  to  George  III,f  though  conformably  to  Pitt's  request  this 
action  was  not  made  public.  On  April  10  Malmesbury  wrote  to  L. 
Crawford  from  the  Secretary  of  State's  office,  inclosing  a  letter  to  Har- 
denberg  notifying  him  of  what  England  proposed  to  do  and  urging 
him  to  delay  signing  a  treaty  with  France  until  he  had  heard  from 
Berlin ;  J  but  Pitt  was  too  late.  The  peace  of  Basle  had  been  signed  on 
April  5,  and  as  soon  as  the  news  reached  London  all  hope  of  Prussian 
aid  was  put  aside.  Fortunately  for  Pitt's  reputation,  the  English 
agents  to  whom  instructions  had  been  sent  were  wise  enough  to  defer 
their  execution  and  to  write  for  further  instructions. §  Spencer  had 
indeed  sought  an  interview  with  the  King  of  Prussia,  but  had  made  no 
disclosure  of  Pitt's  proposals.  Grenville' s  resignation  was  withdrawn, 
and  the  incident  was  closed  without  comment,  for  in  England  it  was 
entirely  unknown  outside  the  Cabinet,  ||  while  on  the  continent  only 
Hardenberg  and  Frederick  William  II  had  any  suspicions  of  it.  Even 
here  all  that  was  known  was  that  Spencer  had  intrigued  for  a  hearing, 
and  Hardenberg  could  not  enjoy  the  satisfaction  of  feeling  that  his 
'  diplomatic  intrigue — for  such  alone  it  was — had  nearly  disrupted  Pitt's 
Cabinet.fi 

*This  is  shown  by  Spencer's  letter  to  Grenville  of  April  24,  1795.  Auckland,  III, 
298.  Charles  Arbuthnot,  writing  to  Croker  February  22,  1845,  states  that  "Mr. 
Dundas  (Lord  Melville)  acted  for  a  short  time  as  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  and  sent  the  instructions  to  Berlin."  Croker,  II,  371. 

f  Dropniore,  III,  50.  The  reply  of  George  III,  on  April  9,  shows  that  the  King 
had  at  first  agreed  with  Grenville,  but  that  he  had  been  won  over  to  the  side  of 
Pitt  by  repeated  Austrian  reverses. 

J  Malmesbury,  III,  254. 

\  Spencer  to  Grenville,  April  24,  1795.     Auckland,  III,  298. 

||  Miles,  who  was  a  very  shrewd  collector  of  information,  was  entirely  ignorant 
of  the  Prussian  subsidy  plan  ;  yet  he  thought  himself  informed  of  what  was  going 
on  in  the  Cabinet.  From  December,  1794,  to  March,  1795,  he  was  corresponding 
on  his  own  account  with  Barthelemy,  and  was  constantly  writing  to  Pitt  that  France 
was  favorable  to  a  peace  with  England  ;  but  no  attention  was  paid  to  him.  Miles, 
II,  217-243.  The  debates  in  both  houses  of  Parliament  during  the  period  exhibited 
an  entire  ignorance  of  Pitt's  plan  either  by  the  opposition  or  by  the  governmental 
supporters  not  included  in  the  Cabinet. 

*  Spencer's  overture  at  Berlin  has  been  treated  by  historians  in  various  ways. 
Sybel,  who  covers  the  Treaty  of  Basle  very  thoroughly,  makes  no  mention  what- 
ever of  an  English  offer  to  Prussia.  Bourgoing  (IV,  165)  states  that  one  of  the 
reasons  why  Barthe'lemy  exceeded  his  instructions  and  signed  the  treaty  of  Basle 
was  that  he  knew  England  was  reverting  to  the  idea  of  subsidizing  Prussia,  but  no 
authority  is  given.  Schlosser  (VI,  607)  says  :  "Lord  Henry  Spencer,  who  came 


THE   NEW   PRUSSIAN   PROPOSALS.  35 

As  time  passed,  it  became  perfectly  clear  to  Pitt  that  there  had  been 
at  no  time  any  chance  for  the  success  of  his  proposed  subsidy  to  Prussia. 
The  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Basle  completely  weaned  him  from  his 
inclination  toward  Prussia,  and  thereafter  he  was  even  more  hesitant 
than  Grenville  of  making  advances  to  that  power.  Grenville,  on  the 
other  hand,  though  fully  as  distrustful  of  Prussian  sincerity  as  formerly, 
came  to  regard  the  Prussian  court  as  one  that  could  be  bought  if  the 
price  were  sufficiently  attractive,  and  on  several  occasions  attempted  to 
purchase  its  aid,  not  by  money,  but  by  promises  of  territorial  acquisi- 
tion. In  the  English  Cabinet  itself  the  incident  clearly  redounded  to 

from  Stockholm  to  Berlin  expressly  for  that  purpose,  dared  to  offer  100,000  dollars  to 
the  Countess  of  L,ichtenau  for  an  audience,  and  a  very  large  sum  to  the  King,  if  he 
would  consent  to  decline  the  peace."  Schlosser's  sole  authority  is  the  Memoires 
cTun  Homme  d' Etat,  III,  135-137,  drawn  from  Hardenberg's  papers.  Schlosser 
is  thoroughly  untrustworthy  on  English  politics,  for  he  is  both  unfamiliar  with  Eng- 
lish sources  and  exceedingly  prejudiced.  Sorel  asserts  that  Spencer  had  opened  at 
Berlin  suggestions  of  a  subsidy  before  Hardenberg's  departure  for  Basle  (IV,  255), 
notes  Hardenberg's  communication  with  Malmesbury,  at  Frankfort,  March  16 
(IV,  279),  and  leaves  the  impression  that  Hardenberg  did  delay  affairs  at  Basle  as 
long  as  he  dared.  Thus  Sorel  states  positively  that  the  English  subsidy  plan  was 
in  the  air.  Incidentally  he  confuses  Ivord  Henry  Spencer  with  Earl  Spencer,  a 
member  of  the  Cabinet,  stating  that  the  latter  was  at  Berlin.  A  comparison  of  the 
correspondence  of  Auckland,  with  whom  Spencer  was  very  intimate,  and  the  Drop- 
more  MSS.  proves  conclusively  that  there  was  no  positive  knowledge  on  the  con- 
tinent of  Pitt's  plan,  and  that  no  offer  was  made  to  Frederick  William  II.  Thus 
Spencer,  far  from  going  to  Berlin  "  expressly  for  that  purpose,"  was  chosen  for  the 
Prussian  position  as  early  as  September,  1794  (Dropmore,  II,  621  ;  Grenville  to 
Malmesbury,  Aug.  16,  1794),  and  he  left  Stockholm  on  December  13,  before  Pitt 
had  brought  forward  his  plan.  Spencer,  when  he  reached  Berlin,  did  not  even 
know  that  negotiations  were  about  to  be  opened  at  Basle.  Auckland,  III,  279 ; 
Spencer  to  Auckland,  Jan.  6,  1795.  On  February  23  Spencer  wrote  to  the  English 
Foreign  Office  that  the  Treaty  of  Basle  would  surely  be  signed,  Prussia  "not 
receiving  any  offers  from  England."  Ibid.,  287  ;  Spencer  to  Auckland.  The 
re'sume'  of  the  Cabinet  situation  in  the  body  of  this  article  shows  that  no  decision 
had  been  reached  in  England  at  this  time,  and  no  instructions  sent  to  Spencer. 
If,  then,  Spencer  made  any  opening  to  Hardenberg,  as  Sorel  states,  it  was  on  his 
own  initiative  solely,  and  was  merely  suggestive.  On  March  30  Spencer  wrote  to 
Grenville  :  ' '  From  the  present  appearance  of  things  on  the  Continent,  I  take  it  for 
granted  that  it  is  not  the  intention  of  his  Majesty's  ministers  to  prevent,  by  any 
new  overtures  or  proposals,  the  final  conclusion  of  the  treaty  which  this  Court  is 
now  negotiating  with  the  French  Convention."  Dropmore,  III,  561.  He  also 
asked  for  a  leave  of  absence,  conclusive  proof  that  up  to  April,  1795,  no  hint  of 
Pitt's  purpose  had  reached  him.  The  Cabinet  decision  to  make  an  offer  to  Prussia 
was  reached  on  April  8.  Dropmore,  III,  50  ;  Grenville  to  George  III.  At  some 
time  between  that  date  and  April  1 7,  when  the  news  of  the  Treaty  of  Basle  reached 
London,  instructions  were  sent  to  apply  to  the  King  of  Prussia,  as  is  shown  by 
Spencer's  letter  to  Grenville  of  April  24.  Auckland,  HI,  298.  It  also  appears  from 
the  same  letter  that  Spencer  had  so  far  carried  out  his  instructions  as  to  secure  an 
interview  with  Frederick  William  II,  but  that,  already  aware  of  the  Treaty  of  Basle, 
he  did  not  disclose  Pitt's  plan,  and  merely  expressed  England's  regret  at  Prussia's 
action.  It  is  possible  that  Hardenberg,  after  his  interview  with  Malmesbury,  had 
an  idea  that  England  might  again  come  forward  with  a  subsidy.  It  is  probable 
that  Spencer  did  bribe  the  Countess  of  Lichtenau  in  order  to  secure  a  personal  in- 
terview with  the  King,  for  such  bribery  was  customary  at  the  Prussian  court ;  but 
it  is  certain  that  no  opening  to  the  King  was  made  before  the  Treaty  of  Basle  was 
signed,  and  that  no  offer  was  made  al  any  time. 


36      THE   INFLUENCE   OF   GRENVIU.E   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

the  credit  of  Grenville,  and  it  is  from  this  moment  that  he  could  count 
upon  a  distinct  following  among  its  members.  At  the  same  time  Pitt 
himself  recognized  the  service  that  Grenville' s  stubborn  opposition  had 
rendered  and  was  happy  to  resume  relations  of  confidence  and  trust 
with  his  foreign  minister. 


FIRST  OVERTURES  OF  PEACE  TO  FRANCE. 
OCTOBER,  1795,  TO  APRII,,  1796. 

The  confident  expectation  of  victory  with  which  Grenville  entered 
upon  the  campaign  of  1795  was  not  fulfilled.  An  alliance  with  Russia 
had  been  signed  February  18,  1795,  and  on  May  20  the  protracted 
negotiations  with  Austria  resulted  in  a  formal  treaty.  From  the  Rus- 
sian treaty  not  much  was  expected,  but  Grenville  believed  that  in 
alliance  with  Austria,  England  would  secure  a  rapid  victory.  In 
attacking  the  colonies  of  France  and  her  allies,  England  was  indeed 
successful  and  rejoiced  in  the  conquest  of  Ceylon  and  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope,  but  on  the  continent  the  failure  of  the  Quiberon  expedition  and 
the  inaction  of  the  Austrian  forces  on  the  Rhine  tended  to  discourage 
the  ministry.  Spain,  too,  made  peace  with  France,  while  the  war  of 
factions  in  Paris  failed  to  encourage  the  English  government,  for  in 
London  itself  tumults  and  riots  were  the  order  of  the  day. 

Moreover,  England  and  Austria  were  equally  suspicious  of  each 
other's  motives  and  diplomacy.  Wickham,  Grenville' s  most  trusted 
agent,  was  writing  from  Switzerland  that  offers  were  passing  between 
Vienna  and  Paris.*  Thugut,  earnest  for  the  war  yet  hampered  by  the 
Polish  situation,  could  not  be  convinced  that  the  English  ministers  were 
not  responsible  for  Hanover's  acceptance  of  the  Prussian  scheme  of 
neutrality.!  Thus  various  conditions,  combined  with  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Directorate  in  France,  giving  some  promise  of  an  orderly 
and  stable  government,  brought  about  a  readiness  to  treat  for  peace, 
and  by  September  this  readiness  had  expanded  into  a  definite  inten- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  ministry  to  make  at  least  an  opening  in  that 
direction. 

The  first  step  looking  toward  peace  was  the  determination  by  the 
English  Cabinet  to  send  Pelham  to  Vienna  to  sound  the  Austrian  gov- 

*  Wickham  to  Grenville,  Aug.  12,  and  to  Morton  Eden,  Aug.  18,  1795.  Wickham, 
I,  152,  155-  On  Carletti's  intrigues  see  Sybel,  III,  431^",  and  Sorel,  IV,  302. 

t Morton  Eden  to  Auckland,  May  15,  1796:  "It  appears  impossible  for  me  to 
convince  any  one  that  his  Majesty's  English  ministers  have  no  influence  over  the 
counsels  of  his  Hanoverian  Government."  Auckland,  III,  335. 


FIRST  OVERTURES  OF   PEACE  TO   FRANCE.  37 

eminent.*  At  the  same  time  instructions  were  given  to  Morton  Eden 
to  try  to  come  to  some  clear  understanding  with  Austria  on  the  subject 
of  war  or  peace.  Portland  objected  to  this  despatch,  though  more  from 
the  effect  it  would  be  likely  to  have  on  Austrian  military  action  than 
from  opposition  to  peace,  and,  whether  from  this  reason  or  some  other, 
Pelham  was  not  sent.f  Grenville  wrote  to  Morton  Eden  on  October  10: 

"  In  our  present  situation,  we  might  possibly  not  find  it  very  diffi- 
cult to  make  either  war  or  peace  with  advantage,  if  Austria  will  set  her 
shoulders  to  the  work  in  earnest."! 

A  series  of  unexpected  Austrian  victories  in  October  somewhat 
changed  the  situation.  The  King  considered  the  action  of  the  Cabinet 
to  have  been  premature,  for  on  October  27  he  wrote  to  Grenville  : 

' '  No  attempt  ought  to  be  encouraged  of  opening  a  negotiation,  which 
ever  has  the  effect  of  destroying  all  energy  in  those  who  ought  to  look 
forward  to  the  continuance  of  war. ' '  § 

And  on  November  30  he  wrote  again  : 

' '  I  think  no  problem  in  Euclid  more  true  than  that  if  the  French  are 
well  pressed  in  the  next  year,  their  want  of  resources  and  other  inter- 
nal evils  must  make  the  present  shocking  chaos  crumble  to  pieces. "|| 

Nevertheless,  Pitt  and  Grenville  were  still  determined  to  draw  up 
instructions  to  Austria  on  the  lines  already  indicated,  and  in  the  King's 
speech  at  the  opening  of  the  Parliamentary  session  on  October  29  the 
statement  was  made  that,  if  the  changes  in  France  brought  into  exist- 
ence a  government  desirous  of  peace,  England  would  be  willing  to  treat 
on  terms  satisfactory  and  honorable  to  herself  and  her  allies.fi  This 
was  received  with  unbelieving  derision  by  the  Parliamentary  opposi- 
tion, but  on  December  8  a  message  from  the  throne  proposed  a  vote  in 
favor  of  a  negotiation  for  peace,  and  Pitt  asserted  his  sincerity  and 
expressed  his  belief  that  a  satisfactory  treaty  was  now  possible.**  The 
vote  was  given  as  requested  and  on  January  30  instructions  were  sent 
to  Morton  Eden  at  Vienna,  and  to  Wickham  at  Berne,  in  accordance 
with  which  the  latter  was  to  open  communications  with  Barthelemy, 
the  French  agent  in  Switzerland,  ff  England  expressed  her  desire  for  a 
general  peace  and  asked  the  French  government  to  suggest  the  means 
and  conditions  of  a  congress. 

*  Grenville  to  George  III,  Sept.  21,  1795.     Dropmore,  III,  134. 
t Portland  to  Grenville,  Sept.  23,  1795.     Ibid.,  135. 
I  Ibid.,  137. 
I  Ibid.,  143. 

||  Ibid.,  149.  Another  objector  was  the  Earl  of  Mornington.  See  letter  to  Gren- 
ville, ibid. 

^Parl.  Hist.,  XXXII,  142. 
**  Ibid.,  570-603. 
tt  For  text  of  note  to  Barthelemy  and  the  French  answer  see  Debrett,  IV,  254-256. 


209095 


38      THE   INFLUENCE   OF   GRENVILLE   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

The  proposal  of  peace  made  to  France  in  January  of  1796  has  usually 
been  regarded  as  a  mere  ruse  on  the  part  of  Pitt  and  as  intended 
wholly  for  the  benefit  of  the  partisans  of  peace  among  his  own  fol- 
lowers.* The  vigorous  English  preparations  for  a  continuance  of  the 
war  and  the  extreme  retrocessions  insisted  upon  by  Pitt  if  peace  were 
made  are  cited  in  support  of  this  view  ;  but  those  who  hold  it  have 
failed  to  appreciate  the  real  hope  Pitt  felt  that  the  convulsions  in 
France  were  about  to  end  in  the  establishment  of  a  government  in- 
clined to  give  up  the  territories  acquired  during  the  last  few  years  in 
return  for  an  acknowledgment  of  its  own  stability  and  permanence. 
Pitt  knew  nothing  of  the  sentiment  rapidly  developing  in  France 
tending  to  identify  patriotism  with  the  retention  of  the  left  bank  of 
the  Rhine.  f  He  honestly  believed  that  the  French  government  ought, 
if  sensible,  to  be  satisfied  with  recognition  within  its  ancient  limits, 
and  thus  believing,  he  hoped  for  peace.  His  excessive  ideas  as  to  the 
extent  of  the  necessary  retrocessions  were  therefore  due  to  a  failure 
to  appreciate  the  actual  situation,  and  are  not  an  evidence  of  a  lack  of 
good  faith.  In  regard  to  the  continuance  of  military  preparations, 
Pitt's  fixed  idea  was  that  he  could  use  them  to  awe  France  into  signing 
a  peace,|  and  in  any  case  it  would  have  been  the  height  of  folly  to 
limit  England's  readiness  for  war  before  a  negotiation  was  actually 
begun.  The  relations  of  England  and  Austria  in  the  summer  and  fall 
of  1795  are  evidence  that  Pitt  really  desired  and  hoped  for  peace,  for 
although  Pelham  was  not  sent  to  Vienna,  Morton  Eden  was  instructed 
repeatedly  to  secure  from  Thugut  a  definite  answer  as  to  whether  he 
wished  to  recover  the  Netherlands,  and  Jackson  in  September  was 
despatched  as  a  special  envoy  to  confer  upon  this  point.  Thugut  re- 
fused an  explicit  answer,  §  and  the  suspicions  of  Austria's  duplicity, 
constantly  forwarded  by  English  agents  abroad,  caused  the  English 
ministry  to  fear  that  Austria  was  preparing  to  yield  the  Netherlands 
to  France  in  return  for  territory  elsewhere.  France  was  in  fact  offer- 
ing Bavaria  to  Austria  in  compensation  for  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  || 
The  central  point  of  English  policy  at  this  time  was  that  France  should 
not  be  permitted  to  retain  Belgium,  and  Pitt  was  eager  to  press  this 
solution  while  Austria  was  still  in  alliance  with  England.  In  England 


*  For  example  see  Sybel,  IV, 

f  Sorel,  IV,  374  :  "  C'est  un  brevet  de  '  patriotisme  '  que  de  se  prononcer  pour  le 
barri£re  du  Rhin."  But  J.  H.  Rose  controverts  this.  See  article  in  English  His- 
torical Review,  April,  1903,  p.  287.  Rose  also  maintains  the  genuineness  of  the 
English  offer  of  peace. 

%  Pitt  to  Addington,  Oct.  4,  1795.     Stanhope,  II,  328. 

\  Morton  Eden  to  Auckland,  Nov.  8,  1795.     Auckland,  III,  320. 

||  Sorel,  IV,  425. 


FIRST  OVERTURES  OF  PEACE   TO   FRANCE.  39 

itself  those  in  close  touch  with  the  government  appreciated  that  a 
tendency  to  peace  was  growing  in  the  ministry.  Auckland,  who  at 
this  very  time  was  in  constant  communication  with  Pitt  upon  the 
details  of  the  great  financial  showing  that  was  to  awe  the  French  gov- 
ernment, published  in  October,  1795,  a  carefully  written  pamphlet 
stating  the  arguments  in  favor  of  peace.  Auckland  in  private  was 
always  an  advocate  of  peace,  but  was  essentially  a  party  man  and  far  too 
careful  of  his  own  political  interests  ever  to  venture  an  open  struggle 
against  the  prevailing  current  of  opinion.  Burke  regarded  Auckland's 
pamphlet  as  an  indication  of  a  change  in  the  intentions  of  the  ministry, 
and  was  accordingly  bitter  and  despondent.* 

But  if  Pitt  was  hopeful  that  the  time  had  arrived  when  a  satisfactory 
peace  might  be  concluded,  Grenville  was  far  from  that  opinion.  There 
was  no  disagreement  between  the  two  men  as  to  the  advisability  of 
that  peace,  if  it  could  be  secured  upon  the  extreme  terms  demanded 
by  the  English  government.  The  difference  was  rather  one  of  tem- 
perament and  of  judgment.  Pitt  eagerly  hoped  for  peace  ;  Grenville 
had  no  hope,  but  was  willing  to  try  the  experiment.  Pitt  would  gladly 
have  accepted  the  Directorate  as  a  satisfactory  government  in  France, 
though  he  was  not  sure  of  its  permanence  ;  Grenville  would  grudgingly 
have  tolerated  it.  Pitt  regarded  the  influence  of  peace  proposals  on 
home  politics  as  of  secondary  importance  ;  Grenville  considered  this 
the  essential  benefit  of  the  negotiation.  When  in  December  the  King's 
message  had  requested  a  Parliamentary  vote  in  favor  of  opening  nego- 
tiations with  France,  Grenville  had  hastened  to  allay  the  fears  of 
Austria,  and  to  instruct  English  agents  that  the  vote  in  question 
meant  no  more  than  that  England  recognized  in  France  a  government 
with  which  it  was  possible  to  treat,  if  so  desired. f  L,ater,  when  it  was 
determined  to  despatch  the  note  to  Barthelemy,  Grenville  wrote  to  the 
King  that  personally  he  was  strongly  in  favor  of  the  proposal,  and  that 
it  ' '  could  not  but  produce  the  most  advantageous  effects  both  at  home 
and  abroad.  If  it  should,  in  the  result,  produce  from  France  such  an 
answer  as  it  seems  most  reasonable  to  expect,  from  what  is  known  of 
the  views  and  dispositions  of  the  present  rulers  there,  it  would,  as  Lord 
Grenville  hopes,  give  additional  energy  and  animation  to  the  public 
mind  here,  and  would  probably  lead  to  much  discontent  and  demur  in 
France. ' '  J  Grenville  added  that  if  France  should  really  prove  amenable 
to  reason,  he  would  also  be  grateful. 

*  Auckland  sent  his  pamphlet  to  Burke,  who  replied  October  30,  1795.  Burke's 
Works,  V,  355. 

t  Grenville  to  Wickham,  Dec.  25,  1795.  Wickham,  I,  227.  Stahremberg  to 
Grenville,  Dec.,  1795.  Dropmore,  III,  165. 

JJan.  30,  1796.     Ibid.,  169. 


4O      THE   INFLUENCE  OF  GRENVILLE   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

This  letter  was  in  part  a  plea  to  overcome  the  King's  opposition, 
but  that  it  represents  Grenville's  real  sentiments  is  unquestionable, 
for  on  February  9,  1796,  in  sending  the  overture  to  Barthelemy,  he 
wrote  Wickham  in  much  the  same  terms  and  betrayed  the  same  lack 
of  faith  in  the  negotiation.*  There  was  then,  beyond  question,  no 
disagreement  between  Pitt  and  Grenville,  though  the  latter  probably 
preferred  war  to  peace  with  the  existing  government  of  France.  He 
could  not,  however,  openly  object  so  long  as  Pitt's  ideas  of  peace  were 
fixed  to  a  restitution  by  France  of  the  territories  she  had  conquered, 
together  with  a  retention  by  England  of  a  part  at  least  of  her  recently 
acquired  colonies.  The  offer  to  France,  acquiesced  in  by  Austria, f 
received  the  answer  that  the  Directory  was  prohibited  by  law  from 
negotiating  upon  the  cession  of  any  part  of  the  French  Republic.  The 
undiplomatic  terms  of  the  French  note  were  construed  as  an  insult  to 
the  English  nation  and  were  in  some  measure  effective  in  rousing  the 
English  public.  At  once  new  and  more  energetic  plans  of  campaign 
were  put  forward  in  conjunction  with  Austria.  Thus  the  principal 
benefits  which  Grenville  saw  in  the  negotiation  were  realized. 


GRENVILLE  PLANS  TO  RECOVER  PRUSSIAN  AID. 
FEBRUARY  TO  AUGUST,  1796. 

The  fact  that  while  Pitt  really  hoped  for  peace,  Grenville  looked 
toward  a  continuance  of  the  war  is  further  borne  out  by  two  contem- 
porary considerations,  the  first  of  which  bore  a  direct  relation  to  the 
proposal  of  peace,  while  the  second  involved  the  opening  of  a  plan, 
distinctly  Grenville's  own,  for  increasing  the  forces  that  might  be  used 
against  France.  The  first  was  the  question  of  continuing  aid  to  the 
royalists  of  France.  The  failure  of  previous  efforts  to  organize  the 
royalists  still  in  France  and  the  disasters  experienced  by  the  expedi- 
tions sent  out  from  England  had  convinced  Pitt  that  little  was  to  be 
expected  from  such  enterprises.  When,  therefore,  the  hope  of  peace 
began  to  gain  ground  in  England,  Pitt  became  unfavorable  to  further 
expenditure  in  aid  of  the  royalists,  and  he  thought  that  the  money 

*  Wickham,  I,  269. 

f  Whether  Austria  actively  joined  in  the  proposal  to  France  is  a  disputed  point. 
Pitt  stated  in  the  Commons  on  May  10,  1796,  that  the  step  was  taken  "in  concert 
with  them  [England's  allies],  though  they  were  not  formally  made  parties  to  the 
proposal."  Parl.  Hist.,  XXXII,  1135.  Sybel  says  Thugut  refused  to  join.  Sybel, 
IV,  152.  But  Morton  Fxien  wrote  to  Auckland  on  June  13,  1796,  in  a  private  letter, 
that  Thugut  sent  a  separate  note  to  France,  similar  to  Wickham's,  and  received 
a  very  insolent  reply  which  he  preferred  to  keep  secret.  Auckland,  III,  345. 


PLANS  TO  RECOVER  PRUSSIAN  AID.        41 

could  be  much  more  wisely  spent  in  an  attack  on  the  French  colonies 
recently  acquired  by  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Spain.*  Windham,  the 
determined  advocate  of  the  French  nobility,  appealed  to  Grenville, 
urging  that  it  would  be  dishonorable  for  England  to  desert  those 
whom  she  had  encouraged  to  insurrection,  and  folly  to  withdraw  the 
assistance  already  pledged. f  Grenville  became  at  once  the  champion 
of  the  royalists,  J  and  was  indeed  at  the  moment  concerting  with  Wick- 
rraST"a~great  royalist  movement  from  Switzerland.  §  Accordingly  he 
opposed  that  part  of  Pitt's  plan  which  involved  the  discontinuance 
of  royalist  efforts  within  the  borders  of  France,  and  although  Pitt  still 
thought  that  the  Count  of  Artois  should  be  informed  of  the  possibilitjr 
of  a  treaty  of  peace  between  England  and  the  Directorate,  [|  he  yielded 
to  Grenville' s  insistence  and  the  preparations  for  renewed  risings  were 
continued. U  Windham  had  written  to  Grenville  on  October  n: 

"  We  shall  really  risk  something  more  than  injury  to  a  cause  which 
includes  all  other  causes,  if,  as  long  as  we  maintain  the  war,  and  till  we 
formally  apprize  the  Royalists  that  they  must  no  longer  count  upon 
our  support  *  •  '  '  we  do  not  continue  to  afford  them  all  such 
assistance  as  we  cannot  show  to  be  actually  out  of  our  power. ' '  ** 

Grenville  strongly  supported  this  view,  and  it  was  his  reference  to 
Pitt  of  Windham' s  letter,  together  with  a  statement  of  his  own  entire 
approval,  that  persuaded  Pitt  to  yield. 

A  second  incident,  contemporaneous  with  the  proposal  of  peace  made 
to  France  and  indicating  Grenville' s  expectation  of  the  continuance  of 
hostilities,  was  the  initiation  of  a  plan  by  which  he  hoped  that  Prussia 
might  be  induced  to  renounce  her  neutrality  and  to  reenter  the  war. 
As  early  as  December,  1795,  Elgin  was  instructed  by  Grenville  to 
sound  the  Prussian  government  on  the  idea  of  resuming  hostilities 
with  France,  but  Elgin's  reply  was  unfavorable, ft  and  it  was  not  until 
February,  1796,  that  the  matter  was  again  taken  up.  On  February  8, 
at  the  very  time  the  Cabinet  approved  the  note  addressed  to  Bar- 
thelemy,  a  proposal  was  made  by  Grenville  to  seek  a  renewal  of  the 
Prussian  alliance.  The  Cabinet  adopted  the  suggestion,  although  it 
involved  a  decided  departure  from  England's  previous  line  of  policy, 

*  Pitt  to  Chatham,  Aug.  3,  1795.     Stanhope,  II,  349. 
f  Windham  to  Grenville,  Oct.  n,  1795.     Dropmore,  III,  137. 
{Buckingham  to  Grenville,  Aug.  9  and  17,  1795.     Ibid.,  95,  99.    Windham  to 
Grenville,  Aug.  16,  1795.     Ibid.,  98. 

\  Wickham  to  Grenville,  Sept.  6,  1795.     Ibid.,  129  ;  also  Wickham,  I,  155-225. 
||  Pitt  to  Grenville,  Oct.  16,  1795.     Dropmore,  III,  140. 
11  Pitt  to  Grenville,  Oct.  18,  1795.     Ibid.,  141. 
**Ibid.,  138. 
tt  Elgin  to  Grenville,  Dec.  26,  1795.     Ibid.,  163. 


42      THE   INFLUENCE   OF  GRENVILLE   ON  PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

since  it  proposed  the  partitioning  of  weaker  states  among  the  greater 
powers.  According  to  Grenville's  plan,  Prussia  was  to  be  won  to  a 
warlike  activity  by  a  promise  of  the  Westphalian  provinces  and  the 
Netherlands,  while  Austria  was  to  be  compensated  by  the  acquisition 
of  Bavaria.*  The  King  vigorously  opposed  the  adoption  of  such  a 
policy,  terming  it  a  disgrace  to  England  that  she  should  sink  to  the 
level  of  continental  powers  in  proposing  an  unjustifiable  spoliation  of 
minor  states.  But  while  the  plan  as  outlined  was  agreed  to  by  the 
Cabinet,  nothing  appears  to  have  been  done  at  the  time  toward  exe- 
cuting it.  Grenville  himself  was  doubtful  if  the  time  had  arrived  for 
making  an  offer  to  Prussia  and  distrusted  the  suggestions  which  had 
evidently  been  made  by  that  power  as  merely  intended  to  wring  some 
concession  from  France,  f  while  Elgin  considered  it  so  little  likely  that 
any  overtures  were  to  be  made  to  Prussia  that  on  May  i  he  asked  for 
leave  of  absence  on  the  ground  that  there  was  nothing  to  do  at  Ber- 
lin. |  In  the  meantime,  however,  various  considerations  had  brought 
the  matter  to  the  front  again.  Late  in  April  the  news  of  Bona- 
parte's astonishing  Italian  victories  reached  England.  Early  in  May 
Bentirick,  who  had  for  some  months  been  investigating  the  likelihood 
of  a  rising  in  Holland  in  favor  of  the  Stadtholder,  became  convinced 
that  nothing  was  to  be  done  without  the  aid  of  Prussia,  and  was  hope- 
ful that  Prussia  was  about  to  offer  that  aid.§  At  the  same  time  the 
mutual  suspicions  of  England  and  Austria  were  renewed,  and  Gren- 
ville feared  that  Austria  was  secretly  preparing  to  make  a  separate 
peace  with  France.  ||  He  therefore  refused  Elgin's  request  for  a  leave 
of  absence,  hinting  that  important  instructions  might  soon  be  ex- 
pected. If  Bentinck's  hopes  in  regard  to  Prussia  were  based  on  rumors 
of  difficulties  with  France,  and  these  had  existence  in  fact,  though  they 
did  not  tend  to  the  solution  desired  by  England.  Prussia  was  striving 

*George  III  to  Grenville,  Feb.  9,  1796.     Dropmore,  III,  172,  173. 

t Grenville  to  Elgin,  Feb.  9,  1796.     Ibid.,  174. 

I  Ibid.,  198. 

§Ibid.,  150-159,  176,  208-211.  Bentinck's  correspondence  with  Grenville  fills  a 
large  place  in  volume  III  of  the  Dropmore  MSS.  In  December  of  1795  he  was  very 
hopeful  of  a  revolution  in  Holland,  but  as  the  months  went  by  without  any  active 
steps  being  taken  to  bring  this  about,  he  became  more  and  more  convinced  of  the 
necessity  of  Prussian  intervention,  if  anything  was  to  be  accomplished.  His  letters 
furnish  excellent  material  for  a  study  of  conditions  in  Holland  and  of  the  political 
intrigues  there. 

||  Grenville  to  Morton  Eden,  May  24,  1796.  Ibid.  ,206.  The  idea  was  widespread 
in  England  that  Austria  was  arranging  a  separate  peace.  See  opinions  of  Sheffield, 
Perregaux,  Crauford,  and  Rose.  Auckland,  III,  347,  351,  352.  See  also  Hudson 
to  Charlemont,  May  29,  1796.  Charlemont,  II,  273.  Thugut  was  as  suspicious  of 
England  as  Grenville  was  of  Austria.  Morton  Eden  to  Grenville,  June  13,  1796. 
Dropmore,  III,  208. 

If  Grenville  to  Elgin,  May  17  and  June  23,  1796.     Ibid.,  206,  215. 


GRENVILLE  PLANS   TO   RECOVER   PRUSSIAN   AID.  43 

in  the  spring  of  1796  to  force  France  to  yield  her  claim  to  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine  and  had  gone  so  far  as  to  form  an  army  of  observa- 
tion in  Westphalia,  but  she  had  no  serious  intention  of  breaking  with 
France.*  Grenville  was  ignorant  of  Prussia's  real  purposes,  and  on 
receipt  of  an  encouraging  letter  from  Elgin  he  determined  to  risk  an 
offer  to  the  court  of  Berlin,  though  he  was  by  no  means  confident  of 
its  success,  f 

This  new  combination  and  the  proposed  means  of  accomplishing  it 
originated  entirely  with  Grenville.  Pitt  was  not  unwilling  to  make 
the  experiment,  but  he  did  not  count  upon  its  success,  and  his  real 
conviction  was  that  England  would  soon  be  deserted  by  her  allies  in 
the  contest  with  France.  On  June  23  he  wrote  to  Grenville : 

"I  can  conceive  no  objection  in  the  mind  of  any  of  our  colleagues 
to  see  whether  the  arrangement  to  which  you  have  pointed  can  be 
made  acceptable  both  to  Austria  and  Prussia.  But  though  I  think  it 
should  be  tried,  I  do  not  flatter  myself  with  much  chance  of  success."  J 

In  the  course  of  the  following  month  the  reports  of  English  agents 
abroad  strengthened  Grenville  in  his  determination  to  apply  to  Prussia. 
Bentinck  furnished  still  further  evidence  in  support  of  his  idea  that  the 
court  of  Berlin  was  preparing  to  intervene  in  Holland.  §  Wickham 
announced  the  complete  collapse  of  the  system  of  "partial  insurrec- 
tions "  in  France,  and  foresaw  that  he  would  soon  be  forced  to  leave 
Switzerland.  1 1  Elgin  reported  the  strong  impression  made  at  Berlin 
by  the  arguments  of  Gouverneur  Morris,  and  experienced  himself  a 
more  friendly  intercourse  with  the  Prussian  ministers. If  Morris,**  who 

*Sybel,  IV,  239-246.     Koch,  IV,  385. 

t  Grenville  to  Buckingham,  Aug.  14,  1796.     Court  and  Cabinets,  II,  348. 

JDropmore,  III,  214. 

§  Bentinck  to  Grenville,  July  5,  1796.     Ibid.,  217. 

||  Wickham  to  Grenville,  July  19,  1796.     Ibid.,  223. 

fl Elgin  to  Grenville,  July  28,  1796.     Ibid.,  225. 

**  Morris  had  come  to  London  in  June,  1795,  and  almost  immediately  gained  the 
ear  of  Grenville,*  to  whom  he  outlined  his  vast  ideas  of  continental  combinations 
against  France.  In  June,  1796,  he  journeyed  to  the  continent,  ostensibly  going  to 
Switzerland,  but  in  reality  traveling  to  various  courts  in  the  interests  of  England. 
He  did  not  know  the  exact  terms  to  be  offered,  but  was  aware  of  their  general  char- 
acter, and  in  a  sense  acted  as  an  advance  agent  for  England.  Grenville  and  Morris 
agreed  that  the  latter 's  best  line  of  argument  was  to  show  that  Prussia  was  doomed 
to  destruction  if  France  was  permitted  to  dictate  terms  of  peace  to  Europe,  and  to 
exhibit  Prussia's  material  advantage  in  an  alliance  with  England  and  Austria. 
Grenville  wrote  of  Morris,  August  23,  1796  :  "  Great  use  may,  however,  I  believe 
be  made  of  him  there  [at  Berlin].  •  •  •  •  His  leanings  are  all  favourable  to  us, 
and  you  are  not  ignorant  how  much  they  may  be  improved  by  attention  and  a 
proper  degree  of  confidence."  Ibid.,  238.  The  letters  between  Greuville  and 
Morris  given  in  Dropmore  are  duplicates  of  those  given  in  Morris's  Diary  and  in 
Jared  Sparks's  Life  of  Gouverneur  Morris.  The  latter  book  includes  two  letters 
not  given  elsewhere,  the  first  of  which  is  important,  as  it  contains  Grenville's  sug- 
gestions to  Morris  as  to  what  he  should  urge  at  Berlin.  Sparks,  III,  89. 


44      THE   INFLUENCE   OF    GRENVILLE   ON  PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

seems  to  have  exercised  considerable  influence  in  determining  Gren- 
ville  to  attempt  a  new  Prussian  arrangement  and  who  was  in  fact  act- 
ing as  an  unofficial  English  agent,  reported  that  the  Prussian  ministers 
were  by  no  means  disinclined  to  listen  to  overtures,  and  believed  a  new 
combination  perfectly  possible.  Before  all  of  this  information  reached 
London  it  had  finally  been  determined  to  send  Hammond,  an  under 
secretary  of  state,  to  Berlin  to  outline  the  proposed  exchanges  and  to 
offer  a  definite  alliance.*  George  III  was  still  bitterly  opposed  to  the 
project,  and  unwillingly  yielded  to  Grenville's  argument  that  France 
could  in  no  other  way  be  deprived  of  the  Netherlands  than  by  giving 
them  to  Prussia,  and  that  this  necessarily  involved  compensating  Aus- 
tria with  Bavaria. f  Meanwhile  Austria  was  not  informed  of  what  was 
taking  place,  and  when  Thugut  at  a  later  date  learned  of  the  proposal 
he  was  highly  indignant,  J  though  it  is  unlikely  that  Grenville  would 
have  followed  Morris's  suggestion  of  coming  to  terms  with  Prussia 
without  waiting  for  Austria's  consent. § 

Morris  left  Berlin  a  few  days  before  Hammond  arrived,  believing 
that  he  had  paved  the  way  for  a  successful  negotiation  ;  but  when  on 
August  17  Hammond  had  a  long  interview  with  Haugwitz,  he  was 
convinced  that  the  veiled  proposals  he  was  instructed  to  make  were  a 
complete  surprise  to  the  Prussian  minister,  while  the  embarrassed  re- 
ply given  him  equally  convinced  him  that  nothing  was  to  be  expected 
from  the  Prussian  court.  ||  Haugwitz  might  well  be  surprised  and  em- 
barrassed, for  on  August  5,  less  than  a  fortnight  before  Hammond's 
interview,  Prussia  and  France  had  signed  a  secret  treaty  committing 
Prussia  to  a  system  of  neutrality.  The  English  offer  received  no 
encouragement  whatever,!!  and  upon  the  receipt  of  Hammond's  report 
Grenville  set  aside  for  the  time  being  all  thought  of  a  new  combination 
that  should  include  Prussia. 

*  Grenville  to  George  III,  July  29,  1796.     Dropmore,  III,  227.     Nominally  this 
proposal  outlined  the  exchanges  preparatory  to  a  general  peace  ;   in  reality  it 
meant  an  alliance  to  force  France  to  accept  the  terms  agreed  on. 

t  Grenville  to  George  III,  July  31,  1796.     Ibid.,  228. 

j  Sybel,  IV,  318.    Morton  Eden  to  Auckland,  Dec.  9,  1796.    Auckland,  III,  368. 

#  Morris  to  Grenville,  Aug.  10,  1796.     Dropmore,  III,  563. 
||  Hammond  to  Grenville,  Aug.  17,  1796.     Ibid.,  235. 

If  Elgin  to  Grenville,  Aug.  23,  1796.  Ibid.,  238  ;  Pitt  to  Chatham,  Sept.  4,  1796. 
Stanhope,  II,  381. 


PITT'S  SECOND   PEACE  PROPOSAL.  45 

PITT'S  SECOND  PEACE  PROPOSAL  AND  MALMESBURY'S  MISSION 

TO  PARIS. 

SEPTEMBER  TO  DECEMBER,  1796. 

With  the  failure  of  Grenville's  plan  to  secure  the  aid  of  Prussia  the 
pendulum  of  English  foreign  policy  swung  back  again  to  ideas  of 
peace,  though  Grenville  himself  was  in  no  wise  inclined  to  discontinue 
war.  Pitt,  however,  oppressed  by  the  knowledge  of  the  rapidly  in- 
creasing financial  difficulties  of  the  English  government,  and  believing 
that  a  change  was  imminent  in  the  sentiments  of  the  French  Directory, 
reasserted  his  authority  in  the  Cabinet  and  resolved  to  attempt  once 
more  a  negotiation  for  peace.  In  August,  1796,  he  had  had  a  number 
of  secret  conversations  with  one  Nettement,  a  Frenchman  claiming  to 
represent  a  pacifically  inclined  faction  of  the  Directory.*  Nettement 
gave  a  detailed  and  truthful  analysis  of  the  political  situation  in  France 
and  urged  that  England  should  propose  to  France  a  negotiation  for 
peace  in  so  frank  a  way  that  the  Directory  "should  be  forced  to  de- 
clare openly  if  it  desires  peace  or  wishes  to  continue  the  war."f  The 
plan  of  negotiations  proposed  by  this  French  agent  was  based  more 
upon  the  idea  of  assisting  the  moderate  party  in  Paris  to  gain  control 
of  the  Directorate  than  upon  any  fixed  belief  that  peace  would  be 
assured  by  such  a  result,  but  Pitt's  readiness  to  listen  to  these  indirect 
suggestions  evinces  his  real  interest  in  the  main  question.  Throughout 
the  summer  of  1 796  the  English  partisans  of  peace  were  active  in  push- 
ing their  policy.  Auckland  urged  Pitt  to  renew  overtures  to  France 
and  was  corresponding  with  friends  in  Paris,  by  whom  he  was  informed 
that  the  exact  moment  had  arrived  when  a  proposal  from  England 
must  be  listened  to  if  made  immediately,  J  while  in  non-political  circles 
the  rumor  was  current  that  the  Cabinet  had  already  reached  the  decision 
to  end  the  war.  It  was  even  asserted  that  the  ministry  and  the  oppo- 

*  Smith  MSS.,  369.  The  papers  of  Joseph  Smith,  Pitt's  private  secretary,  show 
that  Sir  R.  Woodford  brought  Nettement  and  Pitt  together  and  state  the  substance 
of  conversations. 

f  Ibid.,  370-371.  On  August  15  Nettement  returned  to  France,  but  before  leav- 
ing wrote  out  his  advice.  He  believed  the  Directory  to  be  opposed  to  peace, 
but  that  it  was  afraid  of  the  moderate  party  which  advocated  it,  and  that  if  the 
Directory  "should  haughtily  reject  the  conditions  of  peace  proposed  by  England, 
I  should  not  be  surprised  by  a  union  between  the  Moderates,  who  wish  for  peace, 
and  the  Jacobins,  who  do  not  love  the  Directory,  in  order  to  replace  them  by  other 
governors.  But  as  long  as  the  British  Administration  has  not  made  known  its 
views  in  an  authentic  manner,  they  will  be  protected  from  every  sort  of  influence, 
and  will  govern  the  armies  and  the  people  despotically  "  (p.  370).  Nettement  also 
advised  a  protracted  negotiation,  and  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  methods  he 
proposed  were  those  actually  employed  in  Malmesbury's  negotiation  at  Paris. 

%  Auckland  to  Pitt,  July  30,  1796.     Auckland,  III,  352-354. 


46      THE   INFLUENCE  OF  GRENVILLE  ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

sition,  Pitt  and  Fox,  were  to  join  hands  in  a  great,  friendly  coalition 
whose  patriotic  unanimity  should  terrify  France  and  so  secure  an 
honorable  treaty.*  The  rumors  of  coalition  were  without  foundation, 
but  those  prophesying  a  renewal  of  overtures  to  France  were  shortly 
realized  in  a  Cabinet  decision,  for  on  September  2  it  was  agreed  that 
an,  offer  should  be  made  through  the  medium  of  Wedel,  the  Danish 
minister  at  London,  and  in  a  letter  to  the  King  Grenville  outlined  the 
terms  that  might  reasonably  be  expected  if  the  negotiations  were  suc- 
cessfully concluded.!  These  were  :  to  give  to  France  Savoy,  Nice,  and 
all  of  the  Rhenish  conquests  not  belonging  to  Austria,  and  all  French 
colonies  captured  by  England  ;  to  restore  to  Holland  all  colonies  except 
the  Cape,  Ceylon,  and  Cochin  ;  to  secure  for  Austria  the  status  quo  ante 
bellum  ;  but  if  France  absolutely  refused  to  return  the  Netherlands,  and 
Austria  was  willing  to  accept  the  Bavarian  exchange,  England  would 
consent  to  the  transfer,  provided  the  new  ruler  of  the  Netherlands  was 
not  too  closely  bound  to  France. 

The  details  of  this  plan  are  of  interest  as  determining  just  how  far 
Pitt  was  ready  to  go  in  order  to  secure  peace.  Grenville,  discouraged 
at  the  outlook  for  the  allies,  was  in  entire  harmony  with  his  chief  | 
and  seems  to  have  yielded  momentarily  his  personal  convictions. 
Events  soon  revived  his  hopes,  for  immediately  after  the  message  had 
been  forwarded  through  Wedel  news  was  received  of  the  retreat  of 
Pichegru  and  Jourdan  before  the  Austrian  army  under  the  Archduke 
Charles,  while  Thugut  notified  Grenville  that  Russia  would  place 
60, coo  men  in  the  field  against  France  if  a  small  English  subsidy  were 
granted. §  Bentinck  wrote  from  Holland  that  he  was  nearly  positive 
that  a  new  and  secret  treaty  had  recentty  been  signed  between  France 
and  Prussia.  ||  If  this  were  true,  there  was  little  likelihood  of  the 
adoption  of  a  peace  policy  by  the  government  of  France.  The  influ- 
ence of  these  events  on  English  foreign  policy  was  immediate.  It  was 
still  determined  to  continue  overtures  to  France,  but  at  the  same  time 
greater  vigor  was  displayed  in  preparing  for  war.  Russia  was  offered 
the  island  of  Corsica  and  was  promised  a  small  subsidy,  and  Austria 

*Halliday  to  Charlemont,  Aug.  7,  1796,  and  Charlemont  to  Halliday,  Sept.  12, 
1796.  Charlemont  MSS.,  II,  278,  283. 

f  Dropmore,  III,  239. 

j  George  III  to  Grenville,  and  Pitt  to  Grenville,  Sept.  4,  1796 ;  and  Pitt  to  Gren- 
ville, Sept.  5,  1796.  Ibid.,  242. 

§  Russia  voluntarily  proposed  to  Austria  August  21,  1796,  to  put  this  force  in  the 
field.  Sybel,  IV,  321^.  Thugut  referred  it  to  Grenville  on  September  10.  Drop- 
more,  III,  246.  Thugut  had  no  knowledge  at  the  time  of  the  English  offer  to 
France  through  Wedel,  but  was  hopeful  that  the  Russian  offer  would  wean  Gren- 
ville from  his  scheme  of  a  Prussian  alliance. 

||  Bentinck  to  Goddard,  Sept.  13  and  20,  1796.     Ibid.,  250,  253. 


PITT'S  SECOND  PEACE  PROPOSAL.  47 

was  assured  that  England  had  no  intention  of  concluding  peace  with- 
out the  full  concurrence  of  her  ally.* 

The  French  answer  to  the  English  overture  seemed  ' '  insolent ' '  to 
George  III,t  but  the  ministry  determined  to  make  another  effort,  and 
sent  a  direct  message  to  France,  under  a  flag  of  truce,  with  the  result 
that  a  negotiation  was  arranged  to  be  held  at  Paris.  Grenville's  atti- 
tude was  distinctly  changed.  While  no  definite  declaration  of  his 
determination  to  oppose  a  treaty  of  peace  is  to  be  found,  the  entire 
tenor  of  his  letter  to  the  King  in  explanation  of  the  renewed  offer  under 
flag  of  truce  $  and  of  his  private  correspondence  with  his  brother  is 
indicative  that  he  regarded  the  continuance  of  negotiations  as  of  value 
solely  for  the  benefit  to  be  derived  from  them  in  their  influence  on  the 
political  situation  in  England.  He  wrote  to  Buckingham  that  to  his 
view  the  peace  proposals  were  justifiable,  since  ' '  in  the  present  moment, 
the  object  of  unanimity  here  in  the  great  body  of  the  country,  with 
respect  to  the  large  sacrifices  they  will  be  called  upon  to  make,  is  para- 
mount to  every  other  consideration. ' '  §  Yet  Pitt  was  still  sincere  in 
his  offer  to  France  ||  and  was  still  supported  by  the  majority  of  his  col- 
leagues. Grenville  therefore  directed  his  energies  toward  drafting  the 
instructions  of  Malmesbury,  the  English  negotiator,  in  such  a  fashion 
as  to  preclude  the  hasty  conclusion  of  a  treaty  and  to  prevent  any 
sacrifice  of  English  interests.  Malmesbury,  as  Fox  pertinently  stated 
in  a  later  discussion  of  the  negotiations,  was  given  ' '  full  powers  to 

*The  English  ministry  sent  an  order  on  August  31,  1796,  for  the  evacuation  of 
Corsica.  The  resolution  to  offer  Corsica  to  Russia  was  taken  on  October  19,  but 
the  new  orders  did  not  reach  Jervis  and  Elliot  in  time.  Corsica  was  evacuated 
October  26.  Elliot,  II,  355-361. 

f  George  III  to  Grenville,  Sept.  23,  1796.     Dropmore,  III,  255. 

j  Grenville  to  George  III,  Sept.  23,  1796.     Ibid.,  256. 

§  Sept.  24,  1796.     Court  and  Cabinets,  II,  350. 

||  Pitt's  sincerity  is  generally  asserted  by  English  historians  and  denied  by  French 
writers.  The  impression  received  from  this  study  is  that  he  was  certainly  sincere 
up  to  November  7,  but  that  after  that  date,  as  will  be  shown,  he  permitted  Gren- 
ville to  resume  his  ascendancy  in  foreign  affairs.  Sybel  thinks  Pitt  sincere,  or  at 
least  that  he  saw  equally  the  advantages  of  peace  and  the  benefits  of  a  refusal  by 
France  of  the  opening  made.  Sybel,  IV,  322.  Mr.  Dorman,  in  the  first  volume 
of  his  recent  History  of  the  British  Empire  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  (pp.  31-36), 
maintains  the  thesis  that  the  sole  object  of  Malmesbury's  mission  was  to  secure  in- 
formation about  France,  but  this  conclusion  is  based  on  a  superficial  study  of  but 
a  small  part  of  the  available  English  sources.  Sorel,  in  his  fifth  volume,  asserts 
that  the  English  government,  in  both  1796,  at  Paris,  and  1797,  at  Lille,  was  deter- 
mined that  peace,  if  signed,  must  include  the  separation  of  the  Netherlands  from 
France.  This  is  certainly  a  great  error  for  1797,  and  probably  so  also  for  1796,  and 
inasmuch  as  it  is  upon  this  thesis  that  Sorel  rests  his  whole  conception  of  the  rela- 
tions of  France  and  England,  the  error  becomes  a  vital  one.  Sorel  in  fact  knows 
nothing  of  English  sources  for  this  period,  as  has  been  very  clearly  shown  by  R. 
Guyot  and  P.  Muret,  in  their  critical  examination  of  the  documentation  of  Sorel's  fifth 
volume,  Revue  d'Histoire  Moderne  et  Contemporaine ,  XV,  Janvier,  1904,  p.  255. 


48      THE  INFLUENCE   OF  GRENVII<L,E   ON   PITT'S  FOREIGN   POLICY. 

conclude  •  •  •  •  but  was  allowed  no  latitude  to  treat. "*  More- 
over, Grenville  particularly  emphasized  the  point  that  ' '  by  the  conven- 
tion signed  with  the  Court  of  Vienna  in  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the 
King  is  bound  not  to  make  peace  without  the  consent  of  Austria,  except 
on  the  terms  of  procuring  for  that  power  the  restitution  of  all  it  may 
have  lost  in  the  war. ' '  f  No  mention  was  made  in  these  instructions 
of  the  possibility  of  a  Bavarian-Netherlands  exchange. 

The  conditions  which  still  determined  Pitt  to  bring  the  war  to  an 
end,  if  possible,  were  the  difficulty  of  raising  further  loans  in  Bngland, 
the  coolness  which  existed  between  England  and  Austria,  and  the 
threatened  revolution  in  Ireland.  A  financial  crisis  in  England,  due, 
according  to  Fox  and  Sheridan,  to  the  repeated  advances  made  to 
Austria,!  greatly  hampered  the  government.  Austria  demanded  an 
increased  loan  and  was  irritated  at  receiving  the  answer  that  it  must  be 
postponed  for  a  time.  §  Thugut  also  thoroughly  disapproved  of  the 
sending  of  Malmesbury  to  Paris  and  refused  either  to  despatch  any 
Austrian  diplomats  to  treat  for  peace  or  to  commission  Malmesbury  to 
act  for  Austria.  Although  he  was  compelled  to  acknowledge  that 
Austria  could  not  refuse  a  peace  that  fulfilled  the  terms  of  the  alliance 
with  England,  he  was  sincere  and  earnest  in  arguing  in  favor  of  the 
continuance  of  war.||  In  Ireland  the  effect  of  the  recall  of  Earl  Fitz- 
william  had  been  to  arouse  a  serious  discontent,  and  there  was  real 
danger  of  a  widespread  rebellion.  Pitt  knew  also  of  Hoche's  projected 
invasion  for  the  purpose  of  assisting  the  disaffected  Irish.  These  con- 
ditions, then,  were  operative  at  the  moment  when  Malmesbury,  on 
October  18,  left  Dover  for  France. 

The  impression  received  from  Malmesbury 's  correspondence  and 
diary  is  that  he  undertook  his  mission  in  the  full  conviction  that  Pitt 
seriously  desired  peace, If  and  also  in  the  belief  that  such  a  peace  was 
possible  if  France  would  but  listen  to  reason.  Grenville  had  instructed 
him  to  insist  on  the  customary  forms  of  diplomacy,  but  Malmesbury, 
fearing  that  insistence  on  such  forms  would  lead  to  a  sudden  rupture, 
passed  over  in  silence  various  slights  put  upon  him.  Thus  the  answer 
of  Delacroix,  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  first  note 
presented  by  Malmesbury  was  couched  in  terms  of  recrimination,  but 
Malmesbury  ignored  this,  choosing  to  consider  it  as  due  to  unfamiliarity 

*  Parl.  Hist.,  XXXII,  1476. 

t  Grenville  to  Malmesbury,  Oct.  16,  1796.     Dropmore,  III,  260. 
I  Parl.  Hist.,  XXXII,  1518-1524. 

§  Grenville  to  Stahremberg,  Nov.  13,  1796.     Dropmore,  III,  267. 
(I  Morton  Eden  to  Auckland,  Nov.  16,  1796.     Auckland,  III,  362  ;  Sybel,  IV, 
3I8-333-     Malmesbury  to  Pitt,  Oct.  17,  1796.     Malmesbury,  III,  266. 
If  Malmesbury  to  Pitt,  Oct.  17,  1796.     Ibid. 


PITT'S  SECOND  PEACE  PROPOSAL.  49 

with  diplomatic  usage.  Grenville,  however,  despatched  in  answer  to 
Delacroix  a  written  memorial,  which  Malmesbury  was  instructed  to  hand 
in  without  change.  The  wording  of  the  memorial,  beginning  ' '  Quant 
aux  insinuations  offensantes  et  injurieuses  que  Ton  a  trouve  dans  cette 
piece,"  *  did  not  foreshadow  a  happy  ending  for  the  negotiation. 

By  November  7,  the  date  upon  which  this  despatch  was  written, 
Grenville  was  again  the  leader  in  directing  England's  foreign  policy, 
for  the  events  of  the  week  previous  had  greatly  strengthened  the  force 
of  his  arguments.  In  that  week  came  the  news  of  the  organization  of 
' '  patriotic  societies ' '  in  Ireland,  and  the  fear  of  a  general  rebellion  passed 
away.f  In  that  week,  also,  Pitt  gained  a  decided  Parliamentary  vic- 
tory on  questions  of  home  defense,!  while  intelligence  from  Austria 
indicated  a  revival  of  energy  in  that  government.  Pitt  found  that  he 
had  overestimated  the  force  of  the  English  clamor  for  peace  and,  though 
personally  averse  to  the  war,  yielded  to  Grenville' s  insistence  that  the 
negotiations  should  be  carried  on  in  such  a  way  and  for  such  an  end  as 
at  least  to  require  all  of  England's  original  demands.  On  November  5 
he  wrote  a  general  letter  of  commendation  to  Malmesbury, §  but  one 
containing  no  suggestion  of  concessions  to  France,  while  two  days  later 
Canning  ||  also  wrote,  hinting  that  Pitt  would  have  been  better  pleased 
had  Malmesbury  taken  a  stiffer  tone  in  response  to  the  insulting  lan- 
guage of  Delacroix. TI  Canning  was  Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs  and,  perhaps  more  than  any  other  at  the  time,  was  acquainted 
with  Pitt's  real  sentiments  and  purposes.  In  the  same  mail  Canning 
despatched  Grenville' s  instructions  and  memorial,  and  these,  with  Pitt's 
letter,  reached  Malmesbury  November  10.  The  entry  in  Malmesbury's 
diary  for  the  next  day  is  brief,  but  illuminative  :  ' '  Writing — thinking 
over  my  new  instructions — cost,  cosi. ' '  **  Malmesbury  understood  per- 
fectly from  the  tenor  of  Grenville 's  instructions  the  part  he  was  now  to 
play,  and  he  understood  also  from  his  private  letters  that  they  were  in 
truth  new  instructions.  That  they  were  new  to  Malmesbury  goes  to 
prove  that  he  had  up  to  this  time  believed  Pitt  desirous  of  making 
peace,  and  in  fact  Malmesbury,  on  December  20,  in  an  interview  with 
Sandoz-Rollin,  the  Prussian  minister  in  Paris,  accused  Grenville  of 

*  Malmesbury,  III,  301. 

fCharlemont  MSS.,  II,  284-294. 

J  Pitt  to  Malmesbury,  Nov.  5,  1796.     Malmesbury,  III,  295. 

§  Pitt  to  Malmesbury,  Nov.  5,  1796.    Ibid. 

\\Ibid.,  297. 

TJ  Masson  pictures  Delacroix  as  utterly  without  knowledge  of  proper  diplomatic 
language  or  customs,  and  as  permitting  himself  to  be  put  entirely  in  the  wrong  by 
Malmesbury.  Yet  he  also  states  that  Delacroix  merely  followed  the  instructions 
of  the  Directory  in  these  negotiations.  Masson,  390-395. 

**  Malmesbury,  III,  305. 


50     THE   INFLUENCE   OF  GRENVILLE   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

having  thwarted  Pitt's  purpose.*  From  November  n  Malraesbury's 
conduct  in  negotiation,  his  reports  to  Grenville,  and  his  letters  to  Pitt 
and  Canning  exhibit  an  entirely  different  attitude  from  that  previously 
assumed.  He  now  sought  merely  to  put  France  in  the  wrong,  and  to 
cast  upon  her  the  blame  for  an  inevitable  rupture  of  the  negotiations. 
The  diplomatic  maneuvers  became  in  fact  a  contest  for  the  advantage 
of  position,  for  the  Directory  had  been  at  no  time  sincere  in  its  accept- 
ance of  the  English  overture. f  The  actual  issue  was  a  victory  for 
England,  for  Malmesbury,  presenting  Grenville' s  principle  of  "com- 
pensatory restitutions,"  prohibiting  any  connection  between  France 
and  the  Netherlands,  asked  that  the  Director)^  either  accept  this  as  the 
basis  of  a  treaty  or  bring  forward  a  counter-project.  The  Directory 
refused  to  do  either  and  sent  Malmesbury  his  passports,  greatly  to  the 
advantage  of  the  English  ministers,  who  now  recovered  a  wavering 
Parliamentary  constituency  by  disclosing  the  ' '  honorable  and  sincere 
offer  of  peace  made  to  France,  and  the  insulting  refusal  of  that  country 
to  consider  it."  J 

*  "Aujourd'hui  matin,  Malmesbury  m 'a  fait  proposer  ou  de  passer  chez  lui  ou  de 
me  voir  dans  une  tierce  maison.  J'ai  pref6re  le  dernier  parti.  Son  debut  in  'a  etoun£ : 
'Sachez,  m'a-t-il  dit,  que  j'ai  bien  plus  a  me  plaindre  du  ministere  britannique  que 
du  Directoire ;  sachez  encore  que  je  le  publierai  a  Londres  et  que  je  me  plaindrai  au 
chancelier  Pitt  de  la  mauvaise  tournure  que  le  lord  Grenville  a  donnee  a  la  n£gocia- 
tion ;  il  a  fait  retomber  sur  1'Angleterre  tout  1'opprobre  de  la  continuation  de  la 
guerre.'  '  Mais  lesieur  Pitt  voulait-il  d£cid£ment  la paix?  '  ai-je  interrompu.  'II 
la  voulait,  j'en  suis  certain  *,  a-t-il  r£plique  avec  chaleur,  'tout  comme  je  suis  cer- 
tain que  la  ne"gociation  sera  reprise  en  moins  de  trois  semaines  de  temps. ' ' '  Bericht 
von  Sandoz-Rollin  aus  Paris,  Dec.  20,  1796.  Bailleu,  I,  106. 

f  According  to  Barras's  Memoirs,  Carnot,  previous  to  Malmesbury's  arrival,  had 
expressed  the  opinion  that  the  Netherlands  were  not  essential  to  France,  but  this 
was  not  agreed  to  by  other  members  of  the  Directory  (II,  265).  Barras  shows  that 
it  was  only  due  to  the  political  situation  in  France  that  the  English  overture  was 
accepted,  and  he  believed  that  that  overture  had  no  other  purpose  ' '  than  to  expose 
the  Directorate  to  odium  "  (II,  288) .  He  pictures  himself  and  I,areVelliere-L£peaux 
as  demanding  Malmesbury's  dismissal,  Rewbell  desiring  delay,  Letourneur  anxious 
to  continue  negotiations,  and  Carnot  standing  by  Barras's  opinion,  but  hesitatingly  ; 
and  in  the  result  Barras  asserts  that  France  experienced  a  wave  of  patriotic  enthu- 
siasm from  Malmesbury's  dismissal. 

\  In  the  debates  in  Parliament  on  Malmesbury's  negotiation  the  great  effort  of 
both  Pitt  and  Grenville  is  to  prove  England's  sincerity.  Fox  denied  this,  and 
hinted  that  Malmesbury  was  himself  deceived.  "  I  know  that  some  weeks  ago  a 
very  confident  report  was  circulated  with  respect  to  the  probability  of  peace.  It 
would  be  curious  to  know  how  far  I/ord  Maltnesbury  at  that  period  was  influenced 
by  any  such  belief."  Parl.  Hist.,  XXXII,  1473. 

Grenville's  r£sum£  of  the  negotiations  and  defense  of  the  government  is  in  ibid. , 
An  abstract  of  the  Directory's  version  as  published  in  the  Rttdadeur  is  in 
398^. 


GRENVIU,E'S  SECOND   OVERTURE  TO   PRUSSIA.  51 

GRENVILLE'S    SECOND  OVERTURE  TO   PRUSSIA    AND   HAMMOND'S 

JOURNEY. 

NOVEMBER,  1796,  TO  MAY,  1797. 

In  the  episode  just  narrated  the  view  taken  is  that  up  to  November 
7,  1796,  Pitt  was  really  sincere  in  the  proposals  made  to  France,  while 
Grenville  was  sincere  only  so  long  as  he  saw  no  hope  of  any  other  than 
a  peaceful  solution,  and  that  with  his  very  first  instructions  to  Malmes- 
bury  he  was  planning  a  renewal  by  England  of  a  vigorous  war  policy. 
An  additional  proof  of  this  purpose  on  Grenville's  part  and  of  his  re- 
sumption of  authority  in  foreign  affairs  is  that  on  November  7,  the  day 
that  his  memorial  to  the  Directory  was  despatched,  he  reopened  with 
Austria  the  idea  of  securing  Prussian  aid.*  His  plan  was,  as  formerly, 
that  Austria  should  cede  the  Netherlands  to  Prussia,  and  herself  take 
Bavaria.  In  December,  1796,  and  again  in  January,  1797,  Morris 
wrote  of  rumors  of  Prussian  willingness  to  enter  into  the  proposed  ex- 
changes, f  but  Thugut's  dislike  of  a  Prussian  alliance  and  his  earnest- 
ness in  maintaining  Austrian  war  preparations  led  Grenville  to  set  the 
plan  aside  for  the  moment.  But  in  February  Prussia  herself  made 
advances  to  England.  These  were  caused  by  the  suspicion  prevalent 
at  Berlin  that  France  was  offering  a  separate  peace  to  Austria,  involv- 
ing the  sacrifice  of  Bavaria  in  return  for  the  Rhenish  frontier.  The 
offer  had  in  fact  been  determined  upon  by  the  Directory,  and,  though 
the  terms  were  not  positively  known  at  Berlin,  the  old  Prussian 
jealousy  of  Austria  was  aroused.  £  The  overture  made  to  England 
was  apparently  for  an  agreement  as  to  the  terms  of  a  general  peace  to 
be  imposed  on  France, §  but  the  refusal  of  France  to  accept  such  terms 

*  Sybel,  IV,  327. 

f  Morris  to  Grenville,  Dec.  21, 1796,  from  Vienna,  and  Jan.  26, 1797,  from  Dresden. 
Dropmore,  III,  287,  294.  In  December  Morris  urged  upon  Thugut  the  necessity 
of  securing  Prussian  aid  (Morris,  II,  62),  and  on  January  31  he  proposed  to  Gren- 
ville that  England  should  offer  Hanover  to  Prussia.  Ibid. ,  257-264.  This  last  letter 
is  not  in  Dropmore. 

\  Sybel  states  that  in  the  middle  of  January,  1797,  France  desired  to  make  peace 
with  Austria  on  these  terms  :  i,  to  restore  I/ombardy  to  the  Emperor  ;  2,  to  give 
Bavaria  to  Austria  in  exchange  for  Belgium  ;  3,  France  to  keep  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine.  Sybel,  IV,  464.  Barras  details  a  long  discussion  by  the  Directory  on  Janu- 
ary 15  of  Clarke's  offer  to  Austria.  The  terms  of  Carnot's  despatch  to  Clarke 
coincide  with  the  points  given  in  Sybel.  Barras,  II,  312.  The  Berlin  rumor  also 
included  a  cession  of  the  Netherlands  to  England.  Morris,  II,  275. 

§  Grenville  wrote  to  Morton  Eden  on  March  3,  1797,  in  regard  to  the  proposals  of 
Prussia,  "  It  is  very  material  to  observe  that  the  basis  of  this  plan  is  the  scheme 
of  peace  already  offered  by  the  allies."  Dropmore,  III,  298.  This  must  mean  the 
separation  of  the  Netherlands  from  France,  but  coming  from  Prussia  could  not  have 
involved  an  exchange  for  Bavaria.  At  this  same  time  Prussia  was  urging  France  to 
be  permitted  to  propose  to  Austria  and  to  England  the  holding  of  peace  conferences. 
France  objected  to  any  such  suggestion  being  made  to  England,  and  repeatedly 
asserted  that  French  interests  demanded  a  continental,  but  not  a  general,  peace. 
Berichte  von  Caillard  aus  Berlin,  Feb.  18  and  March  4,  1797.  Bailleu,  I,  451-453. 


52      THE   INFLUENCE   OF   GRENVILLE  ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

would  have  necessitated  Prussia's  abandonment  of  her  neutrality. 
George  III  distrusted  the  Prussian  court  and  termed  its  proposals 
"  insidious  advances,"  *  and  even  Grenville  himself  thought  an  attempt 
was  being  made  to  weaken  the  strength  of  the  alliance  between  Austria 
and  England. f  Nevertheless  he  instructed  Elgin  to  confer  freely  with 
the  ministers  at  Berlin,  informed  Thugut  of  the  Prussian  opening,! 
and  outlined  a  plan  of  alliance.  But  the  hopes  aroused  at  this  juncture 
were  suddenly  dashed  to  the  ground  when,  on  March  30,  he  received 
from  Elgin  a  copy  of  the  secret  treaty  of  August  5,  1796,  between 
France  and  Prussia. §  All  expectations  of  a  change  in  Prussian  policy 
or  of  honor  in  the  Prussian  court  were  abruptly  set  aside,  and  Gren- 
ville, temporarily  at  least,  became  wholly  convinced  of  the  uselessness 
of  further  efforts  in  that  quarter.  1 1 

The  dismay  aroused  in  England  upon  learning  the  terms  of  the  secret 
treaty  between  Prussia  and  France  was  almost  immediately  increased 
by  the  news  of  Bonaparte's  rapid  and  decisive  victories  in  Italy  and 
the  Tyrol.  It  was  evident  that  Austria  must  yield  and  yield  soon,  or 
experience  the  dishonor  of  a  French  occupation  of  Vienna.  Even 
Grenville  was  dispirited  and  hopeless  If  and  passively  submitted  to  Pitt's 
determination  to  hurry  an  envoy  to  Vienna  in  time  to  take  part  in  the 
peace  negotiations.  On  April  9  it  was  decided  by  the  Cabinet  to  send 
Hammond  with  full  powers  to  enter  into  a  negotiation  with  France  and 
Austria.**  Hammond's  instructions  permitted  him  to  offer  France  all 
colonies  taken  during  the  course  of  the  war  except  the  Cape,  Ceylon, 
and  Trinidad,  and  to  acquiesce  in  any  territorial  arrangement  on  the 
continent  acceptable  to  Austria,  ff  Thus  England  was  at  last  ready  to 
recognize  the  incorporation  of  Belgium  with  France,  and  Pitt  specific- 
ally approved  both  this  and  the  continued  dependence  of  Holland  on 
France,  if  only  peace  were  secured,  JJ  while  Grenville  had  yielded  his 
own  opinion  under  the  first  impressions  created  by  the  discouraging 
news  from  Austria.  George  III,  recognizing  Grenville's  discourage- 

*  George  III  to  Pitt,  Feb.  28,  1797.     Stanhope,  III,  Appendix,  p.  n. 

f  Grenville  to  Elgin,  March  2,  1797.     Dropmore,  III,  298. 

i  Grenville  to  Morton  Eden,  March  3,  1797.     Ibid. 

§  George  III  to  Grenville      Ibid.,  304. 

fj  Grenville  to  Woronzow,  March  30,  1797.     Ibid.,  306. 

|  Grenville  to  George  III,  April  9,  1797.     Ibid.,  310. 

**  Minutes  of  Cabinet  meeting.     Ibid. 

ft  Sybel,  IV,  493.  The  exact  terms  of  the  instructions  to  Hammond  are  in  a  de- 
spatch of  April  n,  1797,  to  Sir  Morton  Eden,  being  No.  24,  in  volume  49  of  the 
British  Foreign  Office  Records  for  Austria.  The  English  proposal  was  to  keep 
Ceylon  and  the  Cape  from  Holland,  and  either  Martinique  from  France  or  Trinidad 
from  Spain,  and  Tobago  or  St.  Lucia  from  France.  These  terms  are  of  interest 
as  indicating  Pitt's  first  decision  in  turning  toward  peace.  Later  he  lowered 
these  conditions  very  nearly  to  the  point  of  demanding  nothing  at  all. 

}J  George  III  to  Pitt,  April  9,  1797.     Stanhope,  III,  Appendix,  p.  in. 


GRENVILLE 'S   SECOND   OVERTURE  TO   PRUSSIA.  53 

ment  and  knowing  him  to  be  an  obstinate  opponent  of  peace,  showed 
plainly  that  he  regarded  Pitt  as  solely  responsible  for  what  was,  to  the 
King's  mind,  a  dishonorable  policy.*  Buckingham  stated  openly  to 
Grenville  that  he  preferred  an  honorable  war  to  a  dishonorable  peace  and 
hoped  Hammond  would  not  arrive  in  time  to  enter  upon  negotiations.! 
In  reply,  Grenville  exhibited  his  own  despondent  attitude.  "I  hardly 
know,"  he  wrote,  "how  to  tell  myself,  under  these  circumstances,  what 
I  wish  about  Hammond's  mission,  because  the  panic  here  is  so  dis- 
graceful that  the  country  will  not  allow  us  to  do  them  justice."  | 

Hammond's  instructions  as  first  drawn  up  had  looked  toward  the 
intervention  of  Russia  as  a  mediator  in  proposing  negotiations  for  a 
general  peace.  If  on  arriving  at  Vienna  he  found  that  time  was  lack- 
ing to  secure  such  mediation,  he  was  first  to  strive  for  a  general  armis- 
tice, if  possible ;  but  if  this  failed  also,  he  was  given  full  powers,  in 
conjunction  with  Morton  Eden,  to  sign  a  definitive  peace. §  Appar- 
ently there  was  at  first  no  suspicion  in  the  English  Cabinet  that  Ham- 
mond might  find  peace  already  concluded  on  his  arrival  at  Vienna, 
but  shortly  after  he  had  left  England  the  belief  arose  that  such  an 
event  was  possible,  and  supplementary  instructions  were  hurried  after 
him,  directing  him,  in  case  he  found  that  Austria  had  signed  a  sepa- 
rate peace  with  France,  to  proceed  to  Berlin  and  there  accept  an  offer 
previously  made  to  act  as  mediator  in  a  general  peace.  He  was  also 
to  notify  Russia  of  this  act  and  ask  her  joint  mediation  with  the  court 
of  Berlin,  stating  as  England's  reason  for  the  step  that  the  chief  ob- 
stacle to  the  acceptance  of  the  Prussian  offer  had  now  been  removed 
by  Austria's  signature  of  a  separate  treaty  of  peace.  || 

On  April  18,  the  very  day  this  despatch  was  written,  before  Ham- 
mond had  landed  at  Cuxhaven  even,  the  Preliminaries  of  Leoben  had 
been  signed,  and  peace  between  Austria  and  France  was  an  accom- 
plished fact.  Hammond  went  on  to  Vienna,  but  once  there  made  no 
attempt  to  bring  England  into  the  peace,  and  did  not  disclose  to  Thugut 
his  supplementary  instructions  for  the  court  at  Berlin 4  In  the  mean- 
time Grenville  had  recovered  somewhat  from  his  first  depression  and 
was  striving  to  create  a  revulsion  of  opinion  in  the  government.  Thugut 
at  first  refused  to  disclose  to  his  late  ally  the  terms  of  I/eoben,  and 


*  Stanhope,  III,  Appendix,  pp.  mff.     Several  letters  between  George  III  and 
Pitt.     The  King  speaks  also  of  the  "  reluctance  "  of  a  portion  of  the  Cabinet, 
t  April  13  and  May  4,  1797.     Dropmore,  III,  313,  317. 
J  April  28,  1797.     Court  and  Cabinets,  II,  376. 
§  Despatch  to  Morton  Eden,  April  ir,  1797.     Records,  Austria,  49. 
'I  Despatch  to  Hammond,  No.  5,  April  18,  1797.     Ibid. 
*1  Hammond  to  Grenville,  May  9,  1797.     Dropmore,  III,  322. 


54      THE  INFLUENCE   OF   GRENVILLE  ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN  POLICY. 

although  this  greatly  irritated  Grenville,*  the  latter  was  anxious  to 
keep  the  discourtesy  of  Austria  from  the  public  and  to  uphold  Austria's 
honor  for  future  use.  He  urged  this  upon  Woronzow,  the  Russian 
ambassador  in  England,  writing  also  : 

"  Quelle  que  soit  la  paix  qu'on  a  faite,  notre  union  n'en  deviendra 
que  plus  n£cessaire.  II  faudra  bien  nous  attendre  pour  emp£cher 
que  les  principes  Revolutionnaires  ne  deviennent  le  droit  public  de 
PEurope.  C'est  pourquoi  je  desire  de  menager  1'honneur  de  la  Cour 
de  Vienne  m£me  au  moment  ou  elle  parait  avoir  le  plus  oublie  ce 
qu'elle  doit  a  nous  et  a  elle-meme."  f 

In  this  connection  Grenville  now  feared  the  effect  upon  Austria  of 
Hammond's  secondary  instructions  for  the  Prussian  court.  Even  in 
the  despatch  outlining  the  acceptance  of  the  Prussian  offer  of  mediation 
Hammond  had  been  directed  to  emphasize  in  his  communications  to 
Russia  the  desire  of  England  to  maintain  the  system  of  alliance  with  that 
country  and  with  Austria  ' '  for  future  security  against  France  suppos- 
ing it  should  be  found  that  the  Court  of  Vienna  remains  disposed  to  act 
on  that  principle. ' '  J  Hammond  himself  expressed  doubts  of  the  advis- 
ability of  carrying  out  his  instructions  at  Berlin  and  decided  not  to  open 
the  matter  there  until  he  received  further  orders  from  England. §  Gren- 
ville thoroughly  approved  this  violation  of  previous  instructions,  and  May 
26  Hammond  was  directed  to  ' '  avoid  [at  Berlin]  any  particular  discourse 
or  communication  of  the  sentiments  or  views  of  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment but  only  express  in  general  terms  the  King's  continued  readiness 
to  lend  Himself  to  Negotiations  for  general  Peace  in  any  proper  manner 
and  on  such  grounds  as  may  be  consistent  with  His  Dignity  and  the 
Honour  and  Interests  of  His  Crown.  •  •  •  •  AS  the  greatest  indus- 
try will  probably  be  used  at  Berlin  to  discover  the  footing  on  which  His 
Majesty  stands  as  with  respect  to  the  House  of  Austria  you  will  be 
particularly  careful  not  to  let  any  expression  fall  from  you  which  may 
tend  to  commit  His  Majesty's  Government  in  that  respect."  ||  Thus 
Grenville,  struggling  against  peace,  was  attempting  to  preserve  the 
conditions  essential  to  a  possible  future  renewal  of  the  coalition. 

*  George  III  to  Grenville,  May  5,  1797.     Dropmore,  III,  318. 

t  May  5,  1797.     Ibid.,  320. 

J  Despatch  to  Hammond,  April  18,  1797.     Records,  Austria,  49. 

§  Hammond  to  Grenville,  May  13,  1797.     Dropmore,  III,  326. 

||  Despatch  No.  8  to  Hammond,  May  26,  1797.     Records,  Austria,  49. 


THE   NEGOTIATIONS  AT  LILLE.  55 

GRENVILLE'S  OPPOSITION  TO  THE  NEGOTIATIONS  AT  LILLE. 
MAY  TO  OCTOBER,  1797. 

The  recall  of  Hammond  was  the  first  step  in  a  policy  which  Grenville 
was  now  determined  to  urge  looking  toward  a  continuance  of  the  war. 
He  soon  found,  however,  that  the  spirit  of  the  English  ministry  and 
nation  was  not  sufficiently  restored  to  support  the  idea  of  a  war  in  iso- 
lation against  France,  and  his  preparatory  efforts  were  brought  to  a 
full  stop  by  the  decision  of  the  Cabinet  to  make  a  separate  offer  of 
peace.  Pitt  was  thoroughly  disheartened,  and  was  at  last  determined 
to  impose  his  authority  in  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs. 

The  negotiations  of  1797  brought  out  the  final  conflict  of  opinion 
between  Pitt  and  Grenville,  on  the  great  question  of  war  or  peace,  and 
in  their  progress  revealed  both  the  extent  of  Grenville' s  influence  and 
the  sources  from  which  it  was  derived.  The  decision  of  the  Cabinet 
was  reached  on  May  31.*  Since  April  conditions  in  England  had 
created  a  widespread  movement  for  peace.  The  mutiny  in  the  fleet, 
an  army  riot  at  Woolwich,  insurrections  in  Ireland,  the  low  state  of 
the  funds,  the  withdrawal  of  Grattan  and  his  party  from  the  Irish 
Parliament,  and  the  threatened  withdrawal  of  Fox  from  the  English 
Parliament,  all  combined  to  increase  the  panic  raised  by  the  news  of 
Leoben,  and  brought  even  the  friends  of  Burke  to  think  of  peace,  f 
In  Parliament  the  opposition  was  regularly  supported  by  double  the 
number  of  members  it  could  previously  count  upon,  and  between  March 
27  and  June  i  five  distinct  motions  of  censure  and  dismissal  were 
pressed  against  the  government.  At  the  same  time  a  large  body  of 
independents  under  the  leadership  of  the  Earl  of  Moira  attempted  to 
make  a  coalition  with  the  Foxites,  minus  Fox,  in  order  to  turn  out  the 
ministry.  $  Pitt  was  a  sturdy  political  fighter,  ever  ready  to  stand  up 
for  his  own  opinion,  but  in  this  case  his  personal  predilection  coincided 
with  that  of  his  opponents,  and  it  is  therefore  not  surprising  that  after 
the  failure  of  Hammond's  journey  he  renewed  overtures  of  peace  to 
France.  Grenville,  as  stubborn  as  ever  in  his  opposition  to  peace, 
bent  before  the  storm  and  did  not  object  to  the  initial  communications 
with  France,  though  even  from  the  first  he  was  seeking  to  -renew 
friendly  relations  with  Austria  in  the  hope  that  the  conference  which 
the  latter  was  to  hold  with  France  at  Berne  would  result  in  a  rupture.  § 

*  Grenville  to  George  III,  May  31,  1797.     Droptnore,  III,  327. 
t  Sir  Gilbert  Elliot  to  Lady  Elliot,  May  12,  1797.     "A  speedy  peace  seems  to 
have  become  extremely  necessary."     Elliot,  II,  392. 

Jl/etter  from  Moira  to  McMahon,  June  15,  1797.     Parl.  Hist.,  XXXIII,  1210. 
§  Grenville  to  Stahremberg,  June  2,  1797.     Dropmore,  III,  327. 


56      THE   INFLUENCE   OF  GRENVILLE  ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

The  reply  of  the  French  Directory  to  the  opening  made  by  England, 
received  on  June  n,  seemed  to  Grenville  extremely  insolent  and  its 
terms  such  as  should  have  precluded  any  further  negotiations.  The 
Directory  sent  a  passport  for  an  English  diplomat  who  should  be  ' '  fur- 
nished with  the  full  powers  of  his  Britannic  Majesty  for  the  purpose  of 
negotiating,  concluding,  and  signing  a  definitive  and  separate  treaty  of 
peace  with  the  French  Republic  •  *  *  '  . "  *  Thus  the  very  conditions 
upon  which  negotiations  were  to  be  begun  involved  the  recognition 
by  England  of  the  existence  of  the  Republic — a  point  Grenville  would 
have  deferred  until  the  formal  conclusion  of  a  definitive  peace.  But 
Grenville  objected  still  more  to  the  humiliation  of  England  in  accept- 
ing the  arbitrary  conditions  imposed,  and,  though  in  a  minority  in  the 
Cabinet,  earnestly  combated  Pitt's  purpose  to  send  a  negotiator.  He 
was  outvoted,  and  on  June  16  he  wrote  to  George  III  in  regard  to  the 
proposed  reply  to  France  : 

"  Lord  Grenville  would  not  discharge  his  duty  to  your  Majesty  as 
an  honest  man  or  as  an  attached  and  dutiful  servant  if,  with  the  opin- 
ion which  he  cannot  help  entertaining  on  the  subject  of  that  paper,  he 
omitted  to  declare  to  your  Majesty  without  reserve  how  it  appears  to 
him  to  fall  both  in  tone  and  substance  below  what  the  present  situa- 
tion of  your  Majesty's  kingdoms,  even  under  all  the  pressure  of  the 
moment, might  have  entitled  your  Majesty's  Government  to  assume  when 
speaking  in  your  Majesty's  name  ;  and  how  much  even  the  object  of 
peace  itself  is  endangered  by  a  line  of  so  much  apparent  weakness." 

Under  ordinary  circumstances,  Grenville  stated,  he  would  have  re- 
signed at  once,  but  the  mutiny  in  the  fleet  deterred  him  :  ' '  the  crisis 
of  the  present  hour  is  such  that  the  withdrawing  even  of  the  most  in- 
significant member  of  the  Government  might  weaken  it  in  the  public 
opinion  at  a  moment  when  every  good  man  must  wish  it  strengthened,  "f 
Grenville  may  have  been  honest  in  withholding  his  resignation  while 
the  mutiny  in  the  fleet  was  under  way  ;  he  certainly  was  not  sincere  in 
the  fear  that  the  line  taken  by  Pitt  would  endanger  peace  itself.  Un- 
questionably the  most  influential  motives  that  actuated  him  were  the 
hope  of  so  conducting  negotiations  as  to  render  difficult  a  final  agree- 
ment with  France  and  the  belief  that  time  would  restore  his  influence 
over  the  mind  of  his  chief.  George  III,  who  was  in  entire  sympathy 
with  Grenville's  opposition  to  peace,  perfectly  understood  the  situation. 
In  reply  to  Grenville's  letter,  he  wrote  on  June  17  : 

1 '  However  it  may  be  irksome  to  Lord  Grenville  to  hold  the  pen  on 

* Parl.  Hist.,  XXXIII,  911.  fDropmore,  III,  329. 


THE   NEGOTIATIONS   AT  LILLE.  57 

this  occasion,  I  must  feel  at  this  particular  moment  his  remaining  in 
his  situation  absolutely  essential,  for  he  will  be  able  to  stave  off  many 
farther  humiliations  that  might  be  attempted  from  having  shown  a  mind 
jealous  of  what  seems  in  the  outset  an  attempt  to  draw  us  into  future 
embarrassments."  * 

Unlike  previous  similar  contests,  the  struggle  in  the  Cabinet  was  this 
time  generally  known  in  political  circles,  and  surmises  were  frequent  as 
to  the  exact  attitude  of  each  member. f  Meanwhile  Austria  had  finally 
informed  England  of  the  terms  of  L,eoben,|  but  Grenville  was  unable  to 
use  this  to  restore  confidence  in  Austria,  for  the  entire  Cabinet,  Gren- 
ville included,  was  angered  by  Thugut's  doubts  of  Austria's  ability  to 
repay  the  loans  advanced  during  the  war.§  Grenville  was  thus  forced 
to  fight  his  battle  on  the  merits  of  the  French  negotiation,  separate  and 
distinct  from  any  other  question  of  foreign  policy  or  alliance. 

Malmesbury  was  again  the  negotiator  selected  by  Pitt,  and  he  set  out 
for  L/ille,  where  the  conferences  were  to  be  held,  fully  convinced  that 
Pitt  was  thoroughly  in  earnest  in  his  proposals  and  that  this  time 
the  concessions  he  was  instructed  to  offer  to  France  would  speedily  result 
in  a  treaty  of  peace.  ||  Pitt  and  his  protege,  Canning,  were  equally 
hopeful, fl  and  Pitt  had  given  Malmesbury  full  powers  to  sign  without 
reference  to  L/ondon,  if  the  English  terms  were  accepted.**  The  exact 
extent  to  which  the  English  government  was  prepared  to  go  cannot  be 
stated  authoritatively,  but  it  seems  probable  that  in  compensation  for 
French  acquisitions  in  Belgium,  Germany,  and  Italy,  Pitt  would  have 
demanded,  in  the  last  resort,  no  more  than  Ceylon. ff  Malmesbury's 
first  offer  to  the  French  negotiators  specified  also  the  Cape  of  Good 

*Dropmore,  III,  330. 

f  Elliot  wrote  to  Lady  Elliot  June  17,  1797:  "Pitt  differs  with  Lord  Grenville 
and  Dundas  with  both  ;  in  short,  all  is  in  great  confusion."  Elliot,  II,  408.  Later 
Elliot  though*  Dundas  occupying  middle  ground  between  Pitt  and  Grenville  in 
holding  out  for  the  retention  of  the  Cape  and  Ceylon,  which  Pitt  would  have 
yielded.  Ibid.,  410. 

{Grenville  to  Woronzow,  June  17,  1797.     Dropmore,  III,  331. 

§  Grenville  to  Stahremberg,  July  4,  1797.     Ibid.,  332. 

||  Of  Malmesbury's  going  to  Lille,  the  editor  of  Malmesbury's  memoirs  says  : 
"  Lord  Grenville  was  decidedly  opposed  to  this  step,  and  long  argued  it  with  Pitt  ; 
but  the  latter  remained  firm,  repeatedly  declaring  that  it  was  his  duty  as  an  Eng- 
lish Minister  and  a  Christian,  to  use  every  effort  to  stop  so  bloody  and  wasting  a 
war.  He  sent  Lord  Malmesbury  to  Lisle  with  the  assurance  that  '  he  (Pitt)  would 
stifle  every  feeling  of  pride  to  the  utmost  to  produce  the  desired  result ; '  and  Lord 
Malmesbury  himself  went  upon  his  Mission,  anxious  to  close  his  public  life  by  an 
act  which  would  spare  so  much  misery,  and  restore  so  much  happiness  to  mankind. ' ' 
Malmesbury,  III,  369. 

fl  Canning  to  Leigh,  July  12,  1797.     Ibid.,  393. 

**  Malmesbury  to  Pitt,  July  6,  1 797.     Ibid. ,  378. 

ft  While  not  definitely  stated  anywhere  in  the  documents  and  memoirs  pertaining 
to  Lille,  the  indirect  references  to  terms  bear  this  out.  See  also  Maret,  210,  and 
Rose,  I,  189. 


58      THE   INFLUENCE   OF   GRENVILLE   ON  PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

Hope,  Cochin,  and  Trinidad,  but  this  was  met  on  the  part  of  France 
by  the  presentation  of  a  note  involving  three  preliminary  points  which 
it  was  asserted  the  English  government  must  yield  before  any  other 
questions  were  raised.  These  were  the  renunciation  of  the  ancient 
claim  to  France  included  in  the  King's  title,  the  restoration  of  the  ships 
seized  at  Toulon  or  the  payment  of  a  satisfactory  indemnity,  and  the 
release  of  all  claim  to  the  revenues  of  the  Netherlands  founded  on  the 
English  loan  to  Austria.  The  latter  point  was  of  no  importance,  for 
the  English  loan  was  based  on  the  revenues  of  the  Austrian  Empire, 
not,  as  the  French  supposed,  on  those  of  the  Netherlands  alone.*  Nor 
is  it  probable  that  the  first  and  second  points  would  ever  have  been 
permitted  to  stand  in  the  way  of  a  final  treaty  ;  but  the  annoyance  felt 
because  of  the  French  demand  for  a  preliminary  concession  by  England 
aroused  a  feeling  of  irritation  in  the  Cabinet  and  encouraged  Grenville 
to  believe  that  peace  might  yet  be  averted.  While  he  was  careful  to 
write  privately  to  Malmesbury  in  such  terms  as  to  indicate  a  personal 
desire  for  peace,  the  undercurrent  of  feeling  evident  in  his  letters  and 
the  haughty  tone  of  his  official  despatches  evince  his  real  sentiments. 
Keenly  alive  to  every  shift  of  political  opinion  in  England,  he  now 
sought  to  hold  Pitt  to  his  original  instructions  to  Malmesbury,  in  the 
hope  that  these,  if  adhered  to,  would  prevent  the  completion  of  a  treaty. 
A  few  days  later  Grenville's  position  was  strengthened  by  an  assertion 
on  the  part  of  the  French  negotiators  that  they  were  unable  to  discuss 
the  colonial  acquisitions  desired  by  England,  inasmuch  as  the  Directory 
had  pledged  itself  in  a  treaty  with  Holland  ' '  not  to  surrender  Dutch 
colonies  without  the  consent  of  the  Dutch  government. "  f  In  regard 
to  the  three  points,  Grenville  at  once  wrote  to  Malmesbury  that  the 
French  opening  did  not  seem  favorable  to  peace,  ^  but  Canning,  who 
did  not  take  the  French  demands  seriously,  wrote  to  Ellis  : 

' '  Which  of  us  is  there  that  does  not  feel  it  grating  to  have  to  con- 
trive modes  of  concession,  instead  of  enforcing  the  justice  of  de- 
mands ?  *  •  '  '  But  we  cannot  and  must  not  disguise  our  situation 
from  ourselves.  If  peace  is  to  be  had,  we  must  have  it ;  I  firmly 
believe  we  must,  and  it  is  a  belief  that  strengthens  every  day.  '  '  * 
But  though  I  preach  peace  thus  violently,  do  not  imagine  that  I  am 
ready  to  take  any  that  you  may  offer.  •  •  •  •  Give  us  then  some- 
thing to  shew  as  an  acquisition  but  remember  •  •  •  •  that  what 
may  be  very  splendid  as  an  acquisition,  would  be  very  insufficient  as  a 

*  Grenville  to  Malmesbury,  July  13,  1797.     Malmesbury,  III,  394. 
t  Fitzpatrick's  introduction  to  Dropmore,  III,   xlviii-1.      This  presents  a  very 
clearly  stated  and  compact  re'sume'  of  the  negotiations  at  Lille. 
i Grenville  to  Malmesbury,  July  13,  1797.     Ibid.,  333. 


THE   NEGOTIATIONS  AT   LILLE.  59 

cause  of  quarrel.  We  can  break  off  upon  nothing  but  what  will  rouse 
us  from  sleep  and  stupidity  into  a  new  life  and  action,  what  '  will 
create  a  soul  under  the  ribs  of  death  ! '  for  we  are  now  soul-less  and 
spiritless;  and  what  would,  do  this,  except  the  defence  of  Portugal  •  •  •  • 
or  the  preservation  of  our  integrity,  •  •  •  •  I  know  not.  All  beyond 
this  we  shall  like  to  have,  but  we  never  shall  fight  for  it. "  * 

In  spite  of  this  readiness  to  concede  all,  the  immediate  effect  of  the 
French  stand  on  the  question  of  the  Dutch  colonies  was  to  stiffen  the 
attitude  of  the  English  government.  On  July  20,  a  week  after  the 
letter  just  quoted,  Canning  wrote  to  Malmesbury  that,  if  the  French 
remained  fixed  in  the  determination  to  refuse  any  Dutch  colony  and 
remained  also  as  offensive  in  their  manner  of  stating  it,  the  negotia- 
tions would  have  to  terminate, f  while  Grenville,  in  much  more  vigorous 
language,  stated  the  same  opinion.  J 

Grenville  now  not  only  exhibited  greater  hauteur  in  his  official  com- 
munications, but  also  began  actively  to  combat  Pitt  in  the  Cabinet.  A 
source  of  strength  to  Pitt  was  the  public  disinclination  to  continue 
the  war.  Grenville  discovered  that  the  events  of  the  negotiation  were 
known  in  London  almost  as  soon  as  received  by  the  ministers, §  and 
proposed  in  the  Cabinet  a  vote  imposing  secrecy  upon  its  members. 
This  was  passed  and,  according  to  Canning,  "was  devised  by  Lord 
Grenville  to  tie  up  Pitt's  tongue  alone,  whom  he  suspected  of  communi- 
cating with  other  persons,  and  fortifying  himself  with  out-of-door 
opinions  against  the  opinions  which  might  be  brought  forward  in 
Council  by  those  with  whom  he  differed  in  his  general  view  of  the 
Negotiation.  I  am  not  sure  that  he  did  not  suspect  him  further  of 
sounding  the  public  sentiment  through  the  newspapers  as  to  the  terms 
which  it  might  be  proper  to  accept,  and  the  concessions  which  it  might 
be  excusable  to  make  for  the  sake  of  peace."  ||  Grenville  had  in  fact 
secured  a  tactical  victory  over  Pitt.  Every  resolution  of  the  Cabinet 
that  involved  a  decision  not  wholly  agreeable  to  Pitt  was  a  step  toward 
Grenville' s  resumption  of  influence.  So  also  every  event  that  in- 
creased the  impression  of  French  insolence  and  of  English  humiliation 
was  magnified  by  Grenville  in  his  effort  to  renew  the  courage  of  the 
English  government,  and  in  this  connection  Malmesbury  had  unwit- 
tingly assisted  the  war  party  in  the  Cabinet,  for  he  had  dwelt  much 

*  July  13,  1797.  Malmesbury,  III,  396.  Ellis  was  Malmesbury's  right-hand  man 
at  Lille  and  was  a  close  friend  of  Canning's.  Thus  Pitt  and  Malmesbury  were  in 
close  touch  through  their  younger  intimates. 

t  Ibid.,  416. 

j  Grenville  to  Malmesbury,  July  20,  1797.     Dropmore,  III,  333. 

§  Ibid. 

\\  Canning  to  Malmesbury,  July  20,  1797.     Malmesbury,  III,  416. 


60      THE   INFLUENCE   OF  GRENVILLE  ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

in  his  despatches  upon  the  excessive  character  of  the  French  demands 
and  had  forwarded  those  demands  in  such  order  as  to  create  a  steadily 
increasing  irritation  with  the  insolence  displayed.  The  report  for- 
warded to  London  of  the  three  preliminary  stipulations  made  by 
France,  followed  almost  immediately  by  the  French  refusal  to  consider 
the  cession  of  any  Dutch  colony,  had  resulted  in  a  victory  for  Gren- 
ville  in  the  Cabinet.  Pitt  did  not  openly  assert  that  he  was  ready  to 
make  peace  under  the  extreme  conditions  proposed  by  France,  but  he 
opposed  stating  immediately  to  France  that  these  conditions  were  inad- 
missible. Grenville  urged  an  immediate  reply  notifying  France  that 
such  conditions,  if  insisted  on,  would  render  a  treaty  impossible,  and 
his  opinion  prevailed.  The  defeat  of  Pitt  and  the  anxiety  felt  among 
the  friends  of  peace  is  clearly  brought  out  in  a  letter  from  Canning  to 
Ellis,  in  which  the  former  blames  Malmesbury  for  the  character  of  the 
despatches  stating  the  French  demands  and  for  having  sent  them  with- 
out delay  to  England.  "The  second  messenger,"  he  wrote,  "was 
despatched  too  soon,  and  brought  the  proposition  of  the  Directory  in  a 
shape  in  which  it  was  the  most  difficult  to  discuss  it."*  To  this 
Ellis  indignantly  replied  :  "  If  I  understood  Mr.  Pitt  right,  you  want 
either  a  tolerably  good  peace,  or  the  most  unreasonable  requisitions,  "f 
thus  defending  the  despatches  in  question  on  the  ground  that  they 
conformed  to  the  latter  consideration.  Canning's  rejoinder  unveiled 
the  controversy  in  the  Cabinet.  Referring  again  to  Malmesbury 's 
immediate  transmittal  of  the  French  demands  and  its  unfortunate  con- 
sequence, he  wrote  : 

"You  will,  however,  have  understood,  that  what  I  said  upon  that 
point  belonged  rather  to  the  state  of  things  here  than  that  at  Lisle — to 
the  triumph  procured  by  the  particular  discussion  to  those  whom  I  wish 
not  to  triumph,  over  those  to  whom  I  wish  to  maintain  an  ascendancy, 
which  they  have  so  recently  obtained,  and  of  which  I  am  not  yet  sure 
that  they  have  more  than  a  precarious  and  temporary  possession  ;  and, 
upon  my  conscience,  I  believe  the  safety  and  welfare  of  the  country 
hereafter  to  be  involved  in  their  maintenance  and  exercise  of  this  as- 
cendancy. And,  though  I  am  not  so  unreasonable  as  to  wish  or  expect 
that  the  great  work  about  which  you  are  employed  can  be  squared  in 
the  whole,  or  altogether  in  any  one  part,  with  a  view  to  circumstances 
of  this  nature  at  home,  yet  I  do  not  think  it  an  inconsiderable  object  to 
soften  as  much  as  can  be  done,  without  hazarding  truth  and  substance, 
the  roughnesses  of  the  work  to  be  done  here  to  those  who  are  deter- 

*  Ellis  to  Canning,  July  25, 1797.     Malmesbury,  III,  430.     Ellis  quotes  the  phrase 
from  Canning's  letter,  but  the  letter  itself  is  not  to  be  found, 
t  Ibid. 


THE   NEGOTIATIONS   AT  ULLE.  6 1 

mined  to  go  through  with  it ;  and  to  give  as  little  opportunity  as  can  be 
helped  to  those  who  hate  the  work  to  revile  the  master  workman. ' '  * 

In  spite,  therefore,  of  the  nature  of  the  instructions  last  sent  to 
Malmesbury,  Pitt  still  proposed  to  fulfil  his  original  intentions,  and 
waited  only  for  that  lowering  of  the  demands  of  France,  of  which  he 
felt  confident,  to  reimpose  his  authority  upon  the  English  Cabinet. 
Whatever  the  wavering  of  his  fellow- ministers,  Pitt  himself  had  not  as 
yet  yielded  his  belief  in  the  necessity  of  peace  or  increased  the  limited 
concessions  he  was  prepared  to  ask  from  France.  Outwardly  the  rela- 
tions of  Pitt  and  Grenville  rested  upon  their  customary  basis  of  cordial 
cooperation;  in  reality  they  were  in  opposition,  and  their  intercourse 
lacked  that  friendly  character  which  had  formerly  constituted  so  large 
a  part  of  Grenville 's  influence. 

England's  refusal  to  acquiesce  in  the  French  demands  was  presented 
by  Malmesbury  at  Lille  on  July  25,  and  upon  its  becoming  evident  that 
France  would  not  abate  one  jot  of  her  pretensions,  the  negotiation  stood 
in  danger  of  coming  to  a  full  stop  and  even  to  a  rupture  ;  but  in  these 
circumstances  Maret,  one  of  the  three  French  diplomats  at  Lille,  acting 
through  a  friend,  Pein,  who  entered  into  friendly  conferences  with  the 
English  secretary  of  the  mission,  George  Ellis,  sought  and  arrived  at 
a  private  understanding  with  Malmesbury.  Maret  explained  that  no 
further  proposals  could  be  made  by  the  French  representatives  at  Lille 
until  the  issue  of  a  bitter  conflict  then  secretly  waging  in  the  gov- 
ernment at  Paris  was  clear.  Of  the  five  members  of  the  Directory, 
Barras,  Rewbell,  and  Larevelliere-Lepeaux,  aided  by  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  Delacroix,  were  opposed  to  peace.  The  two  remain- 
ing members,  Carnot  and  Barthelemy,  supported  by  a  majority  of  the 
Councils,  were  in  favor  of  a  fair  arrangement  with  England,  and,  if  in 
the  result  this  party  should  gain  the  control  of  affairs,  Maret  believed 
that  pressure  would  be  put  on  Holland  to  force  an  acquiescence  in  the 
cession  of  some,  if  not  all,  of  the  colonies  captured  by  England  during 
the  progress  of  the  war.f  Maret  also  stated  that  the  first  move  of  the 
Carnot  party  would  be  the  substitution  of  Talleyrand  for  Delacroix 

*  Canning  to  Ellis,  July  27,  1797.     Malmesbury,  III,  437. 

t  Ernouf ,  the  author  of  Maret,  Due  de  Bassano,  makes  no  reference  to  the  secret 
portion  of  Maret's  labors  at  Lille,  yet  the  book  was  published  after  the  Malmes- 
bury diary.  Sybel  also  passes  over  this  feature  in  silence,  though  giving  as  a 
principal  foot-note  reference  "Malmesbury,  III. "  Maret's  honest  desire  for  peace 
is  unquestioned,  for  it  is  proved  by  his  letter  to  Barras  urging  that  policy  (in  Maret, 
Ducde  Bassano),  and  also  by  Barras's  dislike  and  suspicion  of  Maret  (Barras,  II, 
263).  Barras's  Memoirs  at  this  period  are  concerned  chiefly  with  the  details  of  the 
struggle  in  Paris  and  touch  but  incidentally  on  foreign  affairs,  but  where  these  are 
mentioned  they  show  that  the  Directory  had  no  thought  of  making  peace  on  any 
terms,  and  was  in  fact  displeased  with  the  attitude  of  its  representatives  at  Lille. 


62      THE   INFLUENCE   OF  GRENVILLE   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

in  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs.  Malmesbury  was  convinced 
of  Maret's  honesty  and  advised  his  government  to  await  the  issue 
of  the  struggle  at  Paris.  All  knowledge  of  Maret's  disclosures  and 
of  the  frequent  communications  which  passed  between  Malmesbury 
and  Maret  during  the  ensuing  month  was,  at  the  suggestion  of  Can- 
ning, kept  from  the  English  Cabinet,  Pitt  and  Grenville  alone  being 
cognizant  of  what  was  taking  place.  Canning's  avowed  reason  for 
this  secrecy  was  the  necessity  of  protecting  Maret's  good  name,*  but, 
in  the  light  of  his  letter  to  Ellis,  it  seems  reasonable  to  suppose  that 
he  had  also  in  view  the  prevention  of  a  recurrence  of  those  acrimonious 
debates  in  the  Cabinet  which  had  lately  resulted  in  a  temporary  victory 
for  Grenville.  If  so,  his  plan,  while  successful  in  the  direct  object 
sought,  was  hazardous  in  its  effect  upon  the  main  question  of  peace, 
for  it  necessitated  a  renewal  of  that  personal  and  private  intercourse 
between  Grenville  and  Pitt  which  recent  events  had  tended  to  prevent. 

While  the  negotiations  at  Lille  were  thus  delayed  until  some  solu- 
tion was  reached  at  Paris,  it  was  still  necessary  to  preserve  the  usual 
diplomatic  forms  of  a  conference,  and  in  forwarding  instructions  to 
Malmesbury  Grenville  clearly  revealed  his  opposition  to  peace.  Al- 
though acknowledging  the  probability  that  Maret  was  dealing  honestly 
with  Malmesbury, f  he  wrote  the  latter  on  August  18  : 

"  I  greatly  doubt  whether  the  period  of  peace  is  yet  arrived.  There 
seems  so  much  insolence,  and  such  an  overbearing  opinion  of  their  own 
consequence  and  power  even  among  those  who  profess  themselves  the 
best  disposed,  that  I  fear  it  will  be  impossible  yet  to  obtain  such  terms 
as  we  must  require."  I 

His  language  in  communicating  with  the  King,  of  whose  sympathy 
he  felt  confident,  was  more  open.  As  to  what  terms  of  peace  might 
be  expected  if  Maret's  plan  was  successful,  he  wrote  on  August  4  : 

' '  It  appears  however  that  nothing  had  passed  on  that  head  beyond 
the  general  expression  of  reasonable  terms,  and  an  implied  concession 
that  your  Majesty  was  entitled  to  some  compensation,  but  without 
intimating  anything  of  its  nature  or  amount.  L/ord  Grenville  does  not 
therefore  flatter  himself  that  much  more  results  from  this  communica- 

*  Canning  to  Grenville,  July  31,  1797.  Dropmore,  III,  337.  By  the  plan  fol- 
lowed, Maltnesbury's  despatches  used  numerals  for  names,  in  mentioning  Maret  and 
others  whom  Maret  employed  in  communicating  with  Malmesbury,  and  they  are 
thus  given  in  the  Dropmore  MSS.  But  the  actual  names  were  long  ago  printed  in 
Malmesbury's  diary.  The  King  was  aware  of  and  consented  to  the  withholding 
of  these  despatches  from  the  rest  of  the  Cabinet.  Ibid. ,  343.  Malmesbury  himself 
saw  no  reason  for  such  secrecy,  though  he  wished  to  protect  Maret.  Malmesbury 
to  Canning,  Aug.  14,  1797.  Malmesbury,  III,  465. 

t  Grenville  to  Malmesbury,  Aug.  9,  1797.     Dropmore,  III,  352. 

t Ibid. ,  356. 


THE   NEGOTIATIONS  AT   UIXE.  63 

tion  than  that  the  moderate  party  were  desirous  to  prevent  the  nego- 
tiation from  being  abruptly  terminated  pending  the  struggle  at  Paris  ; 
but,  if  they  should  succeed,  there  seems  no  sufficient  ground  to  rely 
on  their  being  actuated  by  any  other  disposition  for  peace  than  what 
would  arise  from  a  motive  to  the  operation  of  which  their  adversaries 
would,  under  the  like  circumstances,  be  equally,  or  even  more  exposed, 
the  great  difficulty  which  they  would  find  in  continuing  the  war. ' '  * 

Pitt,  however,  was  hopeful,  basing  his  expectations  upon  Malmes- 
bury's  confidence  in  Maret's  integrity,  and  for  a  month  longer  the 
negotiation  waited  upon  the  turn  of  events  in  Paris.  Malmesbury,  on 
his  part,  sought  to  follow  Canning's  injunctions  in  regard  to  the  con- 
flict in  the  English  Cabinet,  going  so  far  even  as  to  conceal  such  parts  of 
Ellis' s  conversations  with  Pein  as  departed  from  a  stiff  maintenance  of 
English  demands,!  and  writing  on  August  14  :  "This  messenger  will 
not,  I  think,  carry  over  any  materials  for  a  Cabinet  discussion."  J 

Malmesbury 's  precautions  were  unavailing,  for  an  unexpected  event 
soon  revived  the  conflict  of  opinion  in  England,  and  in  its  consequences 
almost  convinced  Malmesbury  himself  that  Pitt  was  yielding  to  the 
influence  of  the  war  party.  Malmesbury  learned  August  12  that  a 
treaty  between  France  and  Portugal  had  been  signed  at  Paris  by  which 
Portugal  agreed  to  assume  a  position  of  neutrality  in  any  war  between 
France  and  England,  and  not  to  permit  more  than  six  ships,  of  either 
nation  in  her  ports  during  the  continuance  of  that  war.§  This  treaty 
was  disavowed  when  it  was  forwarded  to  Ivisbon,  but  in  the  meantime 
it  had  greatly  angered  the  English  government.  Grenville  instructed 

x  Dropmore,  III,  343. 

fThe  reports  sent  to  England,  of  the  conversations  between  Ellis  and  Pein,  and 
later  between  Malmesbury  and  Maret,  are  given  in  Dropmore.  Comparing  these 
with  the  reports  made  by  Ellis  to  Malmesbury  (as  given  in  Malmesbury),  it  is  evi- 
dent that  the  accounts  sent  to  Grenville  were  carefully  edited.  In  the  following 
illustration  the  portions  enclosed  in  parentheses  were  in  the  original  report  by  Ellis 
to  Malmesbury,  while  the  report  as  actually  sent  to  Grenville  is  to  be  read  by 
omitting  the  enclosed  portions.  Ellis  said  "that  the  Cape  (I  was  very  sure,  was  not 
an  object  of  profit  to  any  nation  ;  that  it  was  necessary,  like  Ceylon,  for  the  pres- 
ervation of  our  territory  ;  and  that,  from  the  little  I  had  heard  on  the  subject,  I  saw 
no  reason  for  believing  that  we  attached  such  importance  to  it  as  to  let  it  stand 
in  the  way  of  the  attainment  of  any  great  national  object,  but  that  it)  was  ours  at 
present,  and  that  he  had  not  heard  a  shadow  of  reason  why  we  should  part  with  it. 
Lastly,  that  our  demand  of  Cochin  was  only  in  return  for  Negapatnam,  which  was, 
he  conceived,  of  much  higher  value  to  the  Dutch.  Here  le  Pein  said,  (with  much 
eagerness,  "  Vous  m'e"tonnez  beaucoup.  Oh,)  si  vous  vouliez  reiidre  le  Cap,  je  suis 
bien  persuade  qu'il  ne  tiendrait  qu'a  vous  de  signer  la  paix  dans  quinze  jours." 
Malmesbury,  III,  470-471,  and  Dropmore,  III,  348.  It  is  evident  that  the  omissions 
in  the  report  to  Grenville  were  made  solely  because  the  full  conversation  would 
have  given  ground  for  a  new  controversy  with  Pitt.  Many  such  omissions  are  found 
by  comparing  Malmesbury  and  the  Dropmore  MSS.,  and  most  of  them  were  made 
for  similar  reasons. 

t  Malmesbury  to  Canning.     Malmesbury,  III,  465. 

§  Malmesbury  to  Grenville,  Aug.  14,  1797.     Ibid.,  461. 


64      THE   INFLUENCE   OF  GRENVILLE   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

Malmesbury  that  England  could  not  submit  to  any  such  stipulation, 
and  that  articles  in  regard  to  it  must  be  inserted  in  the  treaty  to  be 
signed  at  L/ille.*  At  the  same  time  Grenville  exhibited  resentment  to 
a  published  declaration  by  the  Directory  to  the  effect  that  England  was 
delaying  peace  negotiations,  and  ordered  Malmesbury  to  hand  in  a 
formal  note  demanding  an  explanation.  The  instructions  in  both  of 
these  cases  revealed  a  temper  and  an  attitude  little  likely  to  be  of  aid 
in  procuring  peace.  Pitt  also  wrote  to  Malmesbury  in  regard  to  the 
Portuguese  treaty  in  much  the  same  sense  as  had  Grenville,  but  in 
gentler  language. f  He  made  no  mention,  however,  of  the  Directory's 
declaration.  Malmesbury  ventured  to  disobey  his  instructions,  in  that 
he  did  not  present  a  formal  note  of  complaint,  but  merely  talked  over 
with  the  French  negotiators  the  declaration  in  question.  J  He  was  also 
greatly  vexed  at  the  stand  taken  by  England  in  regard  to  the  Portu- 
guese treaty,  thinking  that  the  consideration  of  it  might  well  have  been 
delayed  in  the  interests  of  the  conference  at  Lille.  On  August  29  he 
wrote  to  Canning,  "  I  consider  the  Portuguese  peace,  from  the  manner 
in  which  it  has  been  taken  up,  as  an  event  very  likely  to  break  off  the 
Negotiation,  "§  and  Canning  himself  was  of  the  same  opinion.  || 

Malmesbury  in  fact  could  no  longer  remain  blind  to  the  change 
taking  place  in  the  temper  of  the  English  government  and  wrote  again 
to  Canning  on  the  same  day  : 

' '  You  must  have  perceived  that  the  instructions  and  opinions  I  get 
from  the  Minister  under  whose  orders  I  am  bound  to  act,  accord  so  little 
with  the  sentiments  and  intentions  I  heard  expressed  by  the  Minister 
with  whom  I  wish  to  act,  that  I  am  placed  in  a  very  disagreeable 
dilemma.  If  I  do  not  conform  to  my  instructions,  I  am  guilty  of 
diplomatic  mutiny  ;  if  I  do  strictly  and  up  to  the  letter  of  them,  I  am 
guilty  of  what  is  worse,  by  lending  myself  to  promote  a  measure  I 
think  essentially  wrong. ' '  11 

He  then  states  that  he  is  of  course  perfectly  ready  to  resign  his  own 
opinion  as  to  the  best  method  of  securing  peace,  and  declares  : 

"  But  if  another  opinion  has  been  allowed  to  prevail — if  the  real 
end  is  to  differ  from  the  ostensible  one — and  if  I  am  only  to  remain  here, 
in  order  to  break  off  the  Negotiation  creditably,  and  not  to  terminate  it  suc- 
cessfully, I  then,  instead  of  resigning  my  opinion,  must  resign  my 

*Aug.  19,  1797.     Malmesbury,  III,  489. 
f  Aug.  19,  1797.     Ibid.,  491. 

j  Malmesbury  to  Grenville  and  to  Canning,  Aug.  22,  1797.     Ibid.,  494,  497. 
%Ibid.,  512. 
||  Ibid.,  516. 

jfThe  language  of  Grenville's  despatches  had,  in  fact,  convinced  the  French 
Directory  that  England  did  not  desire  peace.  Barras,  II,  520. 


THE   NEGOTIATIONS  AT  LII^E.  65 

office.  '  '  '  '  I  hope,  after  all,  I  may  be  wrong  in  my  misgivings, 
and  that  the  war  party  in  the  Cabinet  have  not  surprised  the  religion  of 
the  pacific  one."  * 

Malmesbury  was  in  a  state  of  excited  distrust  not  customary  with 
him,  for  on  the  same  day,  August  29,  he  wrote  still  a  third  letter  to 
Canning  :  "  For  Heaven's  sake,  do  not  let  the  only  person  in  England, 
perhaps  in  Europe,  who  seeing  right  can  act  with  effect,  be  seduced 
to  wander  from  the  principle  he  laid  down  two  months  ago."  That 
these  letters  were  intended  for  Pitt's  eye  is  shown  by  the  concluding 
sentence  :  "I  never  object  to  anything  being  shewn  to  Pitt  '  '  '  * 
I  do  not  write  to  him,  because  I  could  say  nothing  I  have  not  said  to 
you. ' '  f  Three  days  later  Malmesbury  talked  the  matter  over  with  Ellis 
and  noted  in  his  diary  Pitt's  "weakness  in  regard  to  I,ord  Grenville."  J 

Although  the  policy  of  the  war  party  in  the  English  Cabinet  was  not 
yet  predominant  to  the  extent  feared  by  Malmesbury,  it  was  at  least  so 
far  victorious  as  to  render  Pitt  unwilling  to  risk  a  direct  challenge  of 
authority.  On  August  29  Canning  informed  Malmesbury  that  an  offi- 
cial approval  of  his  violation  of  instructions  in  not  handing  in  a  formal 
note  of  complaint  to  the  French  negotiators  would  have  been  sent  to 
him  "  if  I  had  been  quite  sure  myself,  or  if  the  one  person  with  whom 
I  consulted  upon  the  subject  could  have  answered  it  to  me,  that  a 
thorough  approbation  of  this  omission  would  be  given  •  •  •  .  *  .  J 
vehemently  feared,  and  so  did  my  opposite  neighbour  [Pitt]  ,§  that  the 
warlike  spirit  was  too  strong  in  that  quarter  [Grenville' s]  to  expect  a 
perfect  acquiescence. "||  It  is  thus  evident  that  though  Grenville  was 
still  hampered  by  the  controversy  with  Austria  as  to  the  payment  of  the 
loans, If  he  had  succeeded  in  forming  a  party  in  the  Cabinet  stoutly  an- 
tagonistic to  peace,  and  one  whose  strength  was  daily  increasing.  The 
temper  of  the  country  was  also  steadily  rising,  and  there  is  some  reason 
for  thinking  that  Pitt,  recognizing  his  weakness  in  the  Cabinet,  had 
already  determined  to  sacrifice  his  opinion  to  Grenville's.  Malmesbury's 
three  letters  of  August  29  must  have  reached  London  by  September  4,  at 
the  latest,**  and,  had  Pitt  now  been  in  earnest  to  fulfil  his  first  instruc- 
tions to  Malmesbury,  it  is  certainly  presumable  that  either  he  or  Can- 
ning would  have  hastened  to  relieve  Malmesbury's  uncertainty  and  agita- 
tion. Pitt  did  finally  write  to  Malmesbury  on  September  1 1  that ' '  on  the 

*  Malmesbury,  III,  517. 

•\Ibid.,  518. 

\Ibid.,  521. 

§  Pitt  and  Canning  lived  in  opposite  houses  on  the  same  street. 

||  Malmesbury,  III,  520. 

if  Grenville  to  Morton  Eden,  Sept.  8,  1797.     Dropmore,  III,  369. 

**  The  time  usually  required  in  transit  was  from  two  to  four  days. 


66      THE   INFLUENCE  OP  GRENVILLE  ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

main  points  in  question  in  the  Negotiation  my  opinions  remain  unalter- 
ably what  I  stated  to  you  in  our  last  conversation  ;  that,  on  that  line,  T 
shall  at  all  events  act,  and  \\vati.  collateral  difficulties  may,  I  think,  always 
be  overcome  by  a  mixture  of  firmness  and  temper. ' '  *  And  again  on 
September  14  he  wrote  to  Malmesbury  :  "  On  all  material  points  in  the 
whole  of  your  negotiation,  my  opinion  will  remain  unaltered  (though 
my  hopes  are  rather  more  sanguine) ,  and  my  ultimate  determination 
will  be  what  I  think  you  know."f  These  letters  would  constitute 
excellent  evidence  of  Pitt's  firmness  of  determination,  if  it  were  not  for 
the  fact  that  between  the  probable  date  of  the  receipt  of  Malmesbury's 
letters,  September  3  or  4,  and  the  date  of  Pitt's  first  letter,  September 
1 1 ,  news  had  reached  London  of  the  conclusion  of  the  struggle  in  Paris 
in  the  overthrow  on  September  4  of  the  peace  faction,  and  the  victory 
of  Barras,  Rewbell,  and  the  war  party.  %  If  Maret's  analysis  of  the 
situation  was  correct,  and  of  this  neither  Malmesbury  nor  Pitt  had  any 
doubt,  all  hope  of  peace  through  the  negotiations  at  Lille  was  destroyed 
by  the  coup  cCttat  of  the  i8th  Fructidor  in  Paris.  Moreover,  the  hope 
expressed  by  Pitt  in  his  letter  of  September  14  referred  to  a  secret  nego- 
tiation unknown  to  Malmesbury,  in  which  Pitt  believed  the  way  open 
to  the  purchase  of  a  favorable  peace  by  the  bribery  of  Barras,  and  not 
to  any  confidence  felt  in  the  probable  outcome  at  Lille.  In  the  light 
of  Pitt's  failure  to  reply  to  Malmesbury  until  after  the  knowledge  of 
events  in  Paris  had  reached  him,  his  letters  seem  indeed  the  assertions 
of  a  man  who,  knowing  his  original  plan  defeated,  was  yet,  owing  to 
an  event  foreign  to  the  ground  upon  which  that  defeat  had  been  sus- 
tained, fortunately  able  to  assert  the  fixity  and  integrity  of  his  purpose. 
The  new  government  in  Paris  quickly  brought  the  negotiation  at 
Lille  to  an  end.  Maret  and  his  colleagues  were  at  once  recalled,  and 
two  new  negotiators  appeared  in  their  stead  with  a  demand  so  insolent 
and  extreme  that  Malmesbury  had  no  other  option  than  to  refuse  it. 
Ignoring  the  results  of  all  previous  conferences,  the  new  French  diplo- 
mats insisted  that  as  a  preliminary  to  any  negotiation  whatever,  Malmes- 
bury must  state  explicitly  whether  or  not  he  was  ' '  authorized  to  treat 
on  the  principle  of  a  general  restitution  of  every  possession  remaining  in 
His  Majesty's  hands,  not  only  belonging  to  them  [the  French] ,  but  to  their 
Allies. "§  An  immediate  answer  was  required,  and  Malmesbury,  recog- 

*  Malmesbury,  III,  554. 

f  Ibid.,  560. 

j  The  news  reached  I/ondon  by  September  9,  at  least.  See  Malmesbury  to  Gren- 
ville,  Sept  9,  1797,  and  Grenville  to  Malmesbury,  Sept.  n,  1797.  Dropmore,  III, 
370,  372. 

§  Malmesbury  to  Grenville,  Sept.  17,  1797.     Malmesbury,  III,  562. 


THE  SECRET   PROPOSAL  OF  PEACE.  67 

nizing  the  futility  of  further  pacific  overtures,  sought  merely  to  direct 
the  conferences  into  such  a  channel  as  would  display  the  honor  and 
dignity  of  his  government  to  the  disadvantage  of  France.  In  this, 
thanks  to  his  superiority  in  diplomatic  maneuvering,  he  was  entirely 
successful  and  forced  the  French  diplomats  to  state  their  proposals  in 
terms  most  unreasonable  and  in  manner  most  offensive,  while  Knglish 
honor  and  sincerity  were  sustained  in  Malmesbury's  proud  refusal  to 
disclose  his  instructions.  Grenville  was  elated  at  this  outcome,  writ- 
ing to  Buckingham,  ' '  The  Directory  have  done  everything  they  could 
to  play  our  game."*  Malmesbury,  on  his  arrival  in  England,  was 
surprised  to  find  a  complete  change  in  the  temper  of  the  public,  and 
that  in  the  Cabinet  nearly  every  one  rejoiced  f  that  the  negotiations 
had  been  broken  off,  while  Pitt  himself  seemed  relieved.  J  Malmesbury 
was  convinced  by  several  conversations  with  Grenville  that  he  had  been 
correct  in  his  early  suspicion  of  Grenville's  attitude,  and  that  the  latter 
was  ' '  invariably  against  peace  from  the  beginning. ' '  § 


THE  SECRET  PROPOSAL  OF  PEACE. 

AUGUST  10  TO  OCTOBER,  1797. 

During  the  period  immediately  subsequent  to  Maret's  secret  pro- 
posals of  delay,  another  and  still  more  secret  negotiation  was  begun  in 
London.  In  this  also  Grenville,  exhibiting  now  grudging  acquiescence, 
now  stubborn  refusal,  played  an  important  part  in  determining  the 
final  outcome.  The  London  proposal  apparently  had  no  connection 
whatever  with  that  of  Maret  at  Lille,  save  as  the  French  agents  em- 
ployed in  the  former  made  use  of  their  knowledge  of  what  was  taking 
place  at  Lille  to  convince  Pitt  of  their  relations  with  the  French  gov- 
ernment and  hence  of  their  ability  to  sell  peace  to  England.  Before 
Malmesbury  left  England  a  man  named  Potter  had  suggested  to  the 
government  in  London  that  peace  on  favorable  terms  to  England  might 
be  assured  if  a  secret  bribe  were  paid  to  certain  members  of  the  Direc- 
tory. Potter  claimed  to  be  authorized  to  conduct  such  a  transaction, 
but  his  offer  was  not  seriously  considered.  Later,  on  August  22, 

*Sept.  20,  1797.     Court  and  Cabinets,  II,  383. 

t  Malmesbury's  diary,  Sept.  20,  1797.     Malmesbury,  III,  580. 

JSept.  27,  1797.     Ibid.,  591. 

§  Oct.  4,  1797.  Ibid,,  595.  Lord  Ashburton,  in  writing  of  these  events  in  1845, 
speaks  of  "the  desponding  view  of  affairs  taken  both  by  him  [Pitt]  and  Canning, 
checked  by  the  dogged  obstinacy  of  Grenville."  Croker,  II,  238. 


68      THE   INFLUENCE   OF  GRENVILLE   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POUCY. 

Malraesbury  wrote  a  long  letter  to  Grenville,*  describing  a  visit  paid 
him  by  one  Melville,  who  brought  forward  a  similar  suggestion,  stating 
that  he  was  acting  for  Barras,  but  who  also,  like  Potter,  could  not  pro- 
duce any  proof  of  the  authenticity  of  his  offer.  Malmesbury  thought 
these  overtures  were  but  intrigues  in  some  stock-jobbing  operation, 
yet  considered  them  of  sufficient  importance  to  report  them  in  detail  to 
Grenville.  He  also  received  from  Maret  the  information  that  both 
Barras  and  Rewbell  were  venal, f  though  Maret  did  not  believe  Mel- 
ville authorized  to  make  the  proposal  in  question.  Melville  proceeded 
to  London  and  there  laid  his  project  before  Pitt  himself.  I  Pitt  was  at 
first  suspicious,  but  becoming  convinced  that  Melville  was  really  com- 
missioned by  Barras,  wrote  Grenville  to  that  effect, §  and  wrote  also  to 
the  King  on  September  6,  saying  : 

"  The  sum  he  names  is  a  very  large  one,  amounting  to  four  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand  pounds  ;  but  it  seems  not  to  be  more  than  would  be 
wisely  employed  if  he  can  make  good  what  he  proposes  as  the  condition 
previous  to  its  being  paid,  namely,  that  the  treaty  shall  be  signed  and 
ratified  without  delay,  leaving  this  country  in  possession  of  the  Cape, 
Ceylon,  Cochin,  and  Trinidad,  and  exacting  nothing  in  return.  •  •  •  • 
The  sum  might  without  material  difficulty,  it  is  conceived,  be  supplied  in 
part  from  the  territorial  revenues  of  India,  and  the  remainder  from  secret 
service,  without  the  necessity  of  ever  disclosing  the  transaction."  || 

Pitt  proposed  to  conduct  this  remarkable  transaction  through  the 
medium  of  Malmesbury  at  Lille,  but  before  the  arrangement  could  be 
perfected  the  rupture  of  negotiations  at  that  place  had  occurred.  Gren- 
ville appears  to  have  had  no  connection  as  yet  with  these  overtures, 
except  that  he  was  kept  informed  of  them  by  Pitt.  Probably  he  did 
not  choose  to  oppose  them,  because  he  did  not  believe  them  to  be 
authentic,  but  when  later  in  September  an  offer  of  a  similar  nature 
came  through  a  much  more  responsible  channel,  he  was  roused  to  state 
his  disapproval  and  to  use  his  skill  in  criticism.  Melville's  offer  had 
included  so  large  a  concession  to  England  as  to  seem  preposterous. 
The  offer  that  now  came  through  Boyd,  a  prominent  banker,  was  limited 
to  a  cession  of  Ceylon  and  the  Cape,  while  the  bribe  demanded  was 
increased  to  ,£2,000,000,  or  ^1,200,000  for  Ceylon  alone.H  Pitt  could 
not  hope  to  withdraw  secretly  so  large  a  sum  from  the  revenues,  and 

*  Dropmore,  III,  356. 

t  Malmesbury  to  Grenville,  Aug.  22,  1797.     Ibid.,  358. 

j  Pitt  to  Grenville,  Aug.  28,  1797.     Ibid.,  360. 

§Sept.  2,  1797.     Ibid.,  368. 

II  Ibid.,  369. 

T{  The  letters  in  Dropmore,  considered  alone,  have  caused  the  editor  of  the  MSS. 
to  confuse  slightly  two  distinct  offers.  See  letter  quoted,  p.  69,  note  *,  from  Stan- 
hope. 


THE  SECRET  PROPOSAL  OF   PEACE.  69 

stated  to  the  King  that  he  had  ' '  distinctly  explained  to  the  person 
through  whom  the  proposal  comes,  that  enough  must  be  stated  to  Par- 
liament, in  order  to  procure  the  grant  of  the  money,  to  satisfy  them 
that  it  was  really  employed  for  secret  service  on  the  Continent,  with  a 
view  to  the  settlement  of  peace. ' '  *  On  October  7  the  affair  had  reached 
a  point  where  Pitt,  acting  with  Dundas,  but  with  no  other  member  of 
the  Cabinet,  despatched  to  Paris  a  virtual  acceptance  of  the  proposal. 
On  the  same  day  Pitt  informed  Grenville  that  ' '  the  offer  (if  it  is  real) 
seemed  both  to  Dundas  and  me  so  tempting,  and  the  time  pressed  so 
much  to  an  hour  (lest  an  answer  should  be  given  in  the  interval  to  our 
last  note  which  would  preclude  all  chance)  that  we  did  not  hesitate  to 
desire  Boyd  to  write  to  his  correspondent  immediately  to  the  purport 
of  the  enclosed  memorandum."  f  Grenville  immediately  replied  :  "I 
cannot  deny  to  you  that  the  whole  of  that  transaction  is  so  disagree- 
able to  my  mind  that  I  am  very  glad  to  have  been  saved  the  necessity 
of  deciding  upon  it."  He  then,  while  not  specifically  opposing  the 
purchase  of  peace,  further  states  his  own  feeling  : 

"  I  shudder  at  what  we  are  doing,  and  believe  in  my  conscience  that, 
if  this  country  could  but  be  brought  to  think  so,  it  would  be  ten  thou- 
sand times  safer  (and  cheaper  too,  which  they  seem  to  consider  above 
all  other  things)  to  face  the  storm,  than  to  shrink  from  it.  And  above 
all  I  dread  the  loss  of  consideration  which  must,  I  fear,  infallibly  result 
from  any  mode  of  purchasing  our  safety,  and  such  this  is,  and  will  be 
felt  to  be,  let  us  say  or  do  what  we  will."  | 

Having  thus  expressed  his  own  convictions,  Grenville  brought  for- 
ward in  the  same  letter  a  criticism  of  the  terms  of  the  memorandum 
so  hastily  forwarded  by  Pitt  through  Boyd.  He  pointed  out  in  par- 
ticular that  the  memorandum  promised  that  Malmesbury  would  be  sent 
back  to  Lille,  ' '  with  no  other  security  for  his  future  treatment  than 
results  from  the  private  understanding  established,"  and  that,  in  case 
of  the  very  possible  failure  to  conclude  peace,  this  could  but  result  in 
humiliation  and  dishonor  to  England.  He  urged  then,  as  all-essential 
to  any  public  renewal  of  negotiations,  some  public  official  declaration 
from  France  to  enable  Malmesbury  to  return  to  Lille.  The  point  was 
well  taken,  and  Pitt  at  once  recognized  its  importance,  while  time  and 
reflection  made  him  less  inclined  to  hasty  action. §  When,  therefore, 
on  October  17,  a  reply  to  Pitt's  memorandum  arrived  at  London 
still  secretly  promising  all  that  was  desired,  but  still  unaccompanied 

*  Pitt  to  George  III,  Sept.  22,  1797.     Stanhope,  III,  Appendix,  p.  vii. 

t  Dropmore,  III,  377. 

JOct.  8,  1797.     Ibid.,  378. 

§  Pitt  to  Grenville,  Oct.  13,  1797.     Ibid.,  380. 


70      THE   INFLUENCE   OF  GRENVILLE   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

by  any  "ostensible  act  on  the  part  of  the  French  Government  to  justify 
Lord  M  [almesbury]  's  return, ' '  the  exact  point  upon  which  Lord  Gren- 
ville  had  insisted,  Pitt  altogether  lost  confidence  in  the  intrigue  and 
urged  Grenville  to  hasten  the  preparation  of  a  public  resume  of  the 
negotiations  at  Lille.* 

From  this  time  no  further  thought  was  given  to  ideas  of  peace,  but 
every  energy  was  directed  toward  a  vigorous  preparation  for  national 
defense  and  the  continuation  of  the  war.  Though  the  actual  result 
of  the  negotiations  at  Lille  had  been  decided  rather  by  the  outcome 
of  the  conflict  in  Paris  than  by  any  decided  change  in  Pitt's  own  senti- 
ments, Grenville,  by  his  sturdy  opposition  and  skillful  maneuver- 
ing, had  prevented  Pitt  from  expanding  his  original  concessions  to 
France,  had  saved  him  from  a  dangerous  trap  in  the  secret  overtures, 
and  had  revived  the  spirit  of  the  Cabinet.  The  dignity  and  honor 
with  which  England  emerged  from  the  negotiations,  due  primarily  to 
the  proud  tone  of  Grenville' s  official  despatches,  proved  of  great  service 
to  the  government  both  in  Parliament  and  with  the  public.  Pitt's 
ministry  was  never  stronger.  Grenville  quietly  resumed  his  former 
predominance  in  the  determination  of  foreign  policy,  while  the  old 
conditions  of  friendly  intercourse  and  confidence  with  his  chief  were 
at  once  renewed. 

*Pitt  to  Grenville,  Oct.  18,  1797.  Dropmore,  III,  381.  It  is  stated  by  Stan- 
hope (III,  61)  that  the  offers  came  from  Barras,  but  no  sufficient  proof  of  this  has 
ever  been  produced.  In  Barras's  Memoirs  (II,  576)  mention  is  made  of  "  Potter  the 
Englishman  "  who  has  just  come  from  I,ondon,  July  20,  1797.  Potter  seems  to  have 
been  a  French  spy.  Such  a  man  was  hardly  likely  to  have  been  entrusted  with  the 
offer  in  question.  Maret  believed  Melville  to  be  of  like  character,  and  a  mere  in- 
triguer, planning  things  he  had  no  authority  to  propose.  Malmesbury  to  Grenville, 
Aug.  22,  1797.  Dropmore,  III,  356.  The  offer  through  Boyd  bore  more  marks  of 
authenticity,  because  of  the  character  of  the  person  employed,  but  taken  all  together 
no  positive  assertion  that  Barras  was  implicated  is  possible. 


THE   RESULTS  OF   GRENVILLE'S  VICTORY.  71 


THE  RESULTS  OF  GRENVILLE'S  VICTORY. 

Malmesbury's  estimate  of  the  changed  sentiment  of  the  English 
nation  was  not  a  mistaken  one.  The  resume  of  the  Lille  negotiations, 
drawn  up  by  Grenville  and  presented  to  Parliament  November  3,  was 
received  with  favor,*  and  the  government  now  bent  all  its  energies 
toward  preparation  for  a  continuance  of  the  war  with  France.  An 
address  to  the  throne,  November  8,  pledged  the  British  nation  to  unre- 
mitting hostility  to  the  expansion  of  French  power,  and  in  the  attend- 
ant debate  Grenville  stood  forward  as  the  great  champion  of  patriotic 
England.  His  speech  f  contained  no  word  of  regret  for  the  failure  of 
peace  negotiations  ;  he  rejoiced,  rather,  that  now  at  last  all  men  must 
see  the  desperate  determination  of  France  to  overthrow  the  constitu- 
tion and  law  of  England.  Pitt's  speech  in  the  Commons  on  Novem- 
ber 10  was  much  less  vigorous  ;  but  while  "lamenting  and  deploring ' ' 
the  failure  to  secure  peace,  he  acknowledged  that  he  had  gone  too  far 
in  his  original  offer  to  France  and  explicitly  stated  that  he  could  not 
now  regard  that  peace  as  honorable  which  involved  a  retrocession 
of  all  that  England  had  acquired.  £  The  address  to  the  throne  was 
passed  in  both  houses  without  division  §  and  was  soon  followed  by  the 
preparation  of  measures  intended  to  arouse  the  inherent  patriotism 
of  the  people,  to  appeal  to  the  nation  in  fact  as  France  had  appealed 
to  its  people,  but  on  different  lines  and  for  a  different  purpose.  The 
organization  of  the  volunteer  forces  was  the  first  step  which  was  taken 
in  this  direction,  and  its  great  popularity  furnished  excellent  proof 
of  the  political  wisdom  of  Grenville' s  stubborn  opposition  to  peace. 
In  his  own  department  Grenville  resumed  his  customary  activity  in 
diplomatic  correspondence,  interest  in  which  had  lagged  during  the 
negotiations  at  L,ille. 

*  Parl.  Hist.,  XXXIII,  906-962.  This  re'sume'  contained  most  of  the  official 
despatches  and  correspondence  relating  to  Lille,  but  omitted  all  mention  of  the 
part  played  by  Maret. 

t Ibid.,  979. 

\Ibid.,  987-1025.  Pitt  was  disturbed  and  chagrined  by  a  preceding  speech  by 
Earl  Temple,  Buckingham's  son  and  Grenville's  nephew,  who,  posing  as  an  inde- 
pendent, rejoiced  that  the  negotiation  had  been  broken  off,  and  approved  "  of 
those  measures  which  have  been  taken,  when  we  were  in  the  scrape,  to  extricate 
us  from  it "  (p.  995).  This  had  importance  solely  because  of  Temple's  relationship 
with  Grenville,  and  Pitt  devoted  a  good  part  of  his  own  speech  to  denying  that  any 
such  measures  had  been  taken. 

§  Fox  and  Sheridan  were  still  absenting  themselves  from  Parliament. 


72      THE   INFLUENCE  OF  GRENVILLK   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

With  the  disappearance  of  the  probability  of  peace,  new  overtures 
were  made  to  Russia  and  received  from  her.*  The  death  of  Frederick 
William  II  and  the  accession  of  a  new  monarch  in  Berlin  created  tem- 
porary hopes  of  a  change  in  Prussian  sentiment. f  Even  Austria  hinted 
at  a  renewal  of  alliance  with  England.  I  In  other  and  more  positive 
ways  the  English  position  was  greatly  improved.  The  naval  mutiny 
was  over,  and  Duncan's  victory  off  Camperdown,  October  11,  had  re- 
vived the  confidence  of  England  in  her  warfare  at  sea.  New  French 
attempts  on  Ireland  and  risings  in  England  itself  had  alike  proved 
abortive.  The  crop  prospects  were  unusually  favorable.  The  very 
reaction  from  the  first  wave  of  panic  tended  to  arouse  the  nation  and 
to  restore  its  vigor.  It  needed  but  some  aggressive  act  of  the  French 
government  to  create  that  unanimity  of  English  opinion  for  which 
Grenville  hoped,  and  this  France  did  not  long  delay  to  supply.  In 
January,  1798,  the  government  of  Holland  was  remodeled  to  suit  the 
new  conditions  in  France  ;  in  February  the  Papal  States  were  attacked, 
while  in  April  occurred  the  most  irritating  blow  of  all  and  the  one 
least  possible  of  defense  by  the  partisans  of  peace,  when  France  over- 
threw the  ancient  constitution  of  Switzerland  and  practically  incorpo- 
rated that  country  within  her  own  frontiers.  At  the  same  time  the 
opposition  in  Parliament  lost  its  vigor  and  cohesion.  Fox  and  Sheri- 
dan, who  had  been  absenting  themselves  from  Parliament  for  some 
months  past,  and  thus  protesting  against  the  ' '  arbitrary  conduct  of 
the  government,"  resumed  their  seats  in  December,  1797,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  attacking  Pitt's  new  tax  scheme,  but  found  their  arguments 
considered  unpatriotic  in  the  light  of  these  new  French  aggressions. 
On  April  22  Sheridan,  moved  thereto  by  the  attack  upon  Switzerland, 
came  forward  in  a  brilliant  speech,  in  which  he  acknowledged  that 
the  defense  of  England  must  now  take  precedence  over  every  other 
question.  Fox  more  slowly  and  much  later  reached  the  same  decision. 
For  the  moment  there  was  no  essential  opposition  to  Pitt's  govern- 
ment. Parliament  and  nation  alike  were  united  by  a  wave  of  patriotic 
enthusiasm  for  war.§ 

After  April,  1798,  the  policy  of  the  English  government  was,  as  Pitt 
in  his  speech  of  November  10,  1797,  had  himself  asserted,  fixed  in  the 

*  Woronzow  to  Grenville,  Nov.  10  and  Dec.  12,  1797.     Dropmore,  III,  391,  403. 

t  George  III  to  Grenville,  Dec.  23,  1797,  and  Grenville  to  George  III,  Dec.  29, 
1797-  Mid.,  405,  407. 

J  Woronzow  to  Grenville,  Nov.  17,  1797,  and  Grenville  to  George  III,  Dec.  29, 
1797.  Ibid.,  395,  407. 

§  Even  Miles  thought  war  now  justifiable,  writing  to  Nicholls  on  April  10,  1798, 
"France  leaves  us  no  alternative  between  ruinous  dishonorable  concession  and 
eternal  warfare."  Miles,  II,  293. 


THE    RESULTS   OF   GRENVHJ,E'S   VICTORY.  73 

determination  not  to  consent  to  a  peace  that  did  not  permit  the  reten- 
tion by  England  of  some  of  her  conquests  during  the  progress  of  the 
war.  This  was  based  on  the  theory  that  compensations  were  due  for 
the  continental  acquisitions  of  France.  The  definite  adoption  of  that 
policy,  from  which  Pitt  did  not  thereafter  waver,  was  due  in  fully  as 
great  a  degree  to  the  long- continued  insistence  of  Grenville  as  to  the 
aggressions  of  France.  Its  maintenance  was  a  victory  for  Grenville 
and  constitutes  the  best  general  evidence  of  his  later  influence.  Thus 
the  conclusion  of  the  negotiation  at  I/ille  furnishes  a  logical  halting 
place  in  an  examination  of  Grenville' s  importance  in  English  foreign 
policy,  for  with  that  event  Grenville' s  advice,  hitherto  alternately  ac- 
cepted and  discarded,  became  a  permanent  determining  factor.  Gren- 
ville's  war  policy  became  Pitt's  policy,  and  as  such  has  been  regarded 
in  history  as  the  most  distinguished  feature  of  Pitt's  administration. 

Reviewing  briefly  the  conditions  of  Grenville' s  influence,  it  appears 
that  the  inception  of  his  importance  in  foreign  affairs  was  due  to  the 
opportunities  of  service  that  came  to  him  from  his  intimacy  and  per- 
sonal friendship  with  Pitt.  The  ability  and  wisdom  with  which  he 
conducted  isolated  diplomatic  missions  led  Pitt  to  repose  a  large  confi- 
dence in  his  general  diplomatic  intelligence  and  to  respect  his  sugges- 
tions on  broad  questions  of  foreign  policy.  Until  1791,  then,  Gren- 
ville acted  in  the  capacity  of  private  adviser  to  his  chief,  but  was  in  no 
sense  determining  the  line  of  policy  pursued.  After  that  date — taking 
office  on  a  sharp  and  distinct  reversal  of  a  former  project,  the  armed 
intervention  in  the  Turkish  war — Grenville,  who  more  than  any  other 
one  person  was  responsible  for  the  adoption  of  peaceful  measures, 
assumed  the  control  and  directed  the  business  of  the  Foreign  Office. 
Thus  the  isolation  of  England  from  1791  to  1793  was  largely  the  result 
of  Grenville' s  influence. 

Before  the  outbreak  of  war  with  France  no  difference  of  opinion 
arose  within  the  English  Cabinet,  for  both  Pitt  and  Grenville  believed 
in  the  possibility  and  in  the  wisdom  of  neutrality  ;  b,ut  as  it  became 
evident  that  war  was  inevitable,  Grenville  was  less  dismayed  than  Pitt 
at  the  prospect.  In  the  conduct  of  the  war  itself  several  disagreements 
arose,  in  some  of  which,  as  in  the  wording  of  the  manifesto  of  October, 

1793,  the  plan  of  recovering  Prussian  aid  by  territorial  concessions  in 
1796  and  1797,  and  the  difficulties  placed  in  the  way  of  Malmesbury's 
two  negotiations,  Grenville' s  influence  was  predominant,  while  in  others, 
as  in  the  first  Prussian  subsidy  of  1793  and  the  purpose  to  renew  it  in 

1794,  as  well  as  in  the  genuine  offers  of  peace  made  to  France,  Pitt  dis- 
played his  personal  desires  and  attempted  to  execute  them  in  spite  of 


74      THE   INFLUENCE   OF   GRBNVILLE   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

Grenville's  objections.  But  it  is  to  be  noted  that,  taken  as  a  whole, 
Grenville's  war  policy  was  that  which  England  followed.  This  in- 
volved two  main  ideas :  first,  to  maintain  coalitions  against  France  in 
order  to  reduce  French  influence  and  to  restore  the  balance  of  power 
in  Europe;  second,  to  seek  English  colonial  expansion  as  a  compensa- 
tion for  the  continental  aggrandizement  of  France.  These  two  points 
are  customarily  stated  as  the  essentials  of  Pitt's  own  policy,  when  in 
fact  Pitt,  in  his  desire  to  secure  peace  at  almost  any  price,  would  in 
1796  have  sacrificed  the  first  entire,  and  in  1797  was  ready  to  yield  all  but 
the  shadow  of  the  second.  Canning's  estimate  of  the  struggle  between 
Cabinet  factions  and  his  statement  of  the  ascendancy  of  Grenville  * 
sustains  the  impression  which  is  created  by  a  study  of  the  Dropmore 
manuscripts.  Pitt,  after  1797,  heartily  accepted  Grenville's  war  policy, 
but  it  was  due  to  Grenville  rather  than  to  Pitt  that  in  the  earlier  years 
of  the  conflict  England  assumed  and  persevered  in  that  line  of  conduct 
which  later  rose  to  the  dignity  of  a  national  principle. 

*  See  ante,  p.  60. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 


The  references  cited  in  the  body  of  the  work  are  here  arranged  in 
alphabetical  order  under  the  subtitle  used  in  the  foot-notes.  The  prin- 
cipal source  is  the  new  collection  of  letters  known  as  the  ' '  Dropmore 
Manuscripts."  Whenever  possible,  all  other  references  have  been 
tested  by  it. 

In  a  study  having  for  its  main  object  the  personal  relations  and  in- 
fluence of  two  men  it  was  inevitable  that  the  memoirs  of  contempora- 
ries should  be  used  largely.  The  caution  with  which  such  sources 
must  be  cited  has  been  kept  constantly  in  mind,  and  they  have  been 
cited  only  in  cases  where  comparison  with  the  Dropmore  Manuscripts 
proves  the  credibility  of  the  incidents  stated,  or  where  the  citations 
serve  to  bring  out  the  personal  attitude  or  impression  of  the  writers. 
The  secondary  authorities  have  been  used  merely  either  to  authenticate 
well-established  incidents  essential  to  a  logical  statement  of  events  or  as 
supplementary  proof. 

AUCKLAND.     The  journal  and  correspondence  of  William,  Lord  Auckland.    4  vols. 

London  :  1861-1862. 

William  Eden,  afterward  I<ord  Auckland,  was  on  a  diplomatic  mission  in  Paris  from  178510  1788 
and  represented  England  at  The  Hague  from  1790  to  1793.  His  correspondence  is  therefore  impor- 
tant for  the  formation  of  the  Triple  Alliance  of  1788,  for  the  Russian  armament  of  1791,  and  for  the 
events  leading  up  to  and  including  the  outbreak  of  war  in  1793. 

BAiWvEU.     Preussen  und  Frankreich  von  1795  bis  1807.     Diplornatische  Correspon- 
denzen,  herausgegeben  von  Paul  Bailleu.     2  vols.     Leipzig  :  1881-1887. 

BARRAS.     Memoirs  of  Barras.     Edited  by  George  Duruy.     4  vols.     New  York  : 

1895-1896. 

The  compilation  of  these  memoirs,  long  after  the  events  treated,  renders  them  of  doubtful 
service,  and  they  have  been  used  here  only  as  supplementary  evidence. 

BOURGOING.    Histoire  diplomatique  de  I' Europe  pendant  la  revolution  fran^aise . 

Par  Francois  de  Bourgoing.     4  vols.     Paris  :  1865-1886. 

Bourgoing  is  now  considered  an  antiquated  work,  but  well-authenticated  data  are  sometimes 
found  in  it  not  elsewhere  cited.  His  sources  were  limited  as  compared  with  those  at  the  service 
of  more  recent  historians. 

SURGES.    Selections  frotn  the  letters  and  correspondence  of  Sir  James  Bland  Burges. 

Edited  by  James  Hutton.     London  :  1885. 

Burges  was  Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  under  both  l,eeds  and  Grenville.  His 
letters  are  especially  important  for  the  change  of  English  policy  in  1791,  which  brought  about  the 
resignation  of  I,eeds  and  the  advancement  of  Grenville,  but  they  have  been  so  edited  as  to  furnish 
a  readable  book  rather  than  a  valuable  historical  source,  and  extracts  of  correspondence  must 
therefore  be  checked  from  other  works. 

(75) 


76      THE   INFLUENCE   OF   GRENVILLE   ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

BURKE'S  WORKS.     The  works  of  Edmund  Burke.    Bohn  edition.    6  vols.    London: 
1868. 

CHARLEMONT  MSS. 

Vol.  I.    British  Historical  Manuscripts   Commission.    Twelfth   Report. 

Appendix,  Part  X. 
Vol.11.    British  Historical  Manuscripts  Commission.    Thirteenth  Report. 

Appendix,  Part  VIII. 

The  first  volume  covers  the  period  from  1745  to  1783,  while  the  second  extends  to  1799.  The 
Earl  of  Charlemont's  letters  cover  a  wide  range  of  subjects,  but  are  chiefly  literary  and  political, 
while  his  correspondents  included  many  of  the  most  distinguished  men  of  his  time.  These 
volumes  are  mainly  valuable  in  the  present  study  for  the  side-lights  thrown  on  men  and  events 
and  in  the  description  of  conditions  and  parties  in  Ireland  during  the  earlier  years  of  the  French 
Revolution.  This  latter  consideration  is  of  importance  in  a  study  of  Cabinet  difficulties  in 
England. 

COURT  AND  CABINETS.     Memoirs  of  the  court  and  cabinets  of  George  III.     By  the 

Duke  of  Buckingham.     4  vols.     London  :  1853-1855. 

Consists  almost  wholly  of  letters  between  Grenville  and  his  brother,  the  Duke  of  Buckingham. 
These  are  of  great  value  as  frequently  indicating  Grenville's  real  opinion  and  purpose,  where 
official  letters  are  expressed  in  more  guarded  language. 

CROKER.    The  correspondence  and  diaries  of  the  late  Right  Honourable  John  Wilson 

Croker.     Edited  by  Louis  J.  Jennings.     2  vols.     New  York  :  1884. 
After  his  retirement  from  active  political  life,  Croker  was  much  given  to  collecting  from  men 
of  prominence  narratives  of  obscure  incidents  in  the  diplomatic  history  of  the  French  Revolution. 
A  few  of  these  have  been  cited  in  the  study  as  supplementary  evidence. 

DEBRETT.     A  collection  of  state  papers  relative  to  the  war  against  France.    1 1  vols., 

first  edition.     Published  at  London  from  1794  to  1802. 

This  collection  was  issued  as  a  private  enterprise,  and  contains  many  documents  not  elsewhere 
obtainable,  together  with  many  private  letters  from  the  scene  of  war.  The  documents  cannot  be 
taken  as  authoritative  without  comparison  with  official  sources,  some  wholly  fictitious  pieces 
being  included.  Some  of  these  very  fictitious  pieces  are,  however,  important,  as  explaining  refer- 
ences in  memoirs  and  letters  by  men  who  drew  their  information  from  Debrett. 

.  The  despatches  of  Earl  Gower.  June,  1790,  to  August,  1792.  Edited 

by  Oscar  Browning,  i  vol.  Cambridge,  England  :  1885. 

Earl  Gower  was  the  English  representative  at  Paris  in  the  period  indicated.  His  despatches 
are  therefore  valuable  in  a  study  of  the  events  leading  to  war,  and  have  also  been  used  in  con- 
nection with  the  Kootka  Sound  controversy. 

DROPMORE.    Volume  I.    British  Historical  Manuscripts  Commission.    Thirteenth 
Report.     Appendix,  Part  III. 

Volume   II.    British  Historical  Manuscripts  Commission.     Fourteenth 

Report.     Appendix,  Part  V. 

Volume  III.     British  Historical  Manuscripts  Commission.    Fifteenth  Re- 
port.    "J.  B.  Fortescue  MSS.,  III." 

The  collection  appears  as  a  "Report  on  the  Manuscripts  of  J.  B.  Fortescue,  Esq.,  preserved  at 
Dropmore."  It  contains  principally  the  private  and  secret  letters  passing  between  Grenville  and 
diplomatic  agents  at  foreign  courts,  letters  between  Grenville  and  Pitt  on  government  questions, 
and  letters  between  Grenville  and  George  III.  Very  few  of  these  have  been  previously  published, 
and  all  of  them  are  of  the  greatest  importance  in  a  study  of  English  diplomacy  during  the  period 
covered.  Volume  I,  published  in  1892,  covers  the  period  from  1698  to  1790  and  is  chiefly  concerned 
with  the  affairs  of  Thomas  Pitt,  governor  of  Madras,  though  it  contains  the  first  part  of  the  Gren- 
ville letters.  Volume  II  appeared  in  1895  and  carries  the  correspondence  up  to  1795,  while  in  vol- 
ume III,  published  in  1899,  these  letters  are  continued  to  December  31,  1797.  As  the  report 
numbers  and  titles  of  the  publications  follow  no  uniform  system,  the  references  here  given  are 
to  volume  and  page  of  the  subtitle  used,  "  The  Dropmore  Manuscripts." 


BIBLIOGRAPHY.  77 

ELLIOT.     Life  and  letters  of  Sir  Gilbert  Elliot.     3  vols.     London  :  1874. 

Elliot's  importance  in  this  study  lies  in  his  relations  with  Burke  and  with  Portland  and  in  his 
service  in  Corsica  as  governor  of  that  island.  His  observations  on  public  men  were  usually 
shrewd  and  his  comments  illuminating,  while  his  attitude  on  Pitt's  peace  negotiations  is  im- 
portant, since  he  entered  the  service  of  the  government  because  of  his  belief  in  the  necessity  of 
combating  the  French  Revolution. 

GUSTAVE  III.     Collection  des  ecrits  politiques,  litUraires  et  dramatiques  de  Gus- 

tave  III.     5  vols.     Stockholm:  1804-1805. 

This  is  of  value  in  connection  with  the  relations  of  Sweden  and  the  Triple  Alliance  of  1788  and 
again  in  1791.  The  more  interesting  relations  of  Gustavus  III  and  the  court  of  France  have  no 
bearing  in  this  study. 

.     History  of  the  late   revolution   in   the   Dutch   Republic.     Anonymous. 

London  :  1789. 

A  r6sum6  written  by  George  Ellis  immediately  after  the  events  leading  up  to  the  Triple  Alliance 
of  1788.  Ellis  was  long  the  confidential  friend  of  Harris,  afterward  Earl  of  Malmesbury,  and 
accompanied  him  on  many  of  his  diplomatic  missions.  This  account  is  the  best,  from  the  English 
point  of  view,  of  the  public  causes  of  the  revolution  in  Holland. 

KEITH.     Memoirs  and  correspondence  of  Sir  Robert  Murray  Keith.     2  vols.     Lon- 
don :  1849. 

Keith  represented  England  at  Vienna  at  the  time  of  the  Russian  armament  of  1791  and  was  one 
of  the  negotiators  of  the  Austrian-Turkish  peace  of  Sistovo.  His  letters  are  valuable  in  connec- 
tion with  the  resignation  of  Leeds,  the  involved  diplomacy  of  Leopold  II,  and  also  for  his  intimate 
acquaintance  with  Ewart,  the  English  representative  at  Berlin,  revealing  the  latter's  disgust  with 
Grenville's  diplomacy. 

KOCH.     Histoire  abregee  des  traites  de  paix.     Par  C.  G.  de  Koch  et  M.  S.  F.  Schoell. 
15  vols.     Paris  :  1817-1818. 

LECKY.     A  history  of  England  in  the  eighteenth   century.     By  William  E.  H. 
Lecky.     8  vols.     New  York  :  1878-1890. 

LEEDS.     The  political  memoranda  of  Francis,  Fifth  Duke  of  Leeds.     Edited  by 
Oscar  Browning.     Camden  Society,  ad  series,  vol.  35,  1884. 

M  ALMESBUR  Y.     Diaries  and  correspondence  of  James  Harris,  first  Earl  of  Malmes- 
bury.    4  vols.     London  :  1844. 

Malmesbury  was  Pitt's  favorite  agent  in  diplomacy  from  1788  to  1797.  These  volumes  are  espe- 
cially important  in  this  study  in  connection  with  the  Triple  Alliance  of  1788,  the  Prussian  subsidy 
of  1793-1794,  the  attempt  to  recover  Prussian  aid  in  1795,  the  peace  negotiations  at  Paris  in  1796, 
and  those  at  Lille  in  1797.  The  correspondence  in  Malmesbury  is  published  in  the  form  of  extracts, 
thus  somewhat  lessening  its  value  as  a  source  and  rendering  it  impossible  to  rely  upon  it  alone. 
Most  of  Malmesbury's  letters  and  despatches  to  England  may,  however,  be  checked  word  for  word 
by  reference  to  the  Dropmore  Manuscripts  or  to  the  Parliamentary  History,  and  this  has  been 
done  in  every  important  instance.  Very  few  cases  of  important  difference  have  been  found,  and 
where  found  these  have  been  pointed  out  in  the  foot-notes.  In  general  it  may  be  said  that  Malmes- 
bury as  a  source  has  been  taken  by  historians  too  much  at  his  face  value,  insufficient  care  having 
been  taken  to  discover  his  exact  and  often  hidden  meaning.  He  was  by  habit  diplomatically  indi- 
rect, even  in  his  most  intimate  letters. 

MARET.     Maret,  Due  de  Bassano.     Par  Baron  Ernouf.     i  volume  edition.     Paris: 

1878. 

A.  superficial  monograph,  used  in  this  study  only  as  supplementary  proof  in  connection  with 
Maret's  part  in  the  negotiations  at  Lille. 

MASSON.     Le  departement  des  affaires  etrangeres  pendant  la  Revolution,  1787-1804. 

Par  Fre'de'ric  Massou.     Paris  :  1877. 

Useful  for  exact  dates  and  well-established  facts,  as  well  as  for  general  estimates  of  French 
diplomats. 


78      THE   INFLUENCE  OF  GRENVILLE  ON   PITT'S   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

MILES.     The  correspondence  of  W.  A.  Miles  on  the  French  Revolution,  1789-1817. 
Edited  by  C.  P.  Miles.     2  vols.     London  :  1890. 

Miles's  importance  lies  in  his  secret  use  by  Pitt  in  the  Nootka  Sound  controversy  of  1790,  and 
his  enthusiasm  for  the  French  Revolution.  This  enthusiasm  made  him  desirous  of  peace  with 
France,  and  constituted  him  an  influence  upon  Pitt  in  that  direction.  Miles  held  no  official  posi- 
tion, but  was  an  influential  publicist,  though  not  always  a  correct  exponent  of  public  opinion. 

MORRIS.     The  diary  and  letters  of  Gouverneur  Morris,    Edited  by  Anne  Gary 

Morris.     2  vols.     New  York  :  1888. 

These  letters,  written  from  Paris  in  the  earlier  years  of  the  French  Revolution,  and  later  from 
various  Kuropean  courts,  furnish  brilliant  descriptions  of  contemporary  men  and  events.  They 
are  not  wholly  trustworthy,  for  Morris  had  a  vivid  imagination  ;  but  in  this  study  Morris  plays 
an  important  though  brief  part  as  confidential  adviser  and  agent  of  Grenville  in  the  latter's 
effort  to  secure  a  Prussian  alliance  in  1796. 

OSCAR    BROWNING.      "England  and    France   in    1793."     By  Oscar  Browning. 
Fortnightly  Review.     February,  1883. 

A  critical  examination  of  the  diplomatic  incidents  preceding  the  French  declaration  of  war, 
based  on  the  documents  in  the  English  archives. 

PARI..  HIST.     The  Parliamentary  history  of  England  from  the  earliest  period  to 
the  year  1803.    36  vols.     London:  1806-1820. 

RECORDS  AUSTRIA.   49.    Volume  49  of  British  Foreign  Office  Records  for  Austria. 

The  Records  themselves  being  inaccessible,  no  use  of  them  has  been  attempted  in  general,  and 
in  fact  the  letters  given  in  Dropmore  amply  supply  the  necessary  information  for  a  purely  per- 
sonal study  of  the  relations  of  Pitt  and  Grenville.  But  in  one  instance  the  references  in  the 
letters  were  so  blind  as  to  require  a  transcript  of  the  actual  instructions.  This  was  in  the  case 
of  Hammond's  mission  to  Vienna  and  Berlin  in  1797. 

ROSE.    Diaries  and  correspondence  of  the  Hon.  George  Rose.     2  vols.     London  : 

1860. 

Rose  acted  for  many  years  as  Pitt's  confidential  secretary,  but  the  inexactness  with  which  his 
papers  have  been  edited  greatly  limits  their  usefulness.  Dates  are  frequently  lacking  and  the 
letters  are  usually  merely  extracts.  Rose  has  therefore  been  used  in  this  study  only  as  sup- 
plementary evidence. 

SCHLOSSER.     History  of  the  eighteenth  century.     By  F.  C.  Schlosser.     Translated 
by  D.  Davison.     8  vols.     London  :  1843-1852. 

Schlosser  is  violently  anti-British  and  his  sources  are  limited,  but  he  is  of  value  in  depicting 
conditions  in  the  minor  German  states. 

SMITH  MSS.     British  Historical  Manuscripts  Commission.    Twelfth  Report.     Ap- 
pendix, Part  IX. 

The  notes  and  letters  comprised  in  this  brief  collection  consist  of  the  papers  of  Joseph  Smith,  at 
one  time  private  secretary  to  Pitt.  They  are  of  value  in  elucidating  Pitt's  secret  diplomacy  in  the 
case  of  Nootka  Sound,  and  in  the  steps  leading  to  Malmesbury's  peace  mission  of  1796. 

SOREL.     L* Europe  et  la  revolution  francaise .     Par  Albert  Sorel.     5  vols.     Paris  : 
1885-1903. 

Sorel  is  justly  regarded  as  the  great  authority  on  the  diplomacy  of  Europe  during  the  French 
Revolution.  In  this  study,  however,  he  has  been  cited  only  in  support  of  statements  of  fact  in 
non-English  diplomacy,  for  his  knowledge  of  English  documents  is  apparently  very  limited.  In 
many  cases,  where  he  is  guilty  of  absolute  error  in  his  statement  of  English  purposes  and  acts,  it 
has  been  thought  worth  while  to  prove  that  error  in  the  foot-notes.  And  in  general  the  entire 
thesis  maintained  by  Sorel  in  regard  to  the  relations  of  England  and  France  in  1796  and  1797  is 
denied  by  the  conclusions  reached  in  this  study. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY.  79 

SPARKS.     The  life  of  Gouverneur  Morris.    By  Jared  Sparks.   3vols.    Boston:  1832. 
Contains  some  letters  between  Morris  and  Grenville  not  given  either  in  the  Dropmore  Manu- 
scripts or  in  Morris's  Diaries. 

STANHOPE.     Life  of  the  Right  Honourable  William  Pitt.     By  Earl  Stanhope.     4 

vols.     London  :  1861-1862. 
The  best  long  biography  of  Pitt  with  much  intimate  knowledge  of  men  and  events. 

SYBEI,.     Histoire  de  V Europe  pendant  la  revolution  fran^aise.     Par  H.  de  Sybel, 
Traduit  par  Marie  Dosquet.     6  vols.     Paris  :  1869-1887. 

WICKHAM.     The  correspondence  of  the  Right  Hon.  William  Wickham.     From  the 

year  1794.     2  vols.     I/>ndon  :  1870. 

Wickham  was  for  several  years  Grenville's  most  trusted  agent  in  Switzerland,  and  foremost  in 
intrigues  with  the  Royalists  of  France.  His  importance  in  this  study  is  in  connection  with  the 
various  peace  proposals,  in  showing  Grenville's  energy  in  war,  and  in  uniting  the  threads  of  Eng- 
lish and  Austrian  diplomacy. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 

Los  Angeles 
This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 


OCT3  H957 

MAK  7      I960 

APR -so  1963 


Form  L9-50wi-ll,'50  (2554) 444 


UNIVERSITY  of  CALIFORNIA 

AT 

LOS  ANGELES 
LIBRARY 


PLEASE  DO   NOT    REMOVE 
THIS   BOOK 


University  Research  Library 


